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Henry E. Huntington and the Creation of South­
ern California is the first business biography 
of the legendary entrepreneur who helped 
shape the Los Angeles basin. Based largely 
on archival sources, William Friedricks's 
study presents a balanced view of the ener­
getic Huntington, whose prodigious control 
of street railways, electric power, and real 
estate enabled him to leave a lasting imprint 
on southern California. 
Greater Los Angeles attained its modern 
configuration during the first two decades of 
the twentieth century. Its development was 
influenced heavily by the creative energy 
and genius of a few entrepreneurs, and of 
this group, Henry Huntington played the 
major role. By rapidly pouring vast amounts 
of capital into his triad of interrelated busi­
nesses—all critical for regional growth— 
he achieved a virtual monopoly over the 
development of many parts of the Los Ange­
les basin. Operating at a time when local 
planning commissions had little regulatory 
power, he became the region's de facto metro­
politan planner, building trolley lines where 
and when he wanted and determining the 
spatial layout of the area. Then, as a large-
scale subdivides he further dictated the 
socioeconomic mix of many of the suburbs. 
Huntington further encouraged devel­
opment in southern California through his 
involvement in local agriculture and industry, 
the hotel business, and many leading social 
and civic organizations. As a philanthropist, 
he donated land for parks and schools and 
provided money to various youth organiza­
tions. To encourage and enrich the intellectual 
and cultural life of southern California, he 
lent his support to a number of regional 
institutions of higher education and founded 
the Huntington Library, Art Collections, and 
Botanical Gardens. 
Huntington's various enterprises also 
made him one of southern California's largest 
employers. An outspoken proponent of the 
open shop, he worked hard to keep his com­
panies free of unions, thus foiling organized 




Henry E. Huntington

and the Creation

of Southern

California

Historical Perspectives on

Business Enterprise Series

Mansel G. Blackford and K. Austin Kerr, Editors

Making Iron and Steel:

Independent Mills in Pittsburgh, 1820-1920

John N. Ingham 
Daniel Willard and Progressive Management 
on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad 
David M. Vrooman 
Eagle-Picher Industries:

Strategies for Survival in the Industrial Marketplace, 1840—1980

Douglas Knerr 
Henry E. Huntington

and the Creation

of Southern

California

WILLIAM B. FRIEDRICKS

Ohio State University Press 
COLUMBUS 
Parts of chapters 1, 5, and 8 first appeared in article form. The author would like to 
thank the original publishers for permission to reprint material from the following: 
"Capital and Labor in Los Angeles: Henry E. Huntington vs. Organized Labor, 1900­
1920," Pacific Historical Review 59 (August 1990); "Henry E. Huntington and Real 
Estate Development in Southern California, 1898-1917," Southern California Quarterly 
71 (Winter 1989); and "A Metropolitan Entrepreneur Par Excellence: Henry E. 
Huntington and the Growth of Southern Caliornia, 1898-1927," Business History 
Review 63 (Summer 1989). 
Copyright © 1992 by the Ohio State University Press.

All rights reserved.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 
Friedricks, William B., 1958­
Henry E. Huntington and the creation of southern California / 
William B. Friedricks. 
p. cm.—(Historical perspectives on business enterprise series)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-8142-0553-4

ISBN 0-8142-0556-9 (pbk.)

1. Huntington, Henry Edwards, 1850-1927. 2. Businessmen— 
California. Southern—Biography. 3. Entrepreneurship—California, 
Southern—History—20th century. I. Title. II. Series. 
HC102.5.H87F75 1991 
338'.04'092—dc20 
[B]	 91-21542 
CIP 
Text and jacket design by Bruce Gore.

Type set in Baskerville by Tseng Information Systems, Durham, NC.

Printed by Braun-Brumfield, Ann Arbor, MI.

The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability 
of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity 
of the Council on Library Resources. ® 
Printed in the U.S.A. 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
To my parents

Burt and Ginny Friedricks


Contents

1.	 Introduction: Metropolitan Entrepreneurship and

the Los Angeles Basin 1

2.	 Business Beginnings 19

3.	 Apprenticeship Years in San Francisco, 1892—1901 30

4.	 Trolleys, Real Estate, and Electric Power, 1898-1903 48

5.	 Shaping the Basin and Developing the Economy,

1903-1907 68

6.	 Changing Course and Shifting Gears, 1908-1913 98

7.	 Twilightof the Business Triad, 1914-1917 117

8.	 Organized Labor, 1900-1920 135

9.	 Conclusion: The Huntington Legacy 147

Appendixes 161

Acknowledgments 167

Notes 169

Bibliography 205

Index 221


Introduction: Metropolitan Entrepreneurship

and the Los Angeles Basin

The sprawling Los Angeles basin, today the nation's second-largest 
population center and a leader in agriculture, commerce, and in­
dustry, attained its modern configuration during the first two de­
cades of the twentieth century. Greater Los Angeles is, in fact, 
one of the best examples of areas where urban entrepreneurs have 
played a primary role in creating and expanding a metropolis. 
Of this group, Henry Huntington stands out among the rest. His 
southern California business empire was based on a triad of inter­
related businesses critical for regional development. It consisted 
of a vast trolley network, electric power generation and distribu­
tion, and real estate development. Because Huntington operated 
this group of companies in an era when city and county planning 
commissions held little regulatory power, he became, in effect, the 
region's metropolitan planner. Early in his southern California 
career, he expressed his vision of the Los Angeles basin's future: "I 
am a foresighted man and I believe Los Angeles is destined to be­
come the most important city in this country. It can extend in any 
direction as far as you like. . . . We will join this whole region into 
one big family."' Huntington did this by building interurban lines 
where and when he wanted, and in so doing, he determined the 
spatial layout of the area. Then, as a large-scale subdivider, he also 
decided the socioeconomic mix of many suburbs. Besides operat­
ing his triad of companies, Huntington, a builder by nature and 
the possessor of immense energy, worked in many other ways to 
develop southern California. The huge scale and scope of Hunting­
ton's ventures, combined with the lasting imprint he left on the Los 
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Angeles basin, put him in a category by himself: the metropolitan 
entrepreneur. 
Although urban entrepreneurs remain an important topic of 
study, the focus has shifted away from the elites' role in urban de­
velopment and instead usually concerns the social dynamics and 
composition of a regional urban elite. Fewer works offer analyses 
of individual city-builders and their contributions to urban eco­
nomics. An especially important book that returns the focus to the 
entrepreneurs' role in establishing prosperous cities is Burt W. Fol­
som, Jr., Urban Capitalists (1981).2 Similarly, although scholarship 
on Los Angeles is growing, recent works have concentrated on the 
post-1920 period.3 With this in mind, what follows is a study explor­
ing Huntington's primary role in the development of metropolitan 
Los Angeles. 
Originally a Spanish pueblo founded in 1781, Los Angeles, a 
town 15 miles from the coast and 120 miles from a natural harbor 
at San Diego, did not appear to have any great economic prospects 
in the early nineteenth century. The severe droughts of the early 
1860s brought about the collapse of great ranchos and the cattle 
industry as well as the region's land values. 
In 1868, the Southern Pacific began construction of a rail ex­
tension from California's central valley southward. Thinking that 
the railroad would eventually reach Los Angeles and knowing that 
such a link would stimulate the area's economy, adventuresome 
businessmen began investing in southern California. Yet when the 
rail connection was completed in 1876, it set off only a minor real 
estate boom, and by 1880 Los Angeles remained a small town of 
11,200 inhabitants. 
The stage was set for the town's first major boom in 1885, when 
a competing transcontinental line, the Santa Fe, reached southern 
California. A rate war ensued between the rival railroads until, by 
early 1887, a passenger could travel from Kansas City to Los Ange­
les for only one dollar. Lured by low ticket prices and enticing ad­
vertising, large numbers of Midwesterners came to purchase land 
and settle in Los Angeles. Although the boom collapsed toward 
the end of the decade, Los Angeles's population reached 50,400 
by 1890. From this point on, until about 1920, real estate specula­
tion became the main dynamic for growth in southern California. 
Local banker H. S. McKee explained in 1915: "The most conspicu­
ous fact about Los Angeles lies in its being a residential and not 
industrial community. The half million people who reside here did 
not come here in any considerable numbers to engage in business, 
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they came to reside."4 To accommodate the swelling population, 
commerce and services dominated the Los Angeles economy until 
after World War I, when the movie industry and oil production 
rapidly expanded and became the region's leading sectors.5 
In the 1880s Los Angeles entrepreneurs arrived at the for­
mula that would be repeated over and over and would ultimately 
be successful in developing the area. To overcome the region's 
major natural handicaps—lack of transportation, fuel (oil had not 
yet been discovered), and water—they combined heavy capital in­
vestment with slick advertising and promotion to attract settlers 
and encourage growth.6 Carey McWilliams, a keen observer of the 
southland, has written: 
Without lumber and minerals, with only one natural harbor [San Diego], 
lacking water and fuels, and surrounded by mountains, desert, and ocean, 
there was seemingly never a region so unlikely to become a vast metro­
politan area as Southern California. It is an artificial region, a product of 
forced growth and rapid change. . . . Like the entire region, Los Angeles, 
its heart and center, has developed in spite of its location rather than 
because of it. Southern California is a man-made, gigantic improvisation.7 
Prior to Huntington's arrival, many local entrepreneurs had 
been active in establishing the infrastructural industries of south­
ern California. In the 1880s, James Crank and banker Isaias W. 
Hellman operated a local horse-drawn and cable car system; they 
were supplanted in the 1890s by electric trolley barons Moses H. 
Sherman and his brother-in-law, Eli P. Clark. The real estate mar­
ket for individual home lots was concentrated in the hands of sev­
eral prominent land speculators, including Benjamin Wilson; his 
son-in-law, J. de Barth Shorb; John D. Bicknell; Andrew Chaf­
fey; and Jonathan S. Slauson. Still in its infancy, the hydroelectric 
power business in the 1890s was headed by such entrepreneurs as 
William G. Kerckhoff and Allan C. Balch. Thus, by 1898, when 
Huntington initially invested in southern California, the estab­
lished urban elites of the business community had already laid 
much of the groundwork for the southland's future growth." 
Although Los Angeles was one of the most visible and spectacu­
lar successes of urban entrepreneurs, these businessmen operated 
in other West Coast areas from the mid-nineteenth to the early 
twentieth centuries. As population grew and transportation im­
proved with the spread of the railroads, thousands of new commu­
nities were created. Many of the new settlements were established 
along railroad routes that acted as the cities' economic lifelines to 
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the rest of the country. Entrepreneurs recognized the importance 
of the transportation industry to the expansion of new cities, and 
they generally worked to secure rail lines for their regions of inter­
est. Similarly, these urban businessmen were frequently involved in 
the primary infrastructural industries necessary for the growth of 
a city—real estate development, construction, public utilities, and 
banking. 
Thomas Burke (1849-1925), a successful lawyer and judge, be­
came involved in the expansion of Seattle, Washington, through 
real estate speculation and investments in area banks and mines. 
He realized the importance of railroad connections and organized 
a company to build and operate a railway from Seattle to Walla 
Walla. But Burke's major contribution to the city's growth was his 
work with James J. Hill to make Seattle the western terminus for 
the Great Northern Railroad.9 
Several entrepreneurs played key roles in the development of 
San Francisco: two of the most important were William C. Ralston 
and James Phelan. Ralston (1826—75) came to San Francisco in 
1854 as a partner in the steamship company of Garrison and Mor­
gan. During his career in the city, he organized several banking 
firms, among them the Bank of California, which soon became the 
leading bank of the region. Along with banking, Ralston expanded 
into other areas with such companies as Mission Woolen Mills, 
Kimball Carriage Factory, and Pacific Insurance. In addition, his 
activities in real estate development took him into the hotel busi­
ness, and he built the grandest hostelry in the city, the Palace Hotel. 
Like Burke, Ralston knew the importance of a railroad connection 
and loaned the Central Pacific $3 million to complete its line.10 
James Phelan (1824—92) came to San Francisco following news 
of the discovery of gold and became a successful merchant. In 
1870 he entered banking by incorporating the First National Gold 
Bank (it would later become Crocker First National Bank) and then 
served as its president. He also invested heavily in San Francisco 
real estate, and in 1881-82 he constructed the $500,000 Phelan 
Building." 
Across the bay, Francis Marion ("Borax") Smith (1846-1931) 
began making huge investments in Oakland in the 1890s. With a 
fortune made in the borax business, Smith and several partners 
formed the Realty Syndicate and purchased thousands of acres 
in and around Oakland. Then Smith merged the streetcar lines 
of Alameda and Contra Costa counties, and when this network 
was combined with his ferry service between Oakland and San 
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Francisco, it became the Key Route System. Not designed to make 
money on their own, the Key Route trolleys were used to promote 
and sell lots in Smith's many real estate subdivisions.12 
In many respects, Huntington resembled such West Coast en­
trepreneurs. Like other city-builders, Huntington was audacious, 
future-oriented, and willing to gamble on the growth of his area 
of choice—the Los Angeles basin. In addition, with his supreme 
optimism and self-confidence, Huntington seemed to personify 
the avid boosterism that pervaded the southland's business com­
munity.13 Finally, he was interested in a number of different 
businesses and concentrated on the infrastructural industries of 
transportation, power generation and distribution, and real estate 
development, which encouraged expansion. With these three basic 
businesses, Huntington tied his financial success to metropolitan 
growth. If the expected expansion took place, Huntington, with 
his multifarious enterprises, was destined to benefit handsomely 
from the urban economic boom he had helped create. 
But Huntington also differed from other entrepreneurs. His 
operations were spread over an entire metropolitan area, and his 
investments were huge and in several sectors basic to urban growth. 
He possessed several attributes that set him apart from the majority 
of city-builders; these characteristics enabled him to lay out metro­
politan Los Angeles and prompt its development over a period 
of twenty years. Most urban entrepreneurs conducted business on 
a small scale and were almost always seeking additional capital 
to expand their operations. Many went into banking in attempts 
to locate needed financing. Unlike others, Huntington began his 
career employed as a manager for several large-scale railroads. His 
move through various administrative posts culminated in 1900 in 
the position of vice-president of the Southern Pacific (SP), of which 
his uncle, Collis P. Huntington, was president. Because of a close 
link to Collis, Huntington inherited a fortune estimated at $15 
million, which gave him the ability to finance many large projects 
simultaneously. Wilh the necessary capital and a railroad manage­
ment background, he envisioned development on a massive scale. 
Predictably enough, Huntington undertook his first business 
venture in southern California in an industry in which he had 
previous experience—street railroads. His partners included men 
with whom he had been associated in San Francisco's trolley com­
pany, the Market Street Railway. Together, Huntington and his 
fellow investors—Isaias W. Hellman, Antoine Borel, and Christian 
DeGuigne—purchased the downtown-oriented Los Angeles Rail­
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way in 1898. By the end of that year, Huntington and his syndicate 
had acquired most of the city's smaller urban railroads. They soon 
dominated the market. Three years later, when it became clear 
that he would not succeed his deceased Uncle Collis as president 
of the SP, Huntington moved quickly to increase his investments in 
greater Los Angeles. 
The majority of the wealth that Henry Huntington infused into 
Los Angeles was inherited from his uncle's estate, the lion's share 
of which was divided by Huntington and Collis's widow—later 
Henry's second wife—Arabella Huntington. When Collis died, 
Henry received one-third of his uncle's Southern Pacific stock, 
valued at $4.35 million, and another $4.9 million worth of stocks, 
bonds, and real estate. Arabella Huntington received the largest 
share of the estate; she was granted two-thirds of her deceased 
husband's SP stock, valued at $8.7 million, and another $6.3 mil­
lion worth of stock, bonds, and real estate. The value of the SP 
stock was based on its market value; at the time of Collis's death 
in August 1900—$33.5 per share. When Henry and Arabella sold 
their 432,700 shares of SP stock to E. H. Harriman in February 
1901, they received $51.5 per share, or $22.3 million.14 
The inability to emulate his uncle and mentor by following him 
as head of the SP had a profound effect on Huntington. Unable 
to match Collis's achievements, Huntington apparently sought to 
build a business empire that would rival or even surpass that of 
his famous relative.15 To carry out this vision, he had to main­
tain a free hand and avoid future situations where his plans might 
be thwarted. Therefore, his southern California enterprises were 
usually set up as small syndicates that Huntington dominated by 
holding a controlling share of stock. His penchant for working 
with a few partners, or completely alone, also reflected the faith he 
had in his own judgment, and it was only on rare occasions that he 
allied himself with other members of the business community. 
Huntington continued to concentrate on the transit sector of the 
southland metropolis. With his experience in railroads, he under­
stood the relationship between the location of rail lines and corre­
sponding land values; property served by rail was more desirable 
and hence much more valuable than land remote from convenient 
transportation. 
Adding to the largely downtown Los Angeles Railway, Hunt­
ington, his syndicate partners, and several other local investors 
incorporated the interurban Pacific Electric Railway (PE) in 1901. 
The PE was intended to connect many of the basin's small periph­
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eral communities, located at distances ranging from ten to ninety 
miles away, to the downtown core of Los Angeles. Yet unlike the 
commuter-carrying Los Angeles Railway, the interurban PE's pri­
mary purpose was not the passenger business but rather the pro­
motion of residential real estate. Other entrepreneurs also under­
stood the promotional power of the streetcars but lacked the capital 
to build trolley lines wherever they wished. Prior to Huntington's 
arrival in the southland, trolley lines were usually paid for by 
landowners along the proposed routes who thought their property 
would appreciate once the railways were completed. Moses Sher­
man, a Los Angeles interurban builder, described how this worked: 
"We might build five, or six, or even seven miles of road, and we 
might build less, according to the amount of money they [the land­
owners] raise, but the understanding is that the Railway Company 
does not put in anything."16 
Huntington, however, did not face such constraints. With access 
to vast capital, he was free to select routes for his electric railway 
lines and then build them. Huntington explained his rail expan­
sion strategy in 1904: "It would never do for an electric line to 
wait until the demand for it came. It must anticipate the growth of 
communities and be there when the builders arrive—or they may 
very likely never arrive at all, but go to some other section already 
provided with arteries of traffic."17 Many of his interurban lines 
were planned in exactly this manner. When people later decided 
to move into these areas, Huntington was among the developers 
ready to sell them real estate. 
In order to take full advantage of the developmental power of 
the trolleys, Huntington formed two companies to operate closely 
with the interurban. He incorporated several land companies to 
purchase, subdivide, and sell real estate. Of these, Huntington's 
first and foremost was his solely owned Huntington Land and Im­
provement Company, established in 1902. Also in 1902, Hunting­
ton and several other investors incorporated the Pacific Light and 
Power Company (PL&P). Its purpose was first to generate and 
supply electricity to the rapidly growing trolley network and second 
to distribute excess power to various parts of Los Angeles County. 
The trolley, the key to Huntington's southern California devel­
opment scheme, was so successful in blanketing the region with rail 
lines that E. H. Harriman and the Southern Pacific were pushed 
to acquire a half-interest in the PE to protect their regional steam 
transportation network from electric railway competition. Once the 
SP became his trolley partner in 1903, Huntington was not always 
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able to build interurban routes to sites he had selected for future 
residential subdivision. Although the SP encouraged expansion of 
the interurban if the extension benefited its own regional tran­
sit system, it blocked construction of some proposed lines if they 
might be detrimental to the SP. For example, the SP scotched Hunt­
ington's equally grand development project for San Diego County, 
which involved thousands of acres of subdivisions, the construction 
of hydroelectric power stations, and an electric railway from Los 
Angeles to San Diego. The rationale was that a PE line to San Diego 
would compete with the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe's existing 
track and upset the harmonious relationship that Harriman had 
recently established between the SP and the AT&SF.18 
The expansion of southern California during the first two de­
cades of the twentieth century was spectacular. From 1900 to 1920, 
the population of the city of Los Angeles increased from 102,479 
to 576,673, and Los Angeles County grew nearly sixfold, from 
170,298 to 936,455. During the same period, bank clearings in 
the city of Los Angeles rose from a mere $123 million in 1900 to 
$4 billion in 1920. From 1899 to 1920, the value of products manu­
factured in Los Angeles jumped from $15 million to $790 million, 
and the value of the city's building permits increased from about 
$2 million to $60 million.19 
Local observers explained the rapid growth of the Los Ange­
les basin in a variety of ways. Writer and booster Charles Fletcher 
Lummis believed trie area's success was directly related to its mild 
climate. Yet many contemporaries attributed the expansion and 
development of the Los Angeles basin to bold entrepreneurs whose 
broad vision, large capital investments, and innovative promotion 
turned an area lacking in natural resources into a bustling south­
ern California metropolis. Among this group of entrepreneurs, 
Huntington was clearly the most important. In 1905, William M. 
Garland, one-time president of the local realty board who some­
times acted as Huntington's land agent, placed a full-page adver­
tisement in Los Angeles newspapers extolling the trolley magnate's 
importance to the region: "Mr. Huntington's advent into Los Ange­
les placed our city ten years ahead of its natural growth."20 Twelve 
years later, Southern California Edison president John B. Miller 
expressed similar sentiments. He thought Huntington's "faith in 
Southern California has been the dominating factor in its return 
from the depression of the latter eighties and its new and wonder­
ful growth, substantiality and prosperity."21 
Huntington's impact was far reaching. Rapidly pouring his 
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financial resources into the southland, he increased his investment 
in the Los Angeles basin from approximately $200,000 in 1901 
to more than $45 million in 1917. The majority of his capital 
investments went into the three legs of his southern California busi­
ness operations that, functioning together, shaped the region and 
spurred its urban boom.22 
With the exception of Sherman and Clark's 180-mile Los Ange­
les Pacific Railway, which dominated the western section of Los 
Angeles County, particularly along the coast, Huntington at one 
point held a virtual monopoly in the Los Angeles basin's pub­
lic intracity and intercity transit. From 1901 to 1904, Hunting­
ton owned a controlling interest in both a money-making transit 
system, the city-oriented Los Angeles Railway, and the sprawling 
interurban PE. From 1904 to 1910, he acquired the Los Ange­
les and Redondo Railway, remained the majority stockholder of 
the Los Angeles Railway, and shared equal ownership of the PE 
with the Southern Pacific. By 1910, the Huntington trolley systems 
stretched over approximately 1,300 miles of southern California.23 
This streetcar network serviced downtown Los Angeles and 
sent lines north and east to the foothill communities of Glendale, 
Pasadena, Sierra Madre, and Glendora; east through Whittier and 
La Habra; southeast to Anaheim, Santa Ana, and Orange; south 
to the coastal villages of Long Beach and San Pedro, Newport, and 
Balboa; and southwest to Redondo Beach. With the exception of 
the PE connection to the San Fernando Valley and the Los Angeles 
Pacific, the 1910 Huntington system was "a detailed sketch for the 
whole Los Angeles that exists today."24 While it would be left to the 
automobile—which encouraged development between and beyond 
the trolley lines—to fill in and extend this outline, the basic spatial 
design of downtown Los Angeles and the surrounding suburbs was 
created by Huntington's streetcars.25 
Many of the transit corridors Huntington laid out for his inter­
urbans remain important to present-day Los Angeles commuters— 
several of the region's major freeways closely follow rights-of-way 
of the PE system.26 But Huntington's transportation legacy in south­
ern California runs even deeper. Angelenos, who once gave up the 
electric railway in favor of the automobile, have derided to build 
another rapid transit rail system and are presently constructing a 
$3.4 billion subway, the Metro Rail, as well as three light-rail lines 
running to various parts of the county. As Neal Peterson, executive 
director of the Los Angeles Transportation Commission, explained 
in July 1989: "What we are trying to do is re-rail Los Angeles. Basi­
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cally, we are trying to re-create the old Red Car [Pacific Electric] 
system."27 
In 1927, historian Robert G. Cleland noted the enormous effect 
of the PE on the expansion of the Los Angeles basin. The inter­
urban system "has . . . knit the surrounding cities into a compact 
community with the larger city, made possible the upbuilding of 
hundreds of square miles of rural territory, and furnished easy 
access to the beaches and mountains for the city's population." 
He added that the extensive trolley system had enabled "the wage 
earner to own his own home in one of the many subdivisions which 
have sprung up along the company's various lines."28 
The immense value of trolley lines was well recognized by 
contemporary real estate developers. Promoters advertising sub­
divisions in local newspapers almost always emphasized the devel­
opments' proximity to trolley lines and their accessibility to Los 
Angeles. In 1903, for example, the Carlson Investment Company 
stressed that three Huntington lines reached its Pasadena Villa 
tract; thus, homeowners were only minutes away from downtown 
Los Angeles.29 Historian Mark S. Foster noted that up to 1920 
almost all real estate promotions tried to attract buyers by em­
phasizing the locations of the trolley connections. Because resi­
dents generally relied on such transportation, few advertisements 
offered homes with garages.30 
Furthermore, just as local governments and business groups 
in the latter decades of the nineteenth century had viewed steam 
railroads as engines of progress and struggled to obtain railway 
connections for their towns and communities, in the early decades 
of the twentieth century, urban leaders tried to cajole street rail­
way companies to build to their respective communities. A trolley 
linking a suburb with the downtown core was considered not only 
synonymous with but necessary for growth and prosperity. This 
belief in the connection between interurban access and progress 
was captured by the Santa Ana Blade, quoting a resident of Tustin— 
an Orange County community northwest of Santa Ana—in 1906: 
"We've just got to have it [a trolley], and that's all there is to it."31 
Besides being a major factor in the growth of outlying com­
munities, Huntington trolleys also shaped the retail districts of 
many suburbs. Established where passenger traffic was heaviest, 
suburban retail centers often were formed adjacent to major PE 
lines running through the various satellite cities. The main retail 
and business district in Glendale, for example, rose on either side 
of the PE line on Brand Boulevard. Similar concentrations of mer­
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chants and retailers occurred along the PE arteries on Pine Ave­
nue in Long Beach, Colorado Street in Pasadena, Second Street 
in Pomona, Third Street in San Bernardino, and Fourth Street in 
Santa Ana.32 
Wherever Huntington's electric railway lines were extended, 
undeveloped land was subdivided and brought on to the real estate 
market. From 1904 to 1913, for example, approximately five hun­
dred new subdivisions were opened every year, and almost all were 
within a block or two of a streetcar line.33 Because Huntington 
decided the direction trolley lines were built and because trolley 
access was crucial to successful real estate development, he in effect 
determined how, when, and where the region would grow. 
With the increasing population being dispersed by the trolleys 
to the many burgeoning suburbs, Huntington's land companies and 
power firm also played significant roles in the region's expansion. 
The southland's market for new residential land was dominated by 
its wealthy elite. According to historian Frederic C. Jaher, between 
1885 and 1915 the region's elite—comprised of business, civic, pro­
fessional, and political figures—numbered about four hundred. 
Jaher categorized the group according to primary occupation, and 
he found that twenty-two men were primarily interested in real 
estate. Others whose primary occupations were not in real estate 
owned substantial amounts of undeveloped property. A more accu­
rate number of elites actively involved in southern California real 
estate may be obtained by including men in closely related occu­
pations. Businessmen in professions that usually crossed over into 
real estate development included six in transportation, five in agri­
culture, fifty-two in finance, and four whom Jaher termed general 
capitalists. Thus, approximately ninety men were paramount in 
real estate in the Los Angeles basin, and the leaders were Harrison 
Gray Otis, Harry Chandler, Sherman, Clark, and Huntington.34 
Such subdividers wielded tremendous power in the pre-1920 
southland. Although the state of California, and more specifi­
cally the city and county of Los Angeles, led the country in regu­
lating the real estate industry and passing regional land-use zon­
ing laws, the major impact of these statutes was not felt until the 
1920s.35 In the absence of all but minimal government regulation 
over urban planning, "subdividers who engaged in fullscale com­
munity development . . . performed the function of being private 
planners for American cities and towns."36 
Huntington, one of the largest landholders in southern Califor­
nia, transformed vast stretches of rural undeveloped land along his 
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interurban lines into many suburban residential districts.37 Aware 
that there were several distinct classes of people seeking home-
sites in the Los Angeles basin, Huntington designed subdivisions 
to appeal to various markets. His developments differed, for ex­
ample, according to street arrangement, lot size and price, and 
various deed restrictions such as minimum value of construction 
required. These controls determined the clientele each subdivision 
would attract.38 
Sometimes, Huntington supplied his residential developments 
with utilities. His Pacific Light and Power Company, one of the 
three major power firms in the Los Angeles basin and the largest 
developer of hydroelectric power, often provided electricity and 
sometimes natural gas to these new communities. Through his 
San Gabriel Valley Water Company, Huntington provided water to 
most of Alhambra and San Marino and parts of San Gabriel, South 
Pasadena, and Pasadena. 
Thus, Huntington's major interests in southern California—the 
three legs of his business triad—were entrenched in critical sec­
tors for regional growth. Operated together, these enterprises not 
only shaped the southern California landscape but also stimulated 
the area's economic boom, and they, in turn, benefited from such 
expansion. 
Besides directing these companies, Huntington acted in many 
other ways to nurture and encourage the growth and development 
of the metropolis. Huntington wore many hats: he was at once a 
farmer, a city booster, an industrialist, a hotelier, a philanthropist, 
a member and promoter of exclusive social clubs, and a collector 
extraordinaire of rare books and fine art. 
As in many of his ventures, Huntington's involvement in agricul­
ture was actually a spin-off from another business interest. While 
purchasing immense tracts of southern California property for sub­
division, Huntington obtained many acres of ranch land planted in 
fruit trees and other salable crops. Such incidental acquisitions led 
him into agriculture and created the possibility of making money 
from land otherwise idle until it was subdivided for residential de­
velopment. Besides producing oranges, the almost mythical citrus 
fruit that brought fame and fortune to the southland, Hunting­
ton's ranches also yielded lemons, grapefruit, peaches, walnuts, 
hay, barley, alfalfa, and flowers. 
In addition to growing produce, Huntington, in association with 
several other ranchers in the area, formed the San Marino Growers' 
Packing Association to prepare, box, and market the citrus fruit. 
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Always the entrepreneur, he was also interested in developing new 
crops for the area. In July 1911, Huntington signed an agreement 
with the U.S. Department of Agriculture to experiment with the 
feasibility of growing avocados in southern California. 
Through his acreage devoted to citrus crops, Huntington 
helped further the romantic image of southern California as a 
Mediterranean garden and a lush land of sunshine. He understood 
that highlighting the area's fertility and mild climate as well as its 
Spanish past would attract visitors, some of whom might become 
permanent residents. 
In order to exploit and even exaggerate the region's colorful 
past, Huntington financed the transformation of Frank Miller's 
Glenwood Tavern, a roadside inn located in Riverside, a rich agri­
cultural community east of Los Angeles, into a grand hotel mod­
eled after the Spanish mission design. Known for its meticulous 
service, the inn attracted wealthy clientele from both the local area 
and the East Coast. Yet the Mission Inn turned out to be much 
more luxurious and ostentatious than anything out of the region's 
past. Writer Kevin Starr described the hotel as "a Spanish Revival 
Oz: a neo-Franciscan fantasy of courts, patios, halls, archways, and 
domes, which he [Miller, the proprietor] furnished with statuary, 
stained glass windows, and religious artifacts of Spain, Italy, and 
Mexico, gathered on pilgrimages abroad."39 
Huntington played a more direct role of regional booster. 
Hoping to bring new industry to southern California, he believed 
if he set up a successful manufacturing business in the area, others 
might be encouraged to follow.40 Informed that the region had all 
the prerequisites for felt manufacture—sunshine, wool, and water, 
available from wells in parts of the San Gabriel Valley—he decided 
in 1903 to set up a felt factory. Created to produce piano hammers 
and shoes, the felt company was named after Alfred Dolge, the 
expert Huntington brought from New York to manage the opera­
tion. Unfortunately the felt enterprise was not a money maker. 
Even though it went through reorganization, the venture proved 
to be a constant financial drain on the primary stockholder, the 
Huntington Land and Improvement Company. 
Huntington's failure to create a prosperous felt industry in 
southern California did not deter him from entering new busi­
nesses that might spur the area's development. Like his entrance 
into agriculture, Huntington had gone into the hotel industry be­
cause of his real estate investments. In 1906, in association with 
other developers, he opened the prestigious Oak Knoll subdivision 
14 INTRODUCTION 
in Pasadena. Several acres of the property had been reserved for 
the construction of a luxury hotel. The partially completed Hotel 
Wentworth opened its doors in February 1907. It soon encoun­
tered financial troubles, and less than six months later the hotel 
was closed. 
After being entangled for over three years in complicated bank­
ruptcy court proceedings, the Hotel Wentworth was put up for 
sale in 1911. The following year it was purchased by Huntington, 
who intended to fulfill the original plans of establishing a first-
class hotel. Huntington added two stories to the hotel and directed 
his personal botanist and gardener, William Hertrich, to lay out 
the gardens. Renamed the Huntington Hotel, the beautiful struc­
ture opened for business in January 1914. A pamphlet advertising 
the new hotel used florid language to paint a romantic portrait 
that emphasized the sumptuous Spanish design of the building 
and surrounding grounds: "What you read about of palaces in 
Spain—what you have dreamed of Moorish architecture—grace­
ful arches pillared on fragile columns—vine trailed balconies—low 
broad windows that make for daylight everywhere—tree embow­
ered patios where fountains tinkle—trickling streams that wend 
through wondrous gardens, all these are 'come true' here."41 In 
three years the bankrupt property was turned around into a popu­
lar guest house for the wealthy, and Huntington sold it in 1917. 
Like many urban entrepreneurs, Huntington was also a phi­
lanthropist. He donated land to cities for parks and schools and 
provided money to youth organizations such as the Boy Scouts 
and the YMCA. Huntington also wanted to enrich the intellectual 
and cultural life of the area, and he gave generous support to such 
regional institutions of higher education as Occidental College, the 
California Institute of Technology, and the University of South­
ern California. While his largess was designed to benefit strictly 
the local area, Huntington understood the ramifications of pro­
viding such gifts. Private monies and property granted for civic 
improvements made the region more alluring to outsiders. They 
encouraged migration to southern California and accelerated the 
growth of the metropolis. 
To establish further the southland's civility and to provide 
places where well-to-do businessmen could meet others of their ilk, 
Huntington was active in promoting several of the area's most pres­
tigious social clubs. He reasoned that these organizations brought 
together many elite entrepreneurs who had the necessary capital 
and shared the desire to build a major urban center in southern 
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California. Belonging to the same "correct" clubs, the area's urban 
entrepreneurs met socially, and out of these meetings, business 
deals were often forged. These conservative, all-white organiza­
tions tended to cement the region's elite into a cohesive unit. 
Affiliated with most of the southland's prominent country clubs, 
Huntington was also a member of the exclusive Bolsa Chica Gun 
Club, the California Club, and the University Club. His most inti­
mate involvement was with the Jonathan Club. Besides serving 
as this organization's president, Huntington set aside the top two 
floors of his nine-story Pacific Electric Building at the corner of 
Sixth and Main streets in downtown Los Angeles for the club's 
facilities. 
Huntington's major cultural contribution to the area was the 
now famous Huntington Library, Art Collections, and Botanical 
Gardens in San Marino, a wealthy residential community lying east 
of Los Angeles and on the southeast side of Pasadena. Always inter­
ested in book collecting, he began to take the hobby more seriously 
after 1900. Ten years later, Huntington started to disengage him­
self from his various business concerns and devote more time to 
collecting rare books and paintings. By 1916, Huntington's library 
consisted of approximately sixty thousand volumes, and it held one 
of the largest collections of early English literature in the world. His 
collection soon rivaled the library assembled by another great pri­
vate collector, J. P. Morgan, but Huntington's method of acquisition 
and the ultimate purpose of his library drastically differed from 
those of the famous financier. Rather than purchase individual rare 
works or manuscripts, as Morgan generally did, Huntington often 
bought entire libraries. In addition, although both men intended 
their collections to be open to the public, Huntington designed his 
institution to include facilities for scholarly research and to provide 
exhibitions for tourists. The Morgan Library, on the other hand, 
emphasized the museum aspect, offering changing exhibits for the 
public view and underplaying the library's research component. 
In 1919, Huntington endowed a trust creating an institution 
that established the Huntington Library, Art Collections, and 
Botanical Gardens. They stand on part of the original San Marino 
Ranch that he purchased in 1903. Because he also wished to ex­
pand the area's research facilities, Huntington called for bringing 
world-renowned scholars to study at the library and make use of 
his many fine rare books and manuscripts. 
When the deed of the trust was recorded, construction began 
on a library building about two hundred feet northeast of Hunt­
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ington's San Marino home. Although not completed until 1923, 
the structure was occupied in September 1920, when Hunting­
ton's library headquarters were transferred from New York to 
San Marino. Thus, Huntington gave southern California a major 
library and helped create an atmosphere conducive to intellectual 
and scholarly activity in the area. 
Of all his achievements, Huntington was apparently proudest 
of the library. When asked if he wanted a biography of himself 
written, Huntington replied: "I have been approached regarding 
a biography, but I do not want that. This library will tell the story. 
It represents the reward of all the work I have ever done and the 
realization of much happiness."42 
Whether justifiably most satisfied with the library he established 
for the public or overly modest about his major achievements in 
southern California, Huntington, from his first investment in the 
area in 1898 to his death in 1927, was involved in such a wide array 
of projects that his name became ubiquitous throughout the re­
gion. In 1914, writer Isaac F. Marcosson stressed Huntington's tre­
mendous involvement in the area by relating the story of a mother 
taking her inquisitive young daughter on a trolley excursion to the 
beach. Early in the journey, the little girl asked a string of questions: 
"Whose streetcar are we riding in?" 
"Mr. Huntington's," was the reply. Passing a park, the little one asked: 
"What place is that?" 
"Huntington Park." 
"Where are we going, mother?" continued the girl. 
"To Huntington Beach." Arriving at the sea, the child, impressed by 
the sameness of all the replies, ventured one more query: 
"Mother, does Mr. Huntington own the ocean or does that still belong 
to God?"« 
Although it is unlikely that a single man combining Hunting­
ton's wealth and management background could have replaced him 
or could have rapidly established such a widespread business em­
pire, various individuals or business syndicates might have oper­
ated a similar array of firms as separate and independent entities. 
However, because southern California entrepreneurs were short of 
capital, financing was often a problem. Without Huntington and 
his vast wealth, which was quickly poured into essential sectors in 
the economy, the Los Angeles basin would have developed much 
more slowly and possibly differently. 
Rather than being rapidly built or constructed ahead of de­
mand, the streetcar system would have been laid out by inter­
 17 INTRODUCTION
urban builders such as Sherman, but because it would be financed 
by landowners along the route, it would have spread much more 
slowly and only through areas where property owners were willing 
to capitalize lines. Furthermore, because of this slow growth, the 
Southern Pacific, not feeling a threat to its steam railway system 
in the Los Angeles basin, might not have become involved in the 
region's interurban network or continued to expand it. 
Although the power business would have been dominated by 
Kerckhoff and Balch's San Gabriel Electric, John Miller's SoCal 
Edison, and C. O. G. Miller's Los Angeles Gas and Electric, the 
demand for electricity would not have been as high because of 
the trolley network's slow expansion. This being the case, massive 
hydroelectric projects that Huntington built would not have been 
needed for years. 
Finally, without Huntington the southern California real estate 
market would still have been dominated by a small group of entre­
preneurs. However, with the interurban system being built piece­
meal and financed by landowners along the route, the Los Angeles 
basin would have been subdivided much more slowly. This sluggish 
suburban expansion could have led to a city much more domi­
nated by a downtown core, and vast metropolitan sprawl would 
have awaited the advent of the automobile. Later suburban devel­
opment, generated by the automobile rather than established by 
the trolleys, as well as a more concentrated downtown area, could 
have altered Los Angeles's metropolitan layout. 
The Los Angeles basin lacked many of the obvious natural re­
sources for becoming a large population center. But creative and 
energetic businessmen took advantage of the region's chief asset— 
its mild climate—to promote the southland and lay the necessary 
foundations for metropolitan civilization. During the first two de­
cades of the twentieth century, once people had been lured out to 
southern California, Huntington trolleys, powered by his PL&P, 
carried them to newly opened subdivisions—many times, Hunting­
ton developments—and there they were frequently provided with 
utilities by Huntington companies. These enterprises made Hunt­
ington the foremost city-builder who transformed the rural south­
ern California landscape into a major urban center. On 5 August 
1927, the remaining directors of the Huntington Land and Im­
provement Company recorded their beliefs about their recently 
deceased associate, Henry Huntington, in the firm's minutes: "No 
single individual has done so much to promote the phenomenal 
growth of southern California."" 
Huntington's broad strategy resembled other smaller-scale Los 
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Angeles entrepreneurs, but he operated on a much grander level. 
Like others, he became involved in urban infrastructural indus­
tries. Unlike others, he had experience with mammoth ventures 
and had the capital and vision to carry out such large undertakings. 
These advantages, combined with Huntington's tenacious drive 
and indefatigable energy, led him to dominate the area's streetcar 
industry, electric power generation, and the real estate business. 
The very size and scope of Huntington's enterprises—spanning 
metropolitan Los Angeles—set him apart from other urban de­
velopers. Operating his three businesses together, Huntington de­
veloped, and dictated where others would develop, Los Angeles. 
He became, in essence, the region's metropolitan planner, deter­
mining transit corridors, establishing a mix of subdivisions along 
the interurban routes, and frequently providing utilities to the new 
communities. 
The epitome of the successful metropolitan entrepreneur, 
Huntington was a shrewd developer of key industries in the area 
and a prime example of an individual who caused economic change 
and thereby benefited from it. The success of his numerous ven­
tures produced a snowball effect. His activities generated oppor­
tunities for other businessmen to invest in the future of southern 
California. Huntington had used his wealth as well as managerial 
and organizational talents to shape greater Los Angeles and ac­
celerate even more the growth of a metropolitan area that was 
destined to become the nation's leader in manufacturing and enter­
tainment services by the last quarter of the twentieth century. 
Business Beginnings

Once the teenaged Henry Huntington entered the business world, 
his uncle, Collis Huntington, soon became the most important 
figure in the young man's life. When the lure of greater oppor­
tunities brought Henry to New York City, the friendship between 
the two men grew. Sensing a competence in his nephew, Collis 
provided Henry with a management position in a sawmill and sev­
eral years later brought him into the railroad business. But Collis 
was much more than an employer; he became Henry's teacher 
and guide as well as his close friend and role model. Under his 
tutelage, Henry developed into a highly skilled and knowledgeable 
administrator. 
Early in his life, Henry exhibited a drive and determination to 
succeed. At twelve years old, he struggled with his English lesson 
one day and afterward wrote his sister: "I intend to go through my 
grammer [sic] tomorrow and then commence it again the next day 
for I intend to go through it again and again for I want to learn 
to talk correctly as I have not learnt yet."' This trait carried over 
from the schoolhouse into the business world. 
The fourth of seven children, Henry, usually called Ed or 
Edwards by his family, was born on 27 February 1850 in the vil­
lage of Oneonta, New York. His father, Solon Huntington, had 
migrated from Connecticut to Oneonta—a town of approximately 
two thousand residents—in 1840 in search of new opportunities. 
The following year he opened a general store.2 Henry's mother, 
Harriet Huntington, was the daughter of a physician from Burnt 
Hills, New York. The Huntingtons, an old-stock, middle-class mer­
chant family, traced their English ancestors' arrival in America 
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back to 1633.3 Besides his mercantile activities, Solon was a part-
time farmer and land speculator. Conservative by nature, he did 
not have the entrepreneurship needed for great financial success.4 
Solon's younger brother, Collis, on the other hand, did. It was 
Collis, a forceful and astute businessman, who had the greatest 
influence on Henry's early business career. 
Collis P. Huntington was a partner with Solon in the general 
store in Oneonta in 1845. The business prospered, but Collis, lured 
by the discovery of gold in California, headed west in 1849. In 
Sacramento, Collis set up a branch store of the Oneonta partner­
ship, which Solon kept stocked with goods. Soon, however, Collis 
dissolved this partnership and joined Mark Hopkins, "the firmest 
friend Collis would ever have," in the hardware business.5 
In 1860, Collis Huntington and Mark Hopkins heard Theodore 
Judah describe his plans for building a transcontinental railroad. 
Charles Crocker, another successful Sacramento merchant, and 
Leland Stanford were also present. In June 1861, the Central 
Pacific Railroad of California was incorporated, and its capital 
stock was fixed at $8.5 million, or 85,000 shares at $100 each. The 
company initially sold only 1,580 shares, on which only 10 percent 
had been paid. Of the initial subscribers, Huntington, Hopkins, 
Crocker, and Stanford each held 150 shares. Stanford was named 
president, Huntington was vice-president, and Hopkins became 
secretary.6 
The following year, Congress passed the Pacific Railroad Act, 
which gave federal aid to create the country's first transcontinental 
railroads. The Central Pacific was to build east from Sacramento 
and the Union Pacific from the Missouri River west. Promontory, 
Utah, was the eventual meeting place. The federal government's 
aid to the railroads took the form of massive land grants and huge 
loans. Money, in the form of thirty-year, 6 percent bonds, was ad­
vanced to the railroads for each mile of track completed, with the 
amount varying from $16,000 to $48,000 per mile depending on 
the terrain.7 The loan, however, did not become available until forty 
miles of track had been laid. 
Sanguine about the future of their railroad, the men of the 
Central Pacific held ceremonies on 8 January 1863 to mark the be­
ginning of construction. Stanford, now the governor of California, 
assured onlookers there would be no delay in connecting the West 
to the East by rail.8 
But the Central Pacific officers failed to raise enough capital 
through sales of stocks and bonds on the West Coast to finance con­
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struction of the first forty miles of track, the minimum required to 
receive the loan from Washington, D.C. In December 1862, Collis 
was dispatched to New York City to seek additional financing as 
well as purchase materials. Political trips to Washington, D.C, to 
lobby the railroad's cause were also frequent during his years in 
New York. His stay in the East was originally considered tempo­
rary, but Collis's success in raising money and in encouraging Con­
gress to pass a more liberal railroad act in 1864 made his presence 
invaluable, and he made New York his permanent home.9 
From his arrival in New York until mid-1869, Collis was occu­
pied with his job as financier and purchasing agent of the Central 
Pacific. But as the transcontinental railroad neared completion, 
Collis's work load decreased and he was free to consider other ven­
tures. Following the joining of the Central Pacific to the Union 
Pacific on 10 May 1869, Collis was visited by Harvey Fisk and 
Alfrederick Hatch, partners in a brokerage house. Fisk and Hatch 
had assisted Collis in the sale of millions of dollars of Central 
Pacific and federal government bonds. These men had also sup­
ported the bond price by purchasing the securities on the open 
market when it appeared their value might fall. For these services 
the Central Pacific owed this banking house over a million dollars. 
Under such circumstances, Fisk and Hatch called on Collis and 
presented a recommendation. Collis, fully aware of their previous 
aid, was a willing listener.10 
The partners introduced Collis to a representative of the finan­
cially troubled Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad (C&O) who hoped 
to entice Collis to rescue the floundering railroad. Unable to as­
sist the C&O alone, Collis formed a syndicate and presented his 
proposal to General William C. Wickham, head of the C&O. The 
general accepted the offer in November 1869; Collis was named 
president, and Wickham became vice-president and general super­
intendent." 
It was to this man, the shrewd and dynamic Collis Huntington, 
rather than his father, Solon, that Henry Huntington looked for 
inspiration. Childless, Collis became in effect a surrogate father 
after Henry moved to New York City in 1870. Thus began a close 
mentor-student relationship that lasted until the death of Collis in 
1900. Under the guidance of his uncle, Henry received some of 
the best practical management training of his day—working for 
several of Collis Huntington's railroads. 
In obtaining a job from Collis, Henry was not exceptional. 
Over the years Collis employed many young relatives in various 
22 BUSINESS BEGINNINGS 
capacities. Only Henry rose to a position of great responsibility, 
however.12 Undoubtedly one key to Henry's rise was this connec­
tion with a powerful relative, combined with initiative, hard work, 
self-confidence, and a fierce determination to succeed. The years 
Henry spent working under his uncle provided him with an im­
portant apprenticeship where he took to heart many maxims that 
he followed throughout his career. 
Henry's first business experience was a part-time job in an 
Oneonta hardware store. At seventeen, he went to work there full 
time. He stayed with this firm for two years, leaving in 1869 to 
take a position in his brother-in-law's hardware store in the small 
town of Cohoes, New York. Unhappy in Cohoes, Henry left in Feb­
ruary 1870 to look for a job in New York City. By May, he was 
employed at Sargent & Co., hardware manufacturers and manu­
facturing agents, as a porter. He wrote home explaining that he 
had taken the job for lack of other opportunities: "I wanted to get 
into someplace soon as it was getting lonesome here doing nothing, 
and I proposed to Uncle [Collis] that I should go there till I could 
do better."13 
Henry's letters home during this period reveal his close relation­
ship with his mother. He sent her notes frequently, often describing 
commonplace matters and usually making reference to his reli­
gious beliefs or church activity. After discussing his new position, 
he wrote, for example: "I thank you mother for the interest that 
you take in me and you may rest assured that love is returned. I 
think that if I ever amount to anything, I owe it all to my parents 
and my God."14 
While employed at Sargent & Co., Henry spent much time with 
Uncle Collis. Henry's work day was 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., but he 
often passed his one-hour lunch break at his uncle's office. Many 
weekends were spent with his Uncle Collis and Aunt Elizabeth. 
These frequent visits gave rise to a special bond between nephew 
and uncle. Henry often sought his uncle's advice and believed 
Collis would watch out for him. "I asked him what he thought 
about me staying at Sargent & Co., and he said that I had better 
stay awhile yet, for it would be worth more to me to work for noth­
ing here than for twelve dollars per week out in the country. He 
said he was thinking what he should do for me and told me not to 
be in any hurry. I think Uncle will do what is right with me if I try 
to help myself."15 
The wage for beginners at Sargent 8c Co. was usually three dol­
lars per week, but Henry anticipated that "they will pay me more 
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on account of knowing the good will of Uncle Collis." It was wish­
ful thinking. He received the standard salary, which consistently 
fell short of covering his living expenses. The difference between 
his $3.00 weekly earnings and his seven dollar per week room and 
board was made up by his meager savings, some help from his 
parents, and money from Collis. Fiercely independent, however, 
Henry was uncomfortable in this situation. "I got twenty dollars 
from Uncle Collis yesterday, yet I do not like to get money from 
him and it seems like begging, yet I do not think that he would like 
it if I were to leave here he seems so willing to help me all the time. 
Yet I am getting to the age that I do not like to feel dependent on 
anyone." Nonetheless, Henry remained dependent on monetary 
support from his benevolent uncle for the remainder of his stay 
in New York City. He decided in July that the only way he could 
accept more money was in the form of a loan, which he promised 
to repay.16 
Although Henry felt underpaid, he stayed at Sargent & Co. be­
cause of his uncle's advice. Then, as he had hoped, Collis rescued 
him from the hardware business. Collis Huntington, almost always 
a good judge of people, discerned an adroitness for business in 
Henry. In April 1871, Collis took his nephew on an inspection tour 
of his expanding eastern railroad system.17 The Chesapeake and 
Ohio Railroad was the heart of this network. After Collis obtained 
charge of this railroad in November 1869, he set out to execute the 
previously planned C&O construction—a rail line from Virginia 
west to the Ohio River. This was the first of many extensions that, 
combined with purchases of bankrupt railroads, was designed to 
create a continuous line north through Memphis, Paducah, Louis­
ville, and Cincinnati; it then would run through St. Albans, Coving­
ton, and Richmond to its Atlantic Coast terminus at Newport News. 
While surveying his burgeoning transportation empire, Collis 
noticed a small sawmill located on the Coal River just outside the 
railroad connection at St. Albans, West Virginia. An abundance 
of timber was available nearby, and Collis thought that if this mill 
were expanded it could guarantee a supply of railroad ties and 
trestle supports for his growing eastern railways. He promptly pur­
chased the mill and the surrounding land and offered his nephew 
a promised opportunity.1" Eager to work for his uncle, Henry, now 
twenty-one, accepted a job as manager of the St. Albans sawmill. 
So began Henry's almost continuous thirty-year association with 
Collis Huntington's enterprises. 
In May 1871, Henry moved to Coalsmouth, West Virginia. Ini­
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tially he concentrated on increasing the production of railroad ties. 
He hoped to cut three hundred logs per day; to accomplish this 
goal, he decided to run the mill both day and night.19 Henry im­
mersed himself in the new job and worked long hours. Skeptical at 
first, the thirty or so mill employees became impressed with their 
young chief's hard work. Henry, in fact, lowered the cost of pro­
duction, and the St. Albans mill soon produced ties more cheaply 
than surrounding plants.20 
All seemed to be going well for Henry. In January 1872, he re­
turned to Oneonta and New York City for a visit. In the city, he 
became engaged to Mary Alice Prentice, the sister of an adopted 
daughter of Collis Huntington.21 The engagement and subsequent 
marriage on 17 November 1873 further cemented the relationship 
between uncle and nephew. 
Henry's hard work at the mill continued to impress his uncle. 
Early in 1872, Henry expressed his single-minded devotion to busi­
ness in explaining to his mother why his visit to New York had 
to be cut short: "For you know mother that anyone attending to 
business must be punctual if they [sic] succeed." Several months 
later, his actions illustrated his dedication. On 20 May 1872, a flood 
washed away thousands of dollars' worth of timber from lumber 
mills along the riven Henry managed to save all his lumber, how­
ever. Resourcefully, he beat nature by tying the logs into fifty rafts 
and securing them to shore. He recorded the incident in a letter to 
his mother: 
There have been great losses here, some parties have lost three or four 
thousand dollars worth. Everyone has said that it was impossible for me 
to save a stick of my timber but I showed them different. Before I got 
through I got but nine hours sleep from Sunday morning to Thursday 
night. But I did save all my timber and the inhabitants said that it was 
something that had never been done before.22 
After a successful beginning at the mill, Henry formed a part­
nership with S. P. Franchot—the son of Richard Franchot, a friend 
of the family and chief Washington lobbyist for the Central Pacific 
Railroad—and together they purchased the lumber mill from 
Collis. Henry's investment was financed by Collis, who allowed his 
nephew to pay the purchase price at a later date. Collis had high 
hopes for his nephew: "I am glad to hear that your prospects for 
business are so good, but I did not expect anything else."23 
The partnership, however, did not fare so well. Henry's inde­
pendence and his desire to operate the mill on his own created 
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problems between the two young partners. These strains were com­
pounded by the Panic of 1873 and the subsequent economic down­
turn, which hurt the firm of Huntington and Franchot. By June 
1874, each man was blaming the other for the mill's failure to 
prosper, and each wished to dissolve the partnership.24 But Collis, 
thinking that business conditions would soon improve, persuaded 
the partners to stay together. Collis's hopes for an economic re­
bound were overly optimistic, the firm's debts mounted, and he was 
eventually forced to take the mill back at a loss in 1875. Free of 
ownership, Henry returned to his former position as manager.25 
Regardless of these difficulties, Henry remained self-confident. 
Not satisfied with serving as the mill manager, he wrote Collis: "I 
am anxious to be doing something better than I am doing now and 
think I could do well merchandising." Henry asked his uncle for a 
loan to start up a new business, but Collis was unable to spare the 
money. Henry then sought another position from his uncle where 
"I would be useful to you and you could help me."26 
When nothing materialized for Henry, he left the mill in 1876 
for Oneonta to aid his ailing father in his business affairs. This hia­
tus from Collis and his companies was brief; the business relation­
ship between nephew and uncle resumed in 1881. 
Although the sawmill episode was one of Henry's few business 
failures, it illuminates two key traits already surfacing in the young 
entrepreneur. First, Henry's independence and desire to run busi­
ness affairs his own way made it difficult for him to work for, or 
even with, anyone else. Second, there appeared to be one excep­
tion to this rule: Henry could work well for, and with, his uncle, 
Collis Huntington. 
Henry's first business experience with Collis was not, however, 
a total failure. Learning the importance of self-reliance, cost cut­
ting, and efficiency, he had shown signs of promise. This potential 
opened the door for a railroad career in his uncle's empire. In July 
1881, Collis decided to give his favorite nephew another opportu­
nity. Collis was expanding his eastern railroad system east to New­
port News and south to New Orleans. Once completed, he planned 
to link this network with the Southern Pacific under construction 
from California to create his own transcontinental railroad.27 But 
the Chesapeake and Ohio remained financially troubled, and the 
company went through a reorganization in 1878. Collis remained 
in control, and the new C&O owned tracks running from Rich­
mond, Virginia, to Huntington, West Virginia. From 1878 to 1880, 
Collis built tracks between Richmond and Newport News and fin­
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ished laying rails from Huntington, on the Ohio River, through 
Lexington to Elizabethtown, Kentucky. Then, to hasten the growth 
of this system, Collis purchased the Kentucky Central and a num­
ber of other regional railroads then in receivership. The bankrupt 
roads were merged into the Chesapeake, Ohio and Southwest­
ern, and the new company owned a line between Elizabethtown, 
Louisville, Paducah, and Memphis. Additional construction was 
needed to connect these various properties and form a through 
line. Henry was appointed superintendent of construction for this 
stretch of road.28 
The new superintendent set up an office at Trimble, Tennessee, 
and although he had no formal engineering experience, Henry 
completed the task of laying fifty-four miles of track in July 1882. 
While overseeing this work, he frequently received warnings from 
Collis to avoid unnecessary costs or extravagant spending. Henry 
reassured his uncle: "I think I have received one hundred cents 
worth of labor and material for every dollar paid out."29 But this 
was not all that pleased Collis. Deft at handling new situations, 
Henry finished the job nearly two months ahead of schedule by 
noting inefficient work practices and correcting them. After seeing 
a large number of men unloading railroad ties, Henry reasoned 
that by decreasing the size of the work crew and increasing the 
space between the workers, the job could be done more quickly.30 
Years later, one of Huntington's assistants paid tribute to Henry in 
his first railroad job: 
I wish to express my best wishes for the good health and happiness of 
my dear friend and boss, Mr. Huntington, for whom I worked twenty-
three years since as his Principal Asst. Engineer of Construction. . . . He 
is the one you should be proud of. I am proud to be able to say I worked 
for him three years without beingfired. But I did not work half as hard as 
did Mr. Huntington. He never stopped working.31 
Henry thought his labor was bearing fruit. He wrote to his 
mother in October 1882: "I received an encouraging letter from 
Uncle Collis about my work here, which was very gratifying to me. I 
have never worked harder than I have on this work and have more 
to continue with and I cannot tell you how gratified I am to know 
that he appreciates [me], and I feel fully repaid for my labor."32 
Henry followed his triumph on the Louisville to Memphis line 
with more construction work. In Kentucky, Henry laid rails from 
Paris to Livingston, thus opening a rail connection from Livingston 
to Richmond. Then working as the construction engineer for the 
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Kentucky Central Railroad, Henry supervised the completion of 
the 143 miles of track between Ashland and Covington.33 In March 
1885, Collis looked to Henry to revitalize the struggling Kentucky 
Central (KC); the nephew accepted the position of superintendent 
on the condition that he be allowed to run the railroad his own 
way. When the KC passed into receivership several months later, 
Henry was appointed receiver of the railway and then promoted 
to vice-president and general manager.34 
In his new post, Henry learned two more lessons: first, make 
use of the latest technology; second, reinvest earnings back into 
the firm. When he took over the railroad, the number of operable 
freight and passenger cars was declining and many of the usable 
cars were antiquated. Much of the roadbed was in disrepair. These 
elements, plus tough competition from the Louisville and Nashville 
and the Illinois Central, cut into the KC's earnings.35 
In order to remedy the situation, Henry purchased new, up­
dated cars and renewed the roadbed. To regain the losses in the 
valuable freight-carrying business, the vice-president lowered ship­
ping rates and rapidly expanded his freight car fleet. Sometimes, 
Henry employed shrewd and even devious methods to fight the 
competition and obtain additional traffic. In later years, he often 
recounted one episode of which he was especially proud. Henry 
suggested that a heavy shipper who used a competing railway line 
have a switch line built connecting his warehouses to the railroad. 
The merchant agreed but said he would continue transporting his 
goods over the other railway. Henry said that was fine; he built the 
switch and promised to transfer the merchant's cars to the com­
petitor's line. When the switch was completed, Henry prepared to 
transfer several of the merchant's cars but informed him the charge 
would be $100 per car. However, if the cars were carried on the 
Kentucky Central, there would be no switching fee. The merchant, 
not wishing to pay the fee, began sending his freight over the KC.36 
While Henry increased revenues by enlarging the KC's amount 
of freight traffic, he also decreased operating costs by economizing. 
Then, refusing to pay dividends, he poured all the profits back into 
the company to upgrade the railroad. His Spartan reorganization 
succeeded, and Henry led the KC out of receivership.37 
After his nephew had turned the KC around, Collis sold it at a 
profit to the Louisville and Nashville in 1890. This transaction fol­
lowed Collis's sale of his stock in the Chesapeake and Ohio in 1889 
to a Drexel Morgan—led group of investors. Thus began Collis's 
eastern railroad retrenchment. None of his eastern lines showed 
28 BUSINESS BEGINNINGS 
any steady earning power, and Collis soon sold the Louisville, New 
Orleans and Texas Railroad, the line connecting New Orleans to 
Memphis, to the Illinois Central. 
Following his work on the KC, Henry took charge of the Eliza­
bethtown, Lexington and Big Sandy Railroad. He supervised this 
company until Collis leased it to the Chesapeake and Ohio in Feb­
ruary 1892. Twenty-one months later, in November 1893, the last 
link of Collis's eastern railway, the Chesapeake, Ohio and South­
western, was sold under foreclosure.38 Now divested of railroads 
east of the Mississippi, Collis concentrated on the Southern Pacific. 
The Southern Pacific Company (SP) was a holding company 
incorporated in Kentucky in 1884. The joint western interests 
of Stanford, Crocker, Collis Huntington, and the Hopkins estate 
were placed under one management. In 1885 the various railroads 
owned by these four associates were leased for a period of ninety-
nine years to the SP; they included the Central Pacific, the SP of 
California, the SP of Arizona, and the SP of New Mexico, as well as 
a few smaller lines in Texas and Louisiana. Stanford was named the 
company's president, Huntington was first vice-president, Crocker 
was second vice-president, and Timothy Hopkins, the foster son of 
the late Mark Hopkins, became treasurer.39 
Although these railroad associates remained together through 
the years, strains in the relationship later developed. The major 
feud was between Collis Huntington and Leland Stanford. Collis 
believed Stanford was not devoting enough time and energy to 
their railroads, and he feared that, as a result, the business suf­
fered. Stanford did have a variety of other interests besides the 
railroad. In the 1870s he began spending more time and money 
on horses, stables, wineries, and traveling. By the 1880s Stanford 
had taken on even larger and more diverting projects. He founded 
a university in memory of his deceased son, Leland Stanford, Jr., 
and he was elected to the U.S. Senate. Spending less and less time 
contemplating SP affairs, Stanford was little more than a figure­
head president. The situation rankled Collis; if Stanford failed to 
use his post for the maximum good of the railroad, he needed to 
be replaced by a more forceful leader. Collis believed he was that 
40 person.
By 1890 Collis was taking a much more active interest in the 
Southern Pacific, and took steps to remove Stanford from the SP 
helm. Previous disputes between Huntington and Stanford had 
been masterfully settled by Charles Crocker. But Crocker had 
died in 1888, and his eldest son, Charles Frederick Crocker, had 
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taken over his SP position. Although Fred Crocker traveled to New 
York and tried to mediate the Huntington / Stanford differences, 
he lacked his father's flair for peacemaking, and the rift between 
the two widened.41 
Collis's first step to dethrone Stanford was to court Edward T. 
Searles, a young interior decorator who had married one of his 
elderly, widowed clients, Mrs. Mark Hopkins. When Collis was as­
sured that the Hopkins / Searles stock in the SP Company would 
be voted the way he wished, he was ready to blackmail Stanford 
about the so-called Sargent Affair, which was related to the senato­
rial election in California in 1885.42 The ploy succeeded. Hunting­
ton, Stanford, and those representing the Hopkins / Searles inter­
ests met in New York on 28 February 1890. Collis announced 
that he wanted to be elected president of the Southern Pacific at 
the next annual meeting in April; in exchange, Huntington would 
either destroy the papers relating to the Sargent Affair or turn 
them over to Stanford. On 9 April 1890, in accordance with the 
agreement, Collis Huntington was installed as president of the SP 
Company. Soon changes were made on the board of directors that 
strengthened Collis's position. Ariel Lathrop, Stanford's brother-
in-law, lost his place on the directorate to Thomas E. Hubbard, one 
of Mrs. Searles's attorneys.43 
Collis was now firmly entrenched in the SP presidency, but in­
ternecine battles brewed beneath the surface. The Crockers and 
Stanfords, all in California, remained bitter over the ousting of 
Stanford; they were not going to accept the new president's au­
thority or policies without a struggle. Since Collis remained in New 
York, he needed someone to watch over these factions and rep­
resent him in the Southern Pacific's San Francisco office. In April 
1892, Collis appointed as his personal assistant his nephew Henry, 
now a proven railroad manager, and sent him to northern Califor­
nia. 
By the time Henry—or H. E., as he had become known in 
business circles—arrived in San Francisco, the first phase of his 
apprenticeship was over. His tremendous energy and drive to suc­
ceed had been harnessed by Collis. During the long and close asso­
ciation with his uncle, Henry had become a skilled, resourceful 
businessman in his own right, well versed in all aspects of steam 
railroads. But it was the eight years Henry was to spend with the 
SP in California that provided the ultimate educational experience 
and prepared him for his later career in the Los Angeles area. 
3

Apprenticeship Years in San Francisco, 
1892-1901 
Henry's successes on his uncle's eastern railroads, coupled with 
Collis's trust and affection for his nephew, landed the younger 
Huntington a position with the Southern Pacific in San Francisco. 
Henry's years there proved to be ones of continuity and change. 
Although he remained in the railroad business and applied pre­
cepts learned earlier, he faced new challenges. In northern Califor­
nia, Henry was introduced to the streetcar industry and observed 
its connection to real estate development; learned the importance 
of retaining skilled, loyal managers; and, because of the Pullman 
Strike, was instructed on labor relations and unions. His work with 
railroads also took on a new dimension as Henry was forced to 
deal with stiff competition from the Santa Fe in the southland. 
Equally significant, Henry's many trips to southern California dur­
ing this period led to his first investment in that region. Yet the 
biggest changes for Henry involved his uncle. Collis had maneu­
vered himself into the position of SP president by 1899, and Henry, 
as vice-president, looked to be the heir apparent. The following 
year, however, Collis died unexpectedly, and when majority stock­
holders barred Henry from succeeding his uncle as head of the SP, 
he turned his attention southward to the Los Angeles basin. 
Placed in San Francisco to ensure that the presidential poli­
cies of his uncle were carried out, Henry also was employed to 
counter the influence of the family's rivals. The leading figure 
in this opposing camp was Fred Crocker, who not only inherited 
his father's position as second vice-president of the SP Company, 
but also succeeded Charles Crocker as president of the SP Rail­
road of California, a subsidiary of the parent SP. From the time of 
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his arrival, however, Henry's presence aroused suspicion and cre­
ated animosity among the longtime employees at Southern Pacific 
headquarters. Bitterly divided, the major SP shareholders, or their 
representatives, could not agree on corporate policy. Henry was 
thrown into this situation to act as his uncle's alter ego, and Collis 
readily acknowledged his nephew's role. He wrote Southern Pacific 
official Joseph Willcutt: "I wish you would consult with Henry E. 
Huntington in reference to this matter [street railroads] as when I 
am not there he—as you may say—stands in my shoes. . . ."' 
Henry quickly discovered that although his position carried the 
authority of president in his uncle's absence, it was unclear exactly 
where he fit in the established hierarchy. After two months on the 
job, he was unsure of his role but eager to get involved. In a June 
1892 letter to Collis, he wrote: "As yet I do not find my time very 
fully occupied, but presume that I shall soon get into the harness."2 
Shortly thereafter, Henry found a niche, an area over which he 
could exert some control: the Southern Pacific—owned street rail­
way system in San Francisco. 
Initially, Central Pacific interests—namely, Leland Stanford, 
Charles Crocker, and Mark Hopkins—had become intrigued with 
the possibility of urban streetcar transportation. The first San Fran­
cisco cable car line (the first in the world, in fact) was built on 
Clay Street between Kearny and Leavenworth streets in 1873. The 
technical as well as financial success of the line led Stanford and 
his associates to ask the city's board of supervisors for a franchise, 
which they received in 1876. The investors then built a cable road 
down California Street from Kearny to Fillmore Street.3 Although 
they all sold their holdings in the California Street Cable Railroad 
by 1884, this early interest in the streetcar business led to a major 
SP involvement in the industry. 
In November 1878 Fred Crocker and another group of capi­
talists entered the streetcar field with the Geary Street Park and 
Ocean Railroad. Beginning as a horse car line, it was operated 
down Geary Street between Market Street and Presidio Avenue. 
Converted to cable and opened for business in 1880, the line was 
later extended to Golden Gate Park. From the outset, this cable 
system, the fourth to be built in San Francisco, was successful.4 But 
the largest of the cable railway systems, and the one most often 
associated with the Southern Pacific, was the Market Street Cable 
Railway. 
Originally incorporated as the San Francisco Market Street 
Railroad Company in 1857, the firm began with horse car lines. It 
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took over the first street franchise granted in San Francisco and 
built a line on Market Street between California Street and Mis­
sion Dolores. By 1863, the line was extended to the waterfront 
and to Twenty-fifth and Valencia streets. In 1868, the railroad ob­
tained additional franchises to build on McAllister from Market to 
Laguna Street, on Hayes Street to Divisadero Street, and on Market 
between Valencia and Castro streets. These franchises, combined 
with the original grants, covered almost all the lines operated by 
the later Market Street Cable Railroad. By 1870, even without rail 
routes on the streets acquired by the new franchises, the Market 
Street cable system was one of the largest of the eight street railway 
companies in the city.5 
In 1875, the Central Pacific transferred its ferry landings from 
Vallejo and Davis streets to the foot of Market Street. This move 
shifted the city's major business thoroughfare from Broadway to 
Market Street and sent streetcar companies scrambling to obtain 
franchise rights on Market Street. Because the main lines of the 
Market Street Railroad already ran down this commercial artery, 
the company soon emerged as the city's most important street rail­
road.6 
Seven years later, in 1882, Leland Stanford, Fred Crocker, and 
other investors incorporated the Market Street Cable Railway Com­
pany. Capitalized at $5 million, the company took over all lines of 
the Market Street Railroad and began converting the horse and 
steam lines to cable. Construction of the roadbed was considered 
to be excellent, and the company's rolling stock was viewed as 
first class. Edgar M. Kahn noted that "the line was in competition 
with eight other streetcar companies, and it immediately became 
the favorite with the riding public owing to the convenience and 
comfort of the cars, the speed with which they traveled, and their 
frequency."7 
Extension of the railway from Market down Valencia Street in 
1883 stimulated real estate development south of Market and in 
the Valencia district. In the 1880s the population began to mi­
grate slowly from the highly concentrated northeastern corner of 
the city. By 1910, people were more widely dispersed, moving 
southeast and west of the inner city along transportation lines. 
Shortly after the Valencia Street line was completed, the McAllis­
ter and Haight Street cable lines were opened from Market Street 
to Golden Gate Park. Between these two streets, and paralleling 
their lines, an extension was built on Hayes Street. Then in 1887, 
another cable route was constructed south from Market down 
Castro Street to Twenty-sixth.8 
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Popularly known as the SP line, the Market Street Cable Rail­
way served the major commercial and shopping areas and then 
radiated out into residential districts.9 When Henry arrived in San 
Francisco in 1892, Market Street was the city's largest cable railway. 
It operated a main line composed of fourteen miles of double track 
and twelve miles of single track; its property included eighty-four 
horses and two hundred thirty-two cable cars. Leland Stanford was 
president, Fred Crocker was vice-president, and Joseph L. Will­
cutt was secretary.10 However, Stanford was preoccupied with his 
philanthropies or with Stanford University, and Crocker had the 
larger interests of the SP to look after as well as the Geary Street 
cable line. Thus, with the support of his uncle, Henry stepped in 
to fill the void on the Market Street line. 
Henry busied himself with all aspects of the Market Street Cable 
Railway. He conceived several innovative ideas; some were success­
ful, and others were gently but firmly scotched by his uncle. For ex­
ample, Henry called for moving the major Southern Pacific offices, 
which included the headquarters of the Market Street Railway, 
from the location at Fourth and Townsend streets. He reasoned 
that because the city's commercial center had shifted, it made sense 
to have offices near the merchants on Market Street.11 The move 
took place, and the SP offices were relocated on Market and Mont­
gomery streets in September 1894. Another of Henry's ideas was 
to run larger streetcars on some new lines, particularly down Mis­
sion Street, which the company was electrifying. This new motive 
power was capable of propelling bigger, heavier cars, and Henry 
correctly estimated that larger cars could be kept filled, increasing 
profits.12 
Sometimes Henry's exuberance overcame his better judgment. 
In an attempt to attract more patrons, he suggested introduc­
ing two-story cars. His uncle, however, quashed the plan: "Maybe 
doubledeck cars are not the best idea—San Francisco is a windy 
city."13 Collis felt that even if two-tiered cars were safe, the cool 
breezes would keep riders off the second level. Henry concurred: 
"I think probably we had better use the regular cable cars i.e. single 
deck on Mission Street line, and we can decide afterwards whether 
we should try one or two double deck cars as an experiment."14 
Although Henry's early association with the Market Street Cable 
Railway familiarized him with all facets of street railway operations, 
the experience provided limited preparation for later challenges in 
southern California. Fortunately, Henry's arrival in San Francisco 
coincided with discussions about a consolidation of many of the 
city's streetcar lines. Henry's role in the merger and his adminis­
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tration of the resulting company filled in the remaining gaps of his 
business education. 
On 13 January 1893 Willcutt, secretary and general manager 
of the Market Street operations, sent Fred Crocker a plan to con­
solidate several of the city's street railway companies. He suggested 
combining Market Street with the Market Street and Fairmount 
Railway, City Railroad, Potrero and Bay View Railroad, and the 
Southern Heights and Visitacion Railway.15 Of these five compa­
nies, the first four were already controlled by the Southern Pacific, 
and the merger was proposed largely to rationalize streetcar opera­
tions. Collis and Henry backed this idea but hoped to bring more 
of the other large street railway lines into the consolidation. One of 
the larger firms, the Omnibus Cable Company, established in 1861, 
had inaugurated an expansion program in the late 1880s designed 
to build a system rivaling the Market Street Cable Railway. How­
ever, because Market Street already held franchises on the business 
district's major thoroughfares, most of the Omnibus lines were built 
on secondary rather than primary streets. George W. Hilton noted: 
"The company's main line on Howard Street was two blocks in the 
wrong direction (south) from Market Street where it was unable to 
attract a large part of the traffic to the south and west." Ridership 
was light on these less important business streets, and the com­
pany was never very profitable. Nevertheless, the Omnibus Cable 
Company was viewed as an aggravation by the Market Street man­
agement, who considered it an intruder that cut into their territory 
and profits.16 
The major value of the larger companies not mentioned in 
the proposed merger—Omnibus Cable Company, Ferries and Cliff 
House, or North Beach and Mission Railway—lay not so much in 
their existing track or rolling stock but in their street franchises. 
These exclusive contracts granted one company the right to build a 
railway line on a particular street. Collis's awareness of the impor­
tance of franchise rights was a major reason he wished to acquire 
the Powell Street line, a cable road operated by Ferries and Cliff 
House and the Omnibus Cable Company. 
Henry sought to obtain the Ferries and Cliff House Railway and 
the Omnibus Cable Company, believing that both lines were valu­
able properties. He noted the expanding business of the former 
but agreed with Collis that the cost of acquisition through outright 
purchase was too high.17 The takeover was eventually accomplished 
through an exchange of stock. Talks commenced between the Mar­
ket Street and Omnibus people, and Henry was optimistic about 
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the movement toward consolidation. But the self-confident Henry, 
rather than wishing to rely on Fred Crocker, believed he could 
drive a harder bargain. "Fred is talking with the Omnibus people. 
I think I could probably do a better job than he could as I do not 
think he is much of a trader."I8 
Henry ultimately did most of the negotiating because Crocker 
was heavily involved in other aspects of the SP, and Collis had 
supreme faith in his nephew. Collis wrote Henry regarding the 
merger: "I told him [Thomas Hubbard] you were at home in 
such kinds of trades—I should expect nothing but a good trade 
from you."19 
After several months of talks, Henry engineered a deal with the 
Omnibus Company. The Omnibus owners were granted 20 percent 
of the stock in the new company; Market Street shareholders re­
ceived 80 percent. These percentages were shaved down somewhat 
to provide the smaller companies entering into the merger a share 
of stock in the new firm. Besides Market Street and Omnibus, the 
new Market Street Railway was a consolidation of the Market Street 
and Fairmount Railway, City Railroad, Potrero and Bay View Rail­
road, Southern Heights and Visitacion Railroad, Park and Ocean 
Railroad, Ocean Beach Railway, Central Railroad, North Beach 
and Mission Railway, and the Ferries and Cliff House Railway.20 
Collis wished to make Henry president of the company, but the 
Crocker and Stanford faction demanded that Fred Crocker be 
named instead, and the Hopkins / Searles interests cast the decid­
ing vote in favor of Crocker. Crocker became president; Henry 
became vice-president.21 Henry took a more active role in the com­
pany's affairs than Crocker, however. 
The new Market Street Railway Company was organized on 
13 October 1893. It comprised 158.5 miles of track, of which 56 
miles were horse lines, 68.5 were cable lines, 18.3 were steam lines, 
and 15.7 miles were electric lines. Six San Francisco street railroad 
companies remained outside the merger, but none compared in 
size to the new Market Street.22 Besides owning the largest share of 
San Francisco's transit mileage, Market Street rail lines dominated 
the city's business district, running from the commercial center out 
into both established and growing residential areas. 
In order to manage the enlarged Market Street Railway, Henry 
applied the same principles that had proven so successful in his 
earlier railroad career. He aggressively economized, paring away 
extravagance and waste. Unnecessary positions were eliminated, 
departments trimmed down, and the operating efficiency of the 
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street railway was increased. Henry then updated the system by 
using the latest technology; vigorously pushing the introduction 
of electricity as motive power and phasing out many of the horse 
and cable lines. He also tried two new strategies. He planned and 
then pursued the continued expansion of the streetcar lines, and 
he filled administrative vacancies with skilled managers with whom 
he had previously worked. 
Lowering expenses and increasing efficiency meant higher net 
earnings. The sooner the street railway increased its earnings, the 
sooner it could pay dividends to stockholders. Collis wrote Henry: 
"The amount of dividends declared upon the shares is what in­
fluences the people more than the interest on the bonds. That is, 
the bonds are a contract and of course must be paid, but the net 
that the road earns currently goes to the shareholders."23 When 
the Market Street Railway started paying dividends, the current 
stockholders, largely SP people, would directly benefit, and the 
stock, looking more attractive to prospective investors, would likely 
increase in value. 
Henry cut excesses wherever he thought necessary. He first 
looked to the mechanical and repair shops, where he shortened 
the work day to eight hours and then decreased the work week to 
four days. Little street railway construction was under way, and he 
discharged the street railway construction office staff. Henry even 
contemplated laying off Lewis Clement, the engineer in charge of 
the street railway construction. Collis, however, stopped his ambi­
tious nephew; although he felt discharging people was a move in 
the right direction, he believed that Clement was too valuable to 
be laid off.24 
His desire for efficiency led Henry to champion the use of elec­
tricity to power the railway's cars. When the Market Street combine 
was formed, less than 10 percent of the 158.5 miles of track was 
serviced by electric cars. In addition to providing faster service, 
electric trolley cars were cheaper to operate and maintain than the 
cable or horse car lines. On Mission Street, for example, Henry 
noted: "We are losing money on the cars everyday we run them as 
a horse car line and would make money when we run the cars by 
electricity."25 
Although city officials initially opposed the electric cars because 
their use required poles considered unsightly and because it was 
feared that a network of electric wires strung overhead would be 
dangerous, Market Street proceeded to convert all its lines to elec­
tric power. The first line changed over to electricity was Mission 
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Street, completed on 15 September 1894. By the end of the year, 
Market Street had increased its electric track to 53.4 miles. Dur­
ing the same period, Henry oversaw the decrease in cable mileage 
from 68.5 to 65.9 and the diminution of horse lines from 55.9 to 
32.7 miles. The company's annual report of 1894 stated: 
As was anticipated by your Directors, the conversion of horse car lines 
into the electric system has not only developed much new business but 
has enabled the company to make a large saving in all branches of the 
animal service, and it will gratify you to learn that since the electric lines 
have been in operation their net earnings to the present time are shown 
to have been upwards of $60,000 while there was a loss of $30,000 in the 
operation of the last year.26 
The use of electricity to propel streetcars was much more effi­
cient than any other motive power, but Henry wished to ensure 
that his motormen made the best use of this power and did not 
waste energy. Having read about a new device that measured the 
amount of power wasted by trolley operators, Henry instructed 
E. P. Vining, the line's general manager, to investigate this inven­
tion. The firm obtained several of these "currency recorders" on a 
trial basis. After running tests, the general manager reported that 
the device functioned properly on level roadbeds but not on hills. 
Vining, however, did not give up hope; he informed Henry that 
General Electric offered a similar appliance, and his staff would 
test it.27 
While promoting efficiency in his staff, Henry also tried to 
learn all about running a street railway. Whenever Collis offered 
advice on managing the trolley system, Henry eagerly accepted it. 
While Market Street was rapidly electrifying its lines, Collis wrote 
his nephew concerning the use of electricity in urban transit and 
the significance of procuring water rights for future hydroelectric 
power generation: 
Electricity is coming into use fast as a motive power. Just how far it can 
be transmitted is as yet unascertained, but I am inclined to think that 
they will succeed in utilizing it for long distances where it would be gen­
erated, and in this connection I think it would be well for us to secure 
water power in a number of localities in anticipation of the time when we 
shall want it and when it will be very valuable.28 
The younger Huntington agreed with his uncle but was unable to 
convince others on Market Street's board of directors of the im­
portance of securing a source of power. Henry later put his uncle's 
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proposals into practice; his Pacific Light and Power Company's 
hydroelectric facilities provided power for his southern California 
projects. 
The conflict over obtaining water rights was a minor quarrel 
within the Market Street ranks. A greater dispute occurred over 
the issue of expansion and pitted Henry against Fred Crocker. Just 
as Henry had rapidly pursued the conversion of horse and cable 
lines to electricity, he also sought the swift expansion of the Mar­
ket Street Railway system. Henry wanted to extend the railroad to 
streets that ran from the city's center toward the growing regions 
west and south and to lay track down Ellis Street to the west and 
Folsom Street to the south. On some lines, especially the one on 
Mission Street, Henry hoped to build as far as the city line, even 
though the track would extend beyond the present urban popu­
lation. He reasoned that the population had been moving in that 
direction, and people would soon follow the transportation lines 
out from the central district of the city. 
Although there is no evidence that Henry combined real estate 
development with the Market Street Railway, it is clear that in San 
Francisco he observed the relationship between streetcars, popu­
lation movement, and real estate. By the late nineteenth century, 
in fact, it was widely held that trolleys promoted residential real 
estate. A Milwaukee newspaper, for example, called for expanding 
the franchises of its street railways because "Milwaukee is in the 
business of growing."29 Although Henry was rarely explicit about 
his business strategies and never mentioned how or when he de­
cided to combine streetcars with land development, he must have 
conceived the idea during these years in San Francisco. It would 
not be put to use, however, until he moved to southern California. 
Although Henry's proposed expansions to the Market Street 
system made sense to Collis, financing was a problem.30 A panic 
on Wall Street in 1893 and the subsequent depression made loans 
difficult to obtain and the sale of stocks and bonds uninviting. Yet 
the tight money market did not deter Henry from carrying out 
planned extensions. Rather than acquiring the necessary funds 
from the immediate sale of bonds, he procured money to start 
the project from the SP via its construction arm, the Pacific Im­
provement Company, and by withholding dividends and reinvest­
ing profits back into the line.31 With the financing worked out in 
1894, Henry began the building program. His rationale for expan­
sion was simple—new lines would increase traffic, and dividends 
would be increased many times over at a later date because of 
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higher ridership revenues and the lower cost of operating the new 
electric railways. 
Once money was found, Collis encouraged his nephew's plans 
of expansion. By September 1895, however, no bonds had been 
sold, and Fred Crocker, long opposed to further construction until 
a large bond sale could be arranged, put his foot down. As presi­
dent of Market Street Railway, Crocker would not approve any 
additions until a minimum of $2 million of the authorized $17.5 
million in bonds was sold. Also, Crocker and his family, large 
shareholders of Market Street stock, were no longer willing to see 
potential dividends reinvested in a building program. In October, 
banker Isaias W. Hellman, who later worked with Henry in several 
southern California projects, contracted to take a large number of 
Market Street bonds. This deal provided money for expansion and 
made profits available for dividends. Crocker was appeased, and 
he approved further development of the transit network.32 
Under Henry's guidance, the Market Street expansion pro­
ceeded, and the growing company proved very successful. The 
number of tracks in operation rose from 169.3 miles in 1895 to 
183.2 miles in 1900. More telling was the vast increase in elec­
tric line mileage, which jumped during the same period from 53.3 
miles to 103.9 miles. While revenues rose from $3.4 million in 
1897 to $3.9 million by 1900, operating expenses steadily declined. 
In a letter to Collis, Henry boasted that Market Street Railway's 
operating expenses, as a percentage of gross earnings, had steadily 
dropped from 67 percent in 1894 to 58.7 percent by 1898, a total 
reduction of more than 8 percent.33 
Henry's emphasis on expansion and cost cutting carried over to 
the larger steam railroad system as well. When he arrived in San 
Francisco in 1892, the SP no longer held a monopoly of Califor­
nia's railroads. The fiercest competition came from the Santa Fe 
and took place in southern California. Once the Santa Fe broke 
into this area with a through line to San Diego in 1885, the com­
pany moved quickly to lay its own tracks to Los Angeles. Reaching 
this destination in 1887, the Santa Fe merged its lines with several 
local roads it had purchased. The rapid expansion of the Santa 
Fe in southern California cut into the SP's near monopoly of the 
area's transportation system. By the early 1890s, the Santa Fe had 
surpassed the SP in the percentage of traffic carried in southern 
California.34 
The rapid expansion of the Santa Fe into the southland was 
only one example of a new strategy being employed by most of the 
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nation's leading railroads. When attempts to lessen growing post-
Civil War competition between railroads through voluntary agree­
ments and alliances failed in the 1880s, corporate leaders adopted 
a new policy. Rather than try to eliminate competition through co­
operation, they sought to build huge, self-contained rail systems 
that, by controlling connections with major traffic sources, guaran­
teed a constant flow of freight and passengers over their lines.35 
Trained in a corporate culture that stressed system building, 
Henry expanded SP routes either by purchase or construction to 
protect and even increase the company's share of southern Cali­
fornia traffic. He countered the Santa Fe by extending SP lines 
into the fertile agricultural areas of San Bernardino and River­
side and the growing residential regions of the San Gabriel Val­
ley. In 1893 the SP acquired the San Gabriel Valley Rapid Tran­
sit Railroad, which ran from Los Angeles through Boyle Heights 
and Alhambra to Monrovia. In January 1896 a branch line from 
Alhambra to Pasadena was completed, and the Monrovia line was 
extended to Duarte. Henry also encouraged the building of tracks 
southeast of Los Angeles to reach the rich citrus-growing areas. 
Southern Pacific rails reached San Dimas on 7 March 1895 and 
were extended to Pomona by 22 August 1895. The following July 
the SP obtained the Southern California Motor Road, which oper­
ated between San Bernardino, Colton, and Riverside. Reconstruc­
tion of the tracks was necessary, but by 11 May 1898, SP trains 
arrived in Riverside.36 Proud of these achievements, Henry wrote 
Collis: 
Every foot of track built at my instigation in southern California has been 
through a densely populated and highly fertile territory, which yields 
most bountifully its share of traffic that we would otherwise not get, 
thereby helping to sustain the many miles of barren, desert lines that 
produce nothing, of which you know we have more than our share. The 
expense for operation of these branch lines has not increased in propor­
tion to the mileage, as the men have been required to go in and out on 
them within the day's time, in addition to the ocean runs, I hardly believe 
any of our people today question the wisdom of reaching out and build­
ing these branches which enable us to get about 53% of the southern 
California traffic, when we formerly did not get 40%.37 
While directing SP's expansion, Henry also sought to curtail 
the cost of running the railroad. Although road building continued 
in the 1890s, the SP did not expand nearly as rapidly as it had 
in the 1880s. With less construction, fewer land and right-of-way 
agents were required, so Henry cut back on staff. He also reduced 
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the number of seasonal and trip passes issued. In 1897 Henry told 
his uncle: "This list today is drawn so closely to our actual busi­
ness requirements and we are not giving passes excepting for value 
received, so the list is not one third what it was [in 1892]."38 
Henry's policy of saving nickels and dimes and still maintaining 
a standard of efficiency was as successful on the SP as it had been 
on the Market Street Railway. He wrote Collis in 1895: 
Upon my advent here, as you know, I made it my business to produce 
every possible economy that did not interfere with the maintenance of 
the highest efficiency of the property, and you can well imagine that this 
was not a popular thing to do. . .  . By analysis, you will see that we have 
operated 9% more miles of road, carried over the Pacific System lines 4% 
more revenue trains, 7% more revenue cars, and 15% more freight and 
passenger mileage for 3% less actual operating expense than it cost us in 
the previous period with which the comparison was made.39 
The Los Angeles Evening Express of 6 November 1897 praised Hen­
ry's management of the Southern Pacific, crediting him with intro­
ducing discipline to the railroad's employees and running the trains 
on schedule: "He has shown himself to be considerable of a rail­
road man, and if his life is spared it is on the cards for him to go 
still further."40 
Henry was not, of course, solely responsible for the success of 
the Market Street Railway or the improvement of the Southern 
Pacific. Throughout his tenure with the railroad, Henry had many 
knowledgeable, skilled men working with and for him. Surround­
ing himself with capable lieutenants was one of the major reasons 
for his achievements in San Francisco and later in Los Angeles. 
Much like his uncle, Henry displayed an almost uncanny ability to 
select talented, qualified professionals and place them in positions 
of authority. 
When the SP positions became available, Henry quietly brought 
in former associates and assistants who had previously worked for 
him on railroads in the East. A prime example was Epes Randolph, 
who at one time had worked for Henry in Kentucky and was then 
general superintendent and chief engineer in Louisville for the 
Newport News, Mississippi Valley, and Ohio Railway. Both Collis 
and Henry wished to bring Randolph to San Francisco to manage 
the Market Street Company. But for reasons of health, Randolph 
required a drier climate, and he was placed in charge of the SP 
line from Yuma to El Paso. Men previously associated with Henry 
who later filled SP positions in California included S. F. Morse, J. S. 
Frasier, and W. S. Millspaugh.41 
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If Henry could not fill a vacancy with past associates, he looked 
elsewhere for proven administrators. Vining was such a man. Lured 
from the Union Pacific by a salary of $1,000 per month, Vining 
took the job Randolph could not, as general manager of the Mar­
ket Street Railway. Vining cut costs, expanded the system, made 
no concessions to organized labor, and carried out the instructions 
of his boss.42 
Henry expected the same loyalty from his labor force. He had 
come to believe that if workers were treated fairly, they would 
respond by working faithfully. In these early years, one event oc­
curred that taught Henry not to compromise with labor. While 
managing the Kentucky Central, Henry found it necessary to cut 
wages by 10 percent, including his own. The yard crew went on 
strike and rather than negotiate, Henry and the office staff ran the 
yards; the strikers returned to work the following day.43 The fail­
ure of a strike in the face of a management that stood firm and 
refused to make concessions must have lodged in Henry's mind; 
henceforth, he used this method in dealing with labor agitation. 
In May 1894 the Pullman Strike erupted. Initially, it was a 
labor dispute over wage cuts, and in protest, the Pullman Palace 
Car Company employees walked off their jobs. On 26 June the 
strike spread beyond Chicago and became a national concern when 
Eugene V. Debs and his American Railway Union (ARU) supported 
strikers by refusing to haul trains hauling Pullman cars. This action 
soon immobilized the SP.44 
At the strike's outset, Henry wrote to his uncle: "I think we 
should make a fight to the finish and there is no doubt in my mind 
but that we shall succeed." He added: "This is the first strike we 
have ever had here and as we are making history [I] think we ought 
not to take a step backward and make such concessions that we will 
hereafter regret. As we are into it I think we had better stay . . . 
and win our fight."45 
By 28 June, trains within California had stopped moving. 
With their cars immobilized, SP officials estimated their losses 
at $200,000 per day.46 Henry believed that negotiating with the 
union would be tantamount to turning the running of the road 
over to the ARU. He expressed these sentiments later in 1903: 
"When questions shall arise as to what, or how many, men shall 
be employed or how business shall be managed, labor must stop 
right there as before a stone wall to step over which means to tres­
pass on another man's domain."47 The Southern Pacific, therefore, 
stood firm and refused to negotiate with the union. In order to 
protect private property and bring an end to the strike, the state 
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government in Sacramento sent militiamen to aid the SP. The fed­
eral government, under the pretext of ensuring the transport of 
the mail, sent national guard troops to guarantee the movement of 
SP trains. With such assistance, the strike, as Henry had predicted, 
was broken. On 22 July, after a more than three-week disruption 
of service, the ARU admitted defeat in California. 
Determined not to repeat the experience, Henry and Collis de­
cided that the railroad would no longer employ ARU members. 
A month after the conflict was settled, Henry assured Collis: "We 
have not taken an American Railway man back without his first 
resigning and severing his connection with that organization."48 
Henry thought the strike's failure taught laborers a lesson: they 
could not dictate policy to the SP, and the company would do 
everything in its power to thwart such an attempt. Henry stressed 
discipline within the ranks of labor. "Amongst such a large body of 
men as we employ [the Southern Pacific] we must have pretty strict 
discipline, if we do not we might as well throw up the sponge."49 
Such action, however, did not go far enough. Although Henry was 
not antilabor, he became, largely because of the Pullman affair, 
violently anti-union. After this experience, Henry's policy was to 
avoid employing union members. With these views on labor rela­
tions, Henry, when blocked from succeeding Collis as Southern 
Pacific president, established himself in a region in which he had 
already invested and that was known for its anti-union, open shop 
tradition. 
Henry's contact with southern California had begun in 1892 
when, on his way to San Francisco, he was entertained by J. de 
Barth Shorb on the San Marino estate, the property Henry would 
later purchase. Impressed with the region, Henry traveled to the 
southland from the Bay Area many times during the next eight 
years. He was struck by the mild climate, the rapidly expanding 
citrus cultivation, and the potential for future growth. Believing 
that profitable ventures could be launched, Henry, along with a 
syndicate made up of I.W. Hellman, Antoine Borel, and Chris­
tian DeGuigne, purchased the Los Angeles Railway in September 
1898. By the end of that year, this group owned all the city's street 
railways except the Los Angeles Traction Company.50 
But Henry's primary interests remained in northern California. 
On the rare occasions when he was not occupied with affairs of the 
Southern Pacific or the Market Street Railway, he spent most of his 
free time in San Francisco with family members. However, because 
he worked long hours and was frequently away on business trips, 
 45 APPRENTICESHIP YEARS IN SAN FRANCISCO
Henry's wife, Mary, often took one or two of their four children 
away on extended vacations. In 1897, for example, Henry's wife 
and daughter, Clara, traveled to Europe for five months. Since his 
immediate family was rarely together, Henry saw a lot of his favor­
ite sister, Caroline, and her husband, Edmund Burke Holladay, 
who also resided in San Francisco. When Collis and Arabella were 
in California, the five were often together, and they sometimes 
passed time playing card games of cinch or whist.51 
Some of Henry's time away from the SP office was spent tending 
to his uncle's personal affairs. For example, he oversaw the home 
improvements being made on Collis's San Francisco mansion and 
even rehung the paintings himself. On another occasion, Henry 
prepared Collis and Arabella's surprise gift for Caroline and Burke 
Holladay, a fully furnished home.52 
When not in San Francisco or southern California, Henry trav­
eled to New York. In New York City, he talked over SP busi­
ness with Collis and enjoyed socializing with both his uncle and 
Arabella. From there, he usually headed upstate to Oneonta to see 
his mother and then escort her to the West Coast for her annual 
extended stay of several months.53 
Henry, in fact, seemed very fond of Oneonta, and his continued 
interest in his hometown was manifested in several ways. Although 
there is no indication that religion remained very important to the 
middle-aged railroad man, he was still a member of the Presby­
terian church and made several donations to the Oneonta Pres­
byterian Church, including a thousand-dollar gift toward a new 
organ.54 In addition, much later in life, Henry gave his boyhood 
home to the city of Oneonta to be used as a library and park.55 
Once he settled in southern California, Henry named one of his 
subdivisions (located in South Pasadena) Oneonta Park. 
Despite Henry's many trips, some of which were for pleasure, 
most of his time was devoted to business. By 1898 he was presi­
dent of Market Street Railway, and he continued as assistant to 
the president of the Southern Pacific. The following year, how­
ever, Collis, to appease and gain support of the Crocker interests, 
abolished the position of assistant to the president. With Henry 
out of the SP hierarchy, George Crocker, Southern Pacific's second 
vice-president, became the undisputed voice of management on 
the West Coast. Henry stayed on as the head of the street railway, 
and a few months later, he was back with the SP as second vice-
president. Toward the end of 1899, Collis worked out an agree­
ment with the investment firm of Speyer and Company to jointly 
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purchase both the Hopkins / Searles and the Crocker shares in the 
Southern Pacific.56 As a result, Collis, because of his forceful per­
sonality and the bankers' confidence in his abilities to administer 
the railroad, gained absolute authority over the Southern Pacific. 
George Crocker resigned as second vice-president, and on 1 March 
1900, Henry replaced him. In June, Henry was promoted to first 
vice-president and looked to be the heir apparent.57 
Then, in August 1900, Collis died suddenly of a heart attack at 
his lodge on the shores of Raquette Lake in the Adirondack Moun­
tains. Devastated by the loss of his friend, advisor, mentor, and 
business associate of the last thirty years, Henry eulogized: "I am 
simply broken up over it and business of every kind seems to me 
secondary, and in a way of no importance while I am trying to pull 
myself together. . . . His character always seemed to me unique 
in very many respects and among all men I have known, he came 
nearer to rounding the circle than anyone else."58 
Henry's responses to letters of sympathy reflected his feelings 
about Collis's death. For example, he wrote William Crocker: "My 
uncle was all in all to me . . . and when I received the news of 
his sudden death it seemed as if nearly everything had gone out 
of life for me."59 Rather than mourning the death for too long, 
however, Henry was soon back at work pushing to continue his 
uncle's policies. Three weeks after the funeral, he wrote that he 
was "determined as far as my power lies to carry out his [Collis's] 
wishes and policy with respect to the Southern Pacific Company."60 
To do this, he required the same authority his uncle had possessed; 
he needed to become the SP president. With this power, Henry 
hoped to continue Collis's practice of putting a large percentage of 
profits back into the company. But Speyer and Company held the 
balance of power on the board of directors, and the bankers had 
other ideas. They wanted the SP to pay large dividends, thereby 
enhancing its stock on the market.61 Henry and his aides, backed 
by Arabella Duval Huntington, Collis's widow, worked behind the 
scenes to make Henry president of the SP. But in October 1900 
Charles M. Hays of the Canadian Grand Trunk Line was selected 
for the post. The dream of following in his uncle's footsteps was 
shattered, and, as vice-president, Henry was not in a position to 
dictate SP policy. Unable to keep the SP under Huntington family 
control, Henry and Arabella sold their large holdings to New York 
financier E. H. Harriman in February 1901. Nine months later in 
November, Henry closed a deal selling the Market Street Railway 
to a Baltimore syndicate.62 
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In 1902, divested of major interests in San Francisco, Henry de­
cided to leave the Bay Area and settle in southern California. With 
the millions of dollars he received from the sale of the SP stock 
he had inherited from Collis, the fifty-two-year-old businessman 
could have retired to a life of luxury. But Henry the entrepreneur 
was a builder, and unable to continue his uncle's expansion plans 
for the SP, he sought other challenges. 
Yet there seemed to be another force pushing Henry to pursue 
a second career in southern California. Although he had a pious 
regard for his uncle, and once noted that "his memory will be the 
most sacred thing in my whole life,"63 Henry also appears to have 
used Collis as a yardstick against which to measure his own achieve­
ment. If he could not follow in his uncle's footsteps, Henry would 
compete with his mentor by building a rival business empire in the 
Los Angeles basin. 
For such an endeavor, Henry brought with him experience 
culled from his days at the sawmill and on Collis's eastern rail­
roads, which provided him with a solid business foundation. In San 
Francisco, he had mastered the technique of running profitably a 
large streetcar system. In addition, by thinking strategically and 
moving to expand the SP system in southern California, he had 
successfully dealt with competition from rival railroad lines. 
Henry Huntington's apprenticeship ended with the death of his 
uncle. He no longer had the special friendship and guidance of 
the man who introduced him to the world of big business and nur­
tured his development. When the SP presidency position, for which 
he had been groomed, was snatched away from him, Henry sold 
his stock in the company and set off on his own. His new vision was 
of an electric railroad kingdom in southern California. 
4

Trolleys, Real Estate, and Electric Power, 
1898-1903 
By 1898, Henry Huntington had proven himself a capable manager 
of both a large streetcar company, San Francisco's Market Street 
Railway, and a transit giant, the Southern Pacific. After numer­
ous trips to southern California, Huntington decided to launch his 
own venture in the Los Angeles area. The region was tailor-made 
for him: its Mediterranean climate encouraged a large tourist in­
dustry, which introduced visitors to the area and frequently led to 
their settling there, and its citrus cultivation brought the region 
national attention and provided a steady demand for a freight-
carrying business. Meanwhile, the region's streetcar system was in 
its infancy. 
The undeveloped nature of the local transportation system ap­
pealed to the builder in Huntington. Here, he believed, was the 
opportunity to lay out and operate his own trolley network. Early 
in his Los Angeles career, the usually reticent entrepreneur told a 
young reporter about his expansive plans "to build an interurban 
system that will cover Southern California."1 With his railway ex­
perience and proper financial backing, Huntington thought he 
could run a profitable streetcar property. He convinced a group of 
associates who held an interest in the Market Street Railway to join 
him in the Los Angeles trolley business. 
Thus, Huntington's initial investment in southern California 
was in railroading, with his syndicate's purchase of the Los Angeles 
Railway in 1898. Still preoccupied with his interests in San Fran­
cisco, he did not make a major commitment to greater Los Angeles 
until November 1901 when the new Pacific Electric Railway was in­
corporated. Once he focused on the southland, Huntington started 
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building a streetcar empire by applying many techniques that had 
been successful in his career. 
Because Huntington was a quiet, retiring man who did not 
speak of or write much about his personal life, it is difficult to 
determine the reasons for his endeavors in the Los Angeles basin. 
Whether they were due to his entrepreneurial character or an at­
tempt to get out from under the shadow of his uncle by outdoing 
him in the business world, Henry Huntington was clearly a man 
driven to create an empire. To turn his vision of a great southern 
California metropolis into reality and to prevent his plans from 
being blocked, the independent Huntington remained unwilling 
to share decision making. He maintained all his business options 
in his many ventures by holding a controlling share of their stock. 
To ensure that his wishes were carried out, Huntington depended 
on several trusted and highly qualified managers to oversee his 
growing enterprises. His tendency to operate freely and without 
constraint made Huntington somewhat of a loner within the Los 
Angeles business community, and during his first years in south­
ern California, he avoided working with men outside his various 
syndicates. 
Often referred to locally as the "trolley man," Huntington spent 
his first few years in southern California setting up the infrastruc­
ture for an enormous electric railway system. Steeped in the tra­
dition of system building and the importance of controlling traffic 
access, he began piecing together his streetcar network by purchas­
ing and consolidating five existing Los Angeles lines. After acquir­
ing this nucleus, he expanded the existing trolley system through 
a large-scale building program. 
Like many other streetcar magnates, Huntington simulta­
neously entered two industries he intended to operate in conjunc­
tion with the trolleys: real estate development and electric power 
generation and distribution.2 Already aware of the direct relation­
ship between the location of a rail route and the rising value of 
the land it served, he purchased thousands of acres with the idea 
of providing trolley transportation to the undeveloped land and 
then subdividing the property. He became involved in the electric 
business to guarantee a constant source of power for his railway; 
however, Huntington's generation and distribution of electricity 
became a money-maker on its own, selling electric current to the 
city's growing population. 
Because the southland was so vast and its population so dis­
persed, Huntington built and operated two distinct trolley compa­
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nies, the Los Angeles Railway and the Pacific Electric (PE). Each 
was based on a different model, built for a different purpose, 
and managed as an individual enterprise. Resembling the Market 
Street network, the Los Angeles Railway was constructed and run 
as an intraurban company to transport people; the goal was to gen­
erate profits from streetcar operations alone. The Pacific Electric, 
on the other hand, was in many ways modeled after the SP and was 
designed as an interurban to carry both passengers and freight. 
Although Huntington's hopes that the PE would be profitable were 
not realized, when operated with his various land companies, the 
trolleys were indispensable in the promotion and sale of lots in his 
newly created suburbs. 
Six major streetcar companies operated in various parts of the 
city the year before the Huntington syndicate's purchase of the 
Los Angeles Railway. Although not nearly as dramatic as the ex­
pansion and electrification of the Market Street system, the Los 
Angeles lines followed a similar, albeit more modest, program in 
the mid-1890s. The largest company, the Los Angeles Railway, held 
73.7 miles of track.3 In 1895, led by general manager Fred W. 
Wood, an expert in street railroads, the Los Angeles Railway elec­
trified all its lines. Like most other streetcar systems of the time, 
this company retained the narrow-gauge, three-foot six-inch track 
inherited from the cable car days.4 
The tracks of the Los Angeles Railway covered the central 
downtown business district around Main, Spring, and Commer­
cial streets. From this core, its lines extended to the city limits 
in all but the northern direction, reaching Boyle Heights to the 
east, Vernon and Inglewood to the south, and Pico Heights to the 
west.5 The other city lines included the Los Angeles Traction Com­
pany, operating fifteen miles of track; the Main Street and Agri­
cultural Park Railroad, owning ten miles; and the small Temple 
Street Cable Railway, holding four and a half miles. In addition 
to these city lines, there were two interurban trolley companies— 
the Pasadena and Los Angeles Electric Railway, which maintained 
forty-four miles of track, and the Pasadena and Pacific, which held 
sixty-five miles.6 
The investors Huntington assembled to purchase the Los Ange­
les Railway included men familiar with the streetcar business and 
with southern California. Isaias W. Hellman, a prominent banker 
in Los Angeles and San Francisco, had been involved in trolley 
companies in both cities for many years. Both Antoine Borel and 
Christian DeGuigne had previous experience with streetcar sys­
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terns. A fifth man in the syndicate, although he played no real role 
in the acquisition or subsequent managing of the railway, was Collis 
Huntington. Unaware of his involvement until he read about it in 
a newspaper, the surprised Collis asked Henry for information: "I 
would like to know, just what, if any, interest I have in that Los 
Angeles Street Railway. As you know, I would do almost anything 
to please you or help you make money, but I am not altogether sure 
about the success of that road and that doubt is based on the fact 
that I do not know enough about it to have an opinion."7 Henry 
brought Collis into the syndicate either because he needed more 
money for his share of the railway or because he felt it was a good 
investment for his uncle. 
The Los Angeles Railway was established in 1895 to take over 
all the property and franchises of the Los Angeles Consolidated 
Electric Railway, the bankrupt line of southern California's inter­
urban pioneers, Moses H. Sherman and Eli P. Clark. Although 
the new company quickly modernized its lines, net earnings fell in 
1896, and the bondholders wanted to sell the firm. Henry Butters 
of San Francisco represented a South African syndicate that was 
interested in purchasing the fledging streetcar line. But when the 
deal fell through, Henry Huntington -and his partners stepped in 
and acquired the company.8 
On 1 September 1898, Huntington and Lovell White, the chair 
of the bondholder committee of the Los Angeles Railway, agreed 
to terms transferring ownership of the company to the Huntington 
group. The new company was a consolidation of the former Los 
Angeles Railway, the Main Street and Agricultural Park Railroad 
(already leased to the Los Angeles Railway), and the San Pedro 
Street Railway. The new Los Angeles Railway (LARY) was to issue 
$5 million in capital stock and had a bonded indebtedness of $5 
million. Then, to purchase the road, the Huntington syndicate 
issued $3.5 million worth of the new bonds and paid $365,000 in 
cash to the bondholders of the former company. Huntington and 
his fellow investors paid an additional $38,000 in cash for the Main 
and Fifth Street Railroad.9 
Huntington was named president, Borel became vice-president, 
and Hellman was treasurer of the LARY. The new owners planned 
some major changes, including laying heavier T-rails on paved 
streets, increasing the frequency of service, building a better style 
of car, and expanding the system.10 Huntington's 55 percent owner­
ship gave him control of the LARY. Self-confident as ever, the 
new owner wished to check on the recent purchase himself and 
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spent several days traveling over and inspecting the lines of the 
Los Angeles Railway. Afterwards, he ordered the first of many im­
provements. Work crews removed the light rails on East First Street 
and replaced them with the longer-wearing, heavier T-rails. At the 
same time, Huntington called for several new additions. One line 
was built from First Street down Los Angeles Street to Evergreen; 
the other line was constructed on East Ninth Street from Main to 
Santa Fe Avenue.11 
As with the Market Street Railway, Huntington had grandiose 
plans for the Los Angeles streetcar company. Besides improving 
the existing system, he sought to dominate urban transit in Los 
Angeles and vicinity. This goal was to be accomplished by pur­
chasing and consolidating the lines that were outside his control. 
In October, Huntington acquired the Mateo Street and Santa Fe 
Avenue line, and in December he purchased his first interurban 
line, the thirty-three-mile Los Angeles and Pasadena Electric Rail­
way (formerly the Pasadena and Los Angeles). Initially, the latter 
was run independently of the Los Angeles Railway.12 
Improvements and expansion of the LARY were concurrent 
with scheduling reforms and new service offerings. Commenting 
on the railway in January 1900, the Los Angeles Times said: "A new 
feature has been introduced during the past year for the conve­
nience of visitors who wish to see the city at a small expense. Twice 
a day a car is run from the business center through the most at­
tractive residence sections of the city, the trip lasting several hours, 
at a cost of twenty-five cents."13 
Based in San Francisco, Huntington continued to rely on men 
in Los Angeles to manage the growing company. Fred Wood, who 
oversaw the electrification of the former Los Angeles Railway's 
cable and horse lines, was retained as the general manager of the 
new firm. C.W. Smith, affiliated with the Los Angeles and Pasa­
dena prior to its purchase by Huntington, was named president 
and manager of the interurban company. Huntington was content 
to allow these managers, both thoroughly familiar with the city and 
their respective streetcar lines, to make the day-to-day operational 
decisions. But in 1899, when Huntington was temporarily ousted 
from the Southern Pacific, he took a more active interest in his 
southern California ventures. During this brief hiatus from the SP, 
he and his Los Angeles attorney, John D. Bicknell (earlier retained 
by the SP and a member of the board of directors of the former 
Los Angeles Railway), incorporated the Pacific Electric Railway of 
Arizona. Although established as an interurban company, the PE 
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held only one short local line, the Main and Fifth Street Railway. 
Huntington's interest in this new firm was short-lived; when Collis 
regained control of the SP, he returned his nephew to its hierarchy 
in 1900.14 
However, after the death of his uncle, Huntington sold his San 
Francisco interests and headed for Los Angeles. Just two days 
after he agreed to sell the Market Street Railway, Huntington an­
nounced the incorporation of the Pacific Electric of California, on 
10 November 1901. This short period in the fall of 1901 marked 
the end of one phase of Huntington's life and the beginning of 
another. 
Prior to the formation of the PE of California, Huntington had 
been setting the stage for new and larger projects in southern 
California. He brought previous associates to manage his growing 
interests, surveyed property for possible rail routes, and procured 
financial backing. Aware of these activities, the Los Angeles Express 
predicted that "a syndicate, of which H.E.H. and some of his asso­
ciates in the ownership of the Los Angeles Railway Company are 
to be the controlling spirits, is at present figuring upon a complete 
gridironing of the country tributary to L.A. with electric lines."15 
In July 1901, Epes Randolph, the engineer Huntington and 
his uncle had asked to manage the Market Street Railway, was re­
cruited from the SP's Yuma and El Paso division and appointed 
general manager of Huntington's street railroads in Los Angeles. 
Randolph replaced Fred Wood, who had died, and C. W. Smith, 
who was acting as interim manager of the Los Angeles Railway. The 
San Francisco Bulletin considered Randolph an excellent appoint­
ment, noting: "HEH has secured for his electric line construction 
one of the cleverest of railroad managers, and it is his expressed 
intention to thoroughly gridiron the south with electric lines."16 
Randolph was an essential figure in Huntington's management 
team during these early years in Los Angeles. A friend of the 
Huntington family, he had years of experience serving as super­
intendent and chief engineer on several eastern railroads and was 
highly regarded in the steam railway business. An in-house publi­
cation of the PE noted that "while H.E. Huntington is the father of 
the Pacific Electric . . . Epes Randolph can truly be designated as the 
architect of the PE system." Although Randolph's tenure with the 
PE lasted only three years—stricken with tuberculosis, he returned 
to the drier climate of Arizona in 1904—he was responsible for 
laying out many of the network's most important lines.17 
For Huntington to concentrate on his Los Angeles investments, 
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he needed a loyal and knowledgeable associate to supervise his 
eastern concerns. He had become interested in some major U.S. 
firms as a result of his adept investing in the 1880s and 1890s, but 
most of his eastern holdings were inherited from his uncle. In addi­
tion to granting his nephew one-third of his SP holdings, Collis, 
through his will, divided much of the estate between his widow 
and Henry. Interests shared by the two Huntingtons included the 
Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, real estate 
holdings, and stocks and bonds in various eastern railroads.18 Hunt­
ington selected Charles E. Graham, long associated with the Pacific 
Improvement Company and later Huntington's private secretary 
with the Southern Pacific, as his confidential agent and sent him to 
New York.19 
Another key man in Huntington's business operations was 
John A. Muir. Like Randolph and Graham, Muir was lured away 
from the SP management. Superintendent of the SP's Los Angeles 
Division, Muir knew southern California well. When the PE was 
incorporated, the directors decided that the job of managing both 
the Los Angeles Railway and the PE was too much for one man. In 
February 1902, Muir resigned from the SP to accept the appoint­
ment of general manager of the LARY, and Randolph moved from 
heading both companies to running only the PE.20 
Even with these carefully selected managers, Huntington re­
mained the dynamic force behind the growing street railway sys­
tem. Before the PE's incorporation, there were indications of an 
interurban expansion program. One newspaper noted that Hunt­
ington had been inspecting various roads in different parts of the 
southland; he examined the old San Gabriel Valley Rapid Transit 
line from Shorb to Alhambra, as well as the Redondo line. Other 
papers reported that Huntington was applying for street franchises 
and acquiring rights-of-way in many directions out of Los Ange­
les.21 By October 1901, prognosticating about his plans was no 
longer necessary. Huntington's interurban line, the Los Angeles 
and Pasadena, began building an extension to Alhambra and San 
Gabriel, and the company secured a franchise for a line from Los 
Angeles to Monrovia.22 
In order to obtain the financing to carry out his interurban 
plans, Huntington created a new company. Once he had a rough 
idea of the size and scope of the system, he went looking for inves­
tors. He had already determined that the new railroad's goal was 
to operate 452 miles of track. Bicknell, now attorney for the Los 
Angeles Railway, informed his boss that, according to California 
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law, one thousand dollars worth of stock must be subscribed for 
every mile of track proposed in the articles of incorporation.23 The 
Pacific Electric Railway came into being with a minimum amount 
of subscribed stock, 4,520 shares with a par value of one hun­
dred dollars each. However, the initial amount paid on the stock 
amounted to only ten dollars per share. The remainder of the 
money due on each share could be called in when needed through 
stock assessments.24 
Having received a substantial sum of money from his uncle's 
will, Huntington was a wealthy man, but he chose to take on part­
ners in the interurban enterprise. All the investors Huntington 
pulled together for the PE venture possessed knowledge or abilities 
that would benefit the trolley company. The largest block of stock, 
986 shares, or about 22 percent of the PE, was taken by Hunting­
ton. Hellman, Borel, and DeGuigne—the other members of the 
Los Angeles Railway syndicate—each subscribed to 678 shares. As 
bankers, these three investors could facilitate the sale of securities 
and thus raise needed capital for the new company. The remaining 
fifteen hundred shares were divided equally among John Bick­
nell and Epes Randolph, who had already proven their worth to 
Huntington, and Jonathan S. Slauson. Huntington likely brought 
in Slauson, owner of the seventeen-thousand-acre Azusa ranch, to 
tap into the landowner's resources of wealth and influence.25 
The Pacific Electric's Articles of Incorporation, signed 29 Octo­
ber, and filed 10 November 1901, made the company's large-scale 
plans explicit. Its capital stock was set at $10 million, and bonds 
were to be issued as construction began. The PE was a consolidation 
of several streetcar companies Huntington had obtained earlier. It 
consisted of the Los Angeles and Pasadena, the Mt. Lowe Railway, 
the PE of Arizona, the West Ninth Street line, the Mateo Street line, 
and the Temple Street Cable Railway, which was being electrified.26 
Huntington's boldness was illustrated by the articles' description 
of the PE's building program. Trolley routes were being planned to 
run from Los Angeles north and east—to Monrovia, Duarte, San 
Bernardino, Redlands, Riverside, Santa Ana, and Pomona. Other 
northeastern lines to be constructed included a route from Pasa­
dena to Sierra Madre, South Pasadena, and San Gabriel. Heading 
southeast from Los Angeles, tracks were to be laid to Whittier, 
Santa Ana, and then north to Pomona. Plans also called for rails to 
run from Los Angeles to Long Beach, Santa Ana, San Pedro, and 
Covina, and from Los Angeles to San Pedro and Redondo. Indica­
tive of the far-reaching streetcar network envisioned by Hunting­
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ton was a proposed route that was never built, a 115-mile line from 
Los Angeles to Santa Barbara.27 
Unlike the LARY's narrow-gauge track, which limited the size 
and speed of its trolleys, the Pacific Electric, largely because of 
Randolph's influence, operated more like a steam railroad. The 
PE's tracks were standard-gauge, four feet eight and a half inches, 
which permitted easy transfer of passengers and freight from the 
transcontinental steam railroads to Huntington's interurbans. Also 
similar to steam railways, the PE obtained private rights-of-way 
for many of its routes; with no cross traffic and few curves, the 
interurban cars could attain high speeds. Finally, plans on the PE 
drawing board called for many extensions running parallel to and 
competing with existing steam railroad routes.28 
In modeling the PE after a steam railway, Huntington relied 
on his experience with the SP operations in southern California. 
From his many junkets in the 1890s to Los Angeles, he had be­
come thoroughly familiar with the region. He was also well aware 
of the relationship between railroads and land development. Since 
the 1870s and the arrival of the railroads, settlement in south­
ern California had followed the railways' tracks. As the SP and 
the Santa Fe rapidly laid rails through the southland, agricultural 
communities were founded in anticipation of a transcontinental 
connection and the easy access of shipping produce; these towns 
included San Bernardino, Riverside, Pasadena, El Monte, Pomona, 
and Long Beach.29 
The railroad, then, was very effective in creating towns. With his 
Pacific Electric Railway, Huntington held an essential component 
to further real estate development in the entire region. His inter­
urbans, combined with the area's increasing population, enabled 
Huntington to make a fortune in subdivisions. In 1902, he wrote 
of the southland's prospects and growth: "I don't think any bright 
young business fellow can make a mistake in coming to Southern 
California. Los Angeles is growing very rapidly; in 1880 they had 
a population of about 12,000; in 1890 a trifle over 50,000; in 1900 
about 103,000, and they claim today 130,000."30 In order to take 
advantage of his trolley cars, and the expanding population seek­
ing new places to live, Huntington formed several land companies, 
adopting a strategy similar to that used by Borax Smith in the San 
Francisco Bay area. 
His first land enterprise, the Huntington Land and Improve­
ment Company (HL&I), was incorporated in 1902 and capital­
ized at one hundred thousand dollars, comprised of one thousand 
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shares of one hundred dollars each. Although he actually owned 
all the company's stock, forty shares divided into ten-share incre­
ments, the minimum amount legally required for one to qualify as 
a director, were held under the names of his associates who served 
in that capacity. He chose as manager George S. Patton, an anti-
Southern Pacific democrat. Patton, whose son, George S. Patton, 
became the famous World War II general, had served as manager 
of San Gabriel Wine Company, owned by Hellman and Shorb. On 
30 April 1903, two weeks after it was announced that Patton was to 
head the HL&I, the Los Angeles Herald reported that Huntington 
had acquired a controlling interest in the wine company.31 Over 
the seven years Patton worked for Huntington, the two men be­
came close friends, and although Huntington continued to make 
the strategic decisions regarding his real estate properties, Patton 
was given charge of the day-to-day operations.32 
Because many of the proposed PE routes were through the San 
Gabriel Valley and because this was the area that Huntington had 
intensively explored in his SP days, much of his early real estate 
investments were made in this northeastern section of the county. 
From 1901 to 1903, Huntington, largely through HL&I, purchased 
immense tracts of land in what is today Alhambra, Pasadena, San 
Marino, and South Pasadena. Unwilling to relinquish the long-
range planning to his managers, he spent hours pouring over maps 
and passed days in the countryside contemplating land purchases 
and possible rail routes. He made frequent surveying trips by car­
riage, usually accompanied by his stenographer, Oscar A. Smith. 
After he had decided how an area might be developed, Hunting­
ton directed his associates to buy the property and lay out the most 
effective rail line to the region.33 
Huntington's purchases in this area included the choice prop­
erty he had first seen in 1892, the Shorb San Marino Ranch. In 
January 1903, through another of his land firms, the Los Angeles 
Land Company, he acquired the estate of approximately 490 acres 
from the Farmers and Merchants Bank for $239,730.34 Hunting­
ton's son, Howard, who had joined the PE as Randolph's assistant 
in March, wrote his grandmother regarding his father's real estate 
buying spree: "He is certainly buying a great deal of real estate and 
ranches and seems to have the greatest faith in the future devel­
opment of Southern California. It is certainly making a wonderful 
snowing now."35 
Huntington's faith in the area was reflected in the grand scale 
of his projects. Similar to other urban entrepreneurs who built 
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impressive structures, Huntington constructed a larger interurban 
depot. Like James Phelan of San Francisco, who in the 1880s 
erected the Phelan Building, one of the city's first high-rise build­
ings, Huntington planned to build a nine-story structure to cen­
tralize the offices of the various Huntington concerns. Called the 
Pacific Electric Building, it was to be located on property that Hunt­
ington had acquired in March 1902 at the corner of Sixth and 
Main streets in downtown Los Angeles. When purchased, this land 
was in a residential district and far from the city's major business 
section around Spring and First streets. Just as the business dis­
trict had shifted in San Francisco in 1875 when the Central Pacific 
moved its ferry landings, so Huntington believed businessmen in 
Los Angeles would relocate around the new interurban terminal. 
As blueprints for the PE Building were being considered, Hunt­
ington, to hedge his bet and facilitate the shift of the business core 
to the south, worked closely with congressional lobbyist John Boyd 
to keep the Main Street post office in its present location. The post 
office required expanded quarters, and some people wished to see 
it moved, but Huntington's frequent letters stressed the impor­
tance of keeping it where it was. When the depot was completed, 
this thoroughfare would be the major artery for the interurbans. 
Huntington stated: "I am building several interurban lines running 
from the surrounding towns into Los Angeles and probabilities are 
that local mail in Southern California will be carried by electric 
lines. All interurbans lines [will] run past the present post office."36 
Huntington's efforts succeeded, and his move to the corner of Sixth 
and Main proved astute; the business district soon followed the PE 
Building into this section of downtown. 
When the PE Building was opened in January 1905, it con­
tained twelve acres of floor space, making it the largest office 
building west of Chicago. The Huntington companies occupied the 
seventh floor, and the top two floors were held by an exclusive 
men's organization, the Jonathan Club.37 
Although Huntington was making large investments in south­
ern California, the majority of his time was spent in New York. 
His extended stays there served two purposes. First, since Collis's 
will had divided many of the millionaire's extensive holdings be­
tween his widow and favorite nephew, Henry often worked with 
Arabella and the executors of Collis Huntington's estate overseeing 
their joint business interests.38 These New York trips also provided 
an opportunity for Henry to continue his longstanding friendship 
with Arabella. Second, and related to his Los Angeles concerns, 
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Huntington often went to New York to obtain money for his south­
ern California projects by selling and liquidating many of the stocks 
and bonds he held in major railroads and other corporations. As 
the PE's Joseph McMillan explained in 1907, "Year after year, 
Mr. Huntington goes to New York and comes back with money for 
building new lines."39 When in New York, Huntington resided in 
the exclusive Metropolitan Club. When in Los Angeles, prior to 
the completion of the Jonathan Club, he stayed at the prestigious 
Van Nuys Hotel located at the corner of Fourth and Main streets.40 
While Huntington was building street railways and snapping 
up large portions of inexpensive land along planned interurban 
lines, he did not forget his uncle Collis's advice about the value 
of entering another trolley-related industry, electric power gen­
eration. In July 1901, Hellman wrote Huntington regarding the 
purchase of electric power and mentioned Los Angeles entrepre­
neur William G. Kerckhoff, a man with whom Huntington had a 
long business association. The banker told Huntington that Kerck­
hoff had offered to sell electricity to the Los Angeles Railway, and, 
more important, that "Kerckhoff has now made [us] a proposi­
tion to form a new company to supply electric power from the 
Kern River."41 
Kerckhoff and Huntington had become acquainted in 1893. 
Before Huntington and the SP purchased the San Gabriel Val­
ley Rapid Transit Railway, Kerckhoff had been one of the rail­
way's owners. Kerckhoff, who had arrived in southern California 
in 1878, had been involved in several ventures, including a lumber 
company and an ice business, before entering the electric power 
field. He first moved into the electric power industry in April 1894, 
with the incorporation of the San Gabriel Power Company. Three 
years later, on 24 May 1897, he and electrical engineer Allan C. 
Balch formed the larger San Gabriel Electric Company. This firm 
combined the former San Gabriel Power Company with the Sierra 
Power Company, which consisted of two hydroelectric plants, the 
San Antonio facility near Pomona, and the Sierra plant in the 
San Bernardino Mountains. Another hydroelectric power station 
was later built on the San Gabriel River. Known as the Azusa 
plant, it produced and transmitted current to Los Angeles, where 
it powered streetcars and manufacturing plants.42 
Aware of the value of controlling hydroelectric power genera­
tion, Huntington willingly listened to the power entrepreneur's 
proposals. Eager to get the Kern River project off the ground, 
Kerckhoff wrote to Huntington: "My idea is, that we should orga­
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nize the company, go over with our engineers all the estimates, 
plans, and surveys heretofore made, and obtain bids from the 
most responsible."43 After some thought, Huntington agreed to 
join Kerckhoff and two others, Henry W. O'Melveny, a Los Ange­
les attorney associated with John Bicknell, and Kaspare Cohn, in 
the venture. As with his other companies, Huntington brought in 
his investment partners. On 6 March 1902, the Pacific Light and 
Power Company was incorporated. It was capitalized at ten million 
dollars; the Huntington group received 51 percent of the stock, 
which was held under the name of the Los Angeles Railway, and the 
Kerckhoff investors took the remaining 49 percent. Although the 
Huntington syndicate held the controlling share of stock, Kerck­
hoff, because of his experience, was named president of the new 
44 company.
Just as he had done with the street railways, Huntington 
made the PL&P a consolidation of several smaller companies. 
It absorbed the former San Gabriel Electric Company, the Kern 
Power Company, and the Los Angeles Electric Company. The new 
firm owned the 1,600-horsepower Azusa water power plant, the 
800-horsepower San Antonio water power plant, and the 3,000­
horsepower Los Angeles steam plant. The company also owned 
sixty-three miles of transmission lines and a distribution system for 
the Los Angeles area.45 
Since the PL&P was incorporated to provide motive power for 
Huntington's two growing street railways as well as electricity to 
the city, more and larger power plants were necessary. To meet 
demand, PL&P began building the 10,000-horsepower Kern River 
hydroelectric power plant, 11.5 miles down river from Kernville, 
and two sets of transmission lines, which ran 105 miles to Los 
Angeles. In addition, the company doubled the capacity of the 
Los Angeles steam plant; it was to be used to generate power in 
cases of emergencies or when problems occurred with the distant 
hydroelectric sites.46 
Besides expanding through a building program, PL&P con­
tinued to grow by purchasing other power companies. In 1903 
it acquired the Ontario Electric Company, the Ontario and San 
Antonio Heights Railway, which held water rights for a power 
plant, and the San Bernardino Gas and Electric Company.47 
Huntington maintained active interest in PL&P, but this occu­
pied only a small part of his time. A railroad man first, he guided 
the vast expansion programs of both the Los Angeles Railway and 
the Pacific Electric. Proud of his growing trolley and real estate 
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empire, Huntington wished to be kept up to date on the latest 
development of his properties. In Los Angeles he spent much of 
his time in the field checking rail construction and contemplat­
ing future land development. In New York, at his office on Broad 
Street, he kept abreast of details by requiring his subordinates to 
send photographs of the most recent construction work.48 
From 1901 to mid-1903, Huntington's major building efforts 
took place on his interurban PE, although the LARY was not 
altogether neglected. The city's population continued moving 
southeast and southwest of the central residential districts center­
ing near Sixth and Main streets.49 The LARY's extensions followed 
these migration patterns and helped disperse the population away 
from the city's former core. 
In order to reach growing residential areas, the LARY strug­
gled to procure street franchises. In 1901, Huntington encoun­
tered stiff competition for franchises from William and T.J. Hook 
and their Los Angeles Traction Company. On 27 May, the Trac­
tion Company was the highest bidder at the franchise auction for 
rights to build on West Jefferson Street from University to Arling­
ton Avenue. In September, Huntington, represented by manager 
Randolph and attorney William E. Dunn, who had once served as 
Los Angeles city attorney, outbid Hook for the Echo Park franchise. 
Dunn soon retired from his other legal activities to act as Hunt­
ington's agent on the West Coast.50 The disputes over franchises 
continued, and it was not until October that Huntington learned 
of a defeat that had actually occurred five months earlier. In Octo­
ber, Huntington wrote businessman Hervey Lindley regarding the 
franchise Lindley held on Eleventh Street, that ran from Georgia 
to Alvarado; this important franchise covered a street leading to 
the growing residential area of Pico Heights. Much to Huntington's 
chagrin, Lindley responded that Hook had already purchased the 
franchise in May.51 
Regardless of these setbacks, the LARY completed many exten­
sions. In 1901 the Pico Street line was expanded east from Harvard 
to Wilton Place. The following year there were two additions; a 
road was built on private right-of-way from the Washington line 
down La Salle Avenue to Western, and the Eastlake Park (now 
Lincoln Park) line was connected to the Maple Avenue line.52 
Perhaps the most important change in these years was the 
introduction of an improved, standardized streetcar. Designed by 
Huntington engineers, these cars came to be called "Huntington 
Standards." Up to this time, the LARY used a variety of street­
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car models. The Standards were especially well suited to the dry, 
southern California climate. The wooden cars consisted of barred, 
open-air sections at the front and back and a five-window enclosed 
compartment in the middle of the car.53 
As a Huntington letter to the Railroad Gazette revealed, he was 
interested in the Los Angeles Railway and its growth, but he was 
excited about the Pacific Electric and its possibilities. On 20 Feb­
ruary 1902, Huntington reported that the LARY held ninety-eight 
miles of track, but he provided a much more detailed descrip­
tion of his interurban firm. The PE, he noted, designed to carry 
passengers, freight, and mail, had forty miles of track stretching 
from Los Angeles to Pasadena and Altadena via Garvanza (now 
part of Highland Park), with a scenic extension winding its way up 
Mt. Lowe. Huntington added that a new line to Pasadena and a 
Los Angeles to Long Beach line were under construction.34 
Once Huntington decided on a particular destination for the 
PE, he left the details of planning and construction to his civil engi­
neer, Epes Randolph. The new Pasadena route, dubbed the "Short 
Line" because of its directness from downtown to the northeastern 
community, opened 21 June 1902 and quickly replaced the old Los 
Angeles and Pasadena as the commuters' first choice. The cities 
of Alhambra and San Gabriel were to be connected to the new 
Pasadena route by branch lines, and residents eagerly awaited the 
streetcars' arrival. The Los Angeles Times recounted the reaction in 
Alhambra to the advent of the trolleys: 
An electric shock struck Alhambra yesterday morning. It set the people 
agog. It almost completely depopulated the pretty suburban town. After 
many months of anxious anticipation, the new electric line of the Hunt­
ington syndicate opened for business at 6 o'clock. . . . The town turned 
out en masse to experience the novel sensation of riding to the city by 
electricity. . .  . It is the first branch to be set in motion of the big broad 
gauge system of the Huntington-Hellman syndicate.55 
Long Beach had previously been connected to Los Angeles by 
horse car and then by steam railroad. Yet the streetcar possessed 
an almost magical aura. People had seen land booms take place 
in Santa Monica and Pasadena, the two cities first reached by the 
interurbans. The belief that trolley access precipitated increased 
land values led many property owners to donate land to the PE 
along its proposed line to Long Beach. Over this land, combined 
with property the PE had purchased at nominal prices, Randolph 
constructed a double-track route on private, eighty-foot right-of­
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way. Earlier, Huntington had promised Long Beach residents that 
the interurban connection to Los Angeles would be completed by 
October. When acting as construction superintendent in the 1880s, 
Huntington had often beaten his own timetable. Emulating his em­
ployer, Randolph pushed work crews to complete the line three 
months ahead of schedule. On 4 July, the first trolley left Los Ange­
les for Long Beach. With high frequency service—cars ran every 
fifteen minutes—and high-speed transit over a first-class roadbed, 
Huntington called it "the finest road in the world." The Long Beach 
line was soon the system's most profitable run.56 
Wherever the PE cars led, subdividers, development, and 
growth soon followed. And Huntington significantly affected how 
and where greater Los Angeles developed. The advent of the trol­
leys in Long Beach is illustrative. Prior to the interurban con­
nection, an acre of land three blocks from the beach cost three 
hundred dollars in this town of about two thousand residents. Six 
months after the PE's arrival in 1902, an acre of land one mile 
from the ocean was advertised for seven hundred dollars. Further­
more, by 1910, the population of Long Beach had risen to nearly 
eighteen thousand, a rate of growth higher than that of any other 
U.S. city." 
Similar growth, if slightly less spectacular, occurred wherever 
and whenever trolley lines were built. The San Gabriel Valley town 
of Alhambra, for example, although founded during the boom of 
1887, remained too small to be listed on the census reports of 1890 
or 1900. In 1902 the PE reached the community, and by 1910 the 
town's population had risen to five thousand.58 
Huntington's ambition to build an interurban empire and de­
velop land along its lines fueled the PE's expansion. After the Pasa­
dena and Long Beach lines were completed, extensions into the 
San Gabriel Valley centers of Monrovia and Whittier were finished 
in 1903, and by June of that year, the PE's tracks stretched over 
170 miles of southern California.59 The PE's rapid growth led many 
to speculate just how far and in what direction Huntington would 
build. Thinking in this vein, E. A. Adams, a Huntington secretary, 
wrote C. E. Graham in 1903: "There is a good deal of talk about 
Mr. Huntington running his trolley lines to Frisco. It looks like hot 
air, but I would hardly be surprised if such a thing did happen 
within the next year."60 Ironically, it was the success and swiftness 
of his PE expansion that led to an internal conflict among Hunt­
ington and his associates and an external struggle with the steam 
railroad interests. 
66 TROLLEYS, REAL ESTATE, AND ELECTRIC POWER 
Huntington's partners became dissatisfied because of the con­
stant demands for funds to finance the expansions. A stock as­
sessment of 5 percent was levied on all shareholders in February 
1902. Because the PE's building program did not slow down, the 
company issued one million dollars' worth of forty-year, 6 percent 
bonds through Hellman's Union Trust Company in San Francisco. 
The bond issue was oversubscribed by California investors, and 
plans were readied to issue more bonds.61 
The sluggish economy made the immediate sale of more bonds 
difficult but Huntington adhered to his building program. Cash to 
finance construction was obtained by the PE stockholders' taking 
up the bonds themselves. By February 1903, the PE had $3,555,000 
worth of bonds outstanding. Of that amount, Huntington held 
$400,000 by the end of 1902, and by the following December his 
total of PE bonds had risen to $l,468,000.62 
When associated with Huntington in San Francisco, Hellman, 
Borel, and DeGuigne had seen Huntington manage a large street 
railroad that resulted almost immediately in high profits and 
healthy dividends. Yet in Los Angeles, these men found themselves 
providing money for Huntington's pet project, with no end in sight 
for the cash outflow. Following the first assessment, DeGuigne sold 
427 of his 678 shares to the other three associates. Huntington took 
up 273 shares, and Hellman and Borel each bought 77 shares.63 
Concerned about the costs of the PE, the three financiers were 
also displeased with its net earnings. Unlike the LARY's net earn­
ings, which rose from $85,200 in 1900 to $366,100 in 1903, the 
PE netted $121,000 in 1902, but that amount dropped to a loss 
of $37,600 in 1903.64 These figures proved fairly prophetic; over 
the next few years, the LARY continued to have strong earning 
power and showed a steadily increasing profit, but the growing PE 
constantly struggled to meet the break-even point. 
Although the PE did not generate large profits, the already 
existing nucleus of a far-flung, standard-gauge network caught the 
attention of E. H. Harriman and the SP. Harriman feared that 
Huntington's electric system, which often ran cars more frequently 
and at higher speeds than the steam railroads, would drastically cut 
into the SP's passenger and freight business in southern Califor­
nia. The pattern of transportation connected with the annual Los 
Angeles Festival of Flowers in May 1903 indicated the reasons for 
Harriman's concern. Approximately 70,000 out-of-town visitors 
came into Los Angeles to see the pageant. Of that figure, 47,500 
were transported by electric railways, and 30,000 were brought in 
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by Huntington's PE. The SP, on the other hand, carried only 9,000 
of the tourists.65 
Huntington's first five years in southern California met with in­
credible success, but that success did not come without its costs. The 
PE's building program was tremendously expensive, and Hunting­
ton's partners began to worry about his policy of continued expan­
sion. He also had to acknowledge an impending confrontation with 
the Harriman / SP interests. 
During these years, Huntington drew upon his experience with 
the Market Street Railway and the SP to lay the foundation for a 
business empire based on street railroads, and in so doing, was soon 
shaping the growth of greater Los Angeles. He established two 
separate trolley systems, each for a distinct purpose, and entered 
the related industries of real estate and electric power generation. 
Day-to-day operations of these ventures were overseen by his hand­
picked managers, but Huntington made the long-range decisions 
and was the guiding force behind his organizations. 
Huntington then prepared for a period of unprecedented ac­
tivity, which included rail extensions, real estate subdivisions, and 
the building of new power plants. These activities did take place 
but not in the manner, nor as rapidly, as Huntington had ex­
pected. Control over his railways—the key to his growing empire 
that Huntington had jealously sought to hold, became difficult to 
maintain. Hampered by associates unwilling to pour money into 
the PE, and confronted with a battle for the southern California 
transportation market, Huntington was on the brink of an era of 
intense struggle. 
5

Shaping the Basin and Developing the Economy, 
1903-1907 
In 1908 Huntington mused about his activity in southern Califor­
nia: "When I came out here five years ago, my friends in the East 
asserted that I was too optimistic over the opportunities for growth 
and development. . . . They regarded my investments as visionary. 
My chief mistake is that I was too conservative."l 
The period from 1903 to 1907 was Huntington's most active, 
when his business empire in southern California reached i ts apex. 
The Los Angeles Financier, a contemporary business periodical, de­
scribed Huntington's activities: "He has in all his big operations in 
this southland had an immense advantage over the general mar­
ket—he knew what he was going to do next." Huntington con­
structed trolley lines to areas where people could "build their coun­
try homes in his extension block by block in the outposts of the 
city, bringing in the dairies and alfalfa ranches and planting and 
paving and dotting them with bungalows."2 
Huntington rarely released information about his business deal­
ings. In May 1908, he was quoted in the Los Angeles Examiner as 
saying: "I will not tell you what I intend to do further, for I never 
talk about my intentions until they become facts. . . . What I am 
going to do must remain to be told by what I do do."3 
During this half-decade, Huntington remained in charge of 
both of Los Angeles's largest streetcar companies. Meanwhile, his 
longtime associates sold off their interests in the Pacific Electric 
and later the Los Angeles Railway. For different reasons, neither 
of these railroads paid dividends. 
The PE operated near the break-even point, and its revenues 
often failed to meet expenses. Huntington's partners had invested 
68 
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in his southern California trolleys believing they would reap re­
turns similar to those generated earlier by the Market Street Rail­
way. In 1904, alarmed by the PE's failure to pay dividends and by 
the steady cash outgo for assessments for continuing construction, 
the three associates divested themselves of their interests in the PE. 
To Huntington, the PE and his other interurban firms were 
not isolated enterprises. The trolleys worked together synergisti­
cally with his power company and land firms. Huntington street­
cars, powered by his Pacific Light and Power Company, rolled over 
tracks to property that was often already owned by one of his land 
companies or was under consideration for purchase. The acreage 
was eventually subdivided into communities designed for various 
socioeconomic groups and sold at a large profit. From 1905 to 
1907, the return on investment for the Huntington Land and Im­
provement Company was 7.6 percent. Adding to this efficient de­
velopment machine, Huntington bought or established water com­
panies and, with the PL&P, his firms often provided these new 
communities with public utilities. As long as the triad of companies 
was ultimately successful, the profitability of the trolley firms was 
not his primary concern. 
Hellman, Borel, and DeGuigne understood Huntington's logic, 
but they held no interest in the Huntington Land and Improve­
ment Company. Although they all had substantial real estate hold­
ings in the southland and frequently benefited from new PE lines, 
they did not wish to continue putting money into the interurban 
with no sight of a return on their transit investment. Unlike the PE, 
the LARY was very profitable, but, to the dismay of the minority 
stockholders, Huntington reinvested the profits in the company, 
believing that foregoing dividends would generate larger returns 
to the stockholders at a later date. Unwilling to wait, the three 
financiers sold their holdings in the Los Angeles Railway in 1907. 
E. H. Harriman and the Southern Pacific superseded Hellman, 
Borel, and DeGuigne as Huntington's partners in street railways. 
Like Huntington, Harriman and his SP also desired to dominate 
southern California's mass transit business. To attain this goal, 
Harriman wanted to add electric rail lines, which were rapidly 
blanketing the southland, to supplement the existing SP regional 
steam railway network. Huntington's interurban system had be­
come the largest in the area, providing stiff competition with the 
SP for passenger and freight traffic. Thus, Harriman believed that 
if he acquired a percentage of stock at least equal to Huntington's 
share in the PE, he could control the interui ban's development and 
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would be on his way to tightening his grip on the regional trans­
portation business. At the same time, he wanted to eliminate the 
competition between the trolleys and the SP railroad in the Los 
Angeles market. 
Harriman was ultimately successful in creating a unified transit 
system in the Los Angeles area. Although he did not live to see the 
SP gain complete control of the PE in 1910, under his leadership 
the SP obtained half-ownership of the trolley company by 1904. 
With this interest in the PE, the SP was eventually able to control 
where interurban lines were built. An SP veto, for example, kept 
Huntington from constructing a trolley line between Los Ange­
les and San Diego. Generally, however, the SP backed Hunting­
ton's interurban expansion program, and Huntington ultimately 
deferred to the Southern Pacific's control over the PE so he could 
concentrate on the Los Angeles Railway, real estate investments, 
and power development. 
As Harriman expanded the SP's involvement in local mass tran­
sit, Huntington enlarged his rail empire by incorporating another 
company, the Los Angeles Inter-Urban (LAIU), and acquiring sev­
eral existing railways, among them the valuable Los Angeles and 
Redondo Railway. While his rail systems were growing, Huntington 
purchased real estate in the southland. He did so by either incor­
porating new land development companies or by joining existing 
firms with other entrepreneurs already involved in a particular 
region. 
Whether laying rails, surveying property, or inspecting cost 
sheets for new power plants, Huntington was constantly working on 
one project or another. Pacific Electric manager Joseph McMillan 
remarked: "He has inherited the building disease, the operating 
disease. It is in his blood."4 Huntington recognized his need for 
constant work and continuous challenges. When the whirl of the 
business world slowed, he found solace making improvements on 
his San Marino Ranch. In October 1904, he wrote his mother: "I 
am doing some grading on the Shorb place; you know I can't well 
live unless I can be grading somewhere."5 
Aware of this activity, the Los Angeles Times in 1903 reported 
that Huntington "will probably build a palatial estate on the Shorb 
[ranch], and part of that section will be built for millionaires to 
live."6 The newspaper's prediction was accurate. In 1906 Hunting­
ton retained architects Myron Hunt and Elmer Grey to design and 
build a large Georgian-style mansion on the San Marino property. 
While making improvements on his ranch and when in Los Ange­
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les, Huntington continued to reside at the Van Nuys Hotel until he 
moved in 1905 to a five-room suite in the Jonathan Club atop his 
newly completed Pacific Electric Building. 
Huntington's need for continuous challenge and his rapid estab­
lishment of many important enterprises inevitably drew compari­
sons between the nephew and his late uncle. Isaac F. Marcosson 
noted in 1914 that "Henry E. Huntington is a sort of reincarna­
tion of Collis P., with the same thrift, foresight, and constructive 
energy. . . ." Both men also exhibited tremendous patience with 
their businesses and were willing to wait for investments to become 
profitable. But Marcosson also observed a significant difference in 
the two men's personalities; while Collis apparently enjoyed atten­
tion, Henry was rather shy and reserved.7 These personal charac­
teristics, combined with his refusal to have his decisions dictated 
by others, account for Huntington's tendency to operate indepen­
dently. 
Spending more time in Los Angeles, Huntington saw less of his 
family, which had remained in San Francisco. His daughters and 
his mother, as well as his sister, Caroline, and her husband, Burke, 
frequently came south to visit Huntington and his son, Howard.8 
Yet Mary Huntington, who preferred San Francisco to Los Ange­
les, spent little, if any, time in the southland visiting her husband. 
On 21 March 1906, Mary's absences were explained when she filed 
for divorce, revealing that the couple had been separated since 
1900. The divorce hearing took place the following day and lasted 
only seven minutes; Mary's alimony was set at forty thousand dol­
lars annually, to come from a $1 million trust fund. Following the 
brief court appearance, Mary and her daughter, Marian, boarded 
the steamship Korea for a trip to Japan. Huntington returned to his 
business affairs in southern California.9 
Although Huntington's drive to build an empire may have de­
stroyed his marriage, it also took its toll on his relationship with 
his children. Clara, Henry's eldest daughter, later explained that 
business seemed to consume her father's life: "For my own part, I 
see how the few have to be sacrificed for the benefit of the greater 
number, meaning that we rarely saw father, and his ambitions, his 
dreams, [and] his plans that would have been interesting to hear 
about, we just didn't."10 
Three years before his marital problems became public knowl­
edge, Huntington was concentrating on becoming the undisputed 
leader in the Los Angeles transit market. As 1903 began, he pro­
ceeded with his planned rail extensions to Whittier and Monrovia. 
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He then began laying track from downtown to San Pedro to com­
pete for freight and passenger traffic with the SP's steam railroads 
and the Hook family's new narrow-gauge interurban, the Cali­
fornia Pacific, which connected downtown Los Angeles with San 
Pedro. In April he extended his railroad holdings eastward beyond 
the Los Angeles county line to the rich citrus-growing area known 
as the "Orange Empire." Huntington purchased stock in the San 
Bernardino Valley Traction Company and then gained control of 
the Riverside and Arlington Railway. The latter owned all the city 
lines in Riverside, a city about fifty miles east of Los Angeles." 
These acquisitions led many people to believe that Huntington was 
preparing to connect the lines in this eastern region with his Los 
Angeles rail network. 
The electric railway magnate was also interested in interurban 
companies in central California. Huntington's purchase of the 
Fresno Electric Railway, approximately two hundred miles to the 
north, and the streetcar lines in Stockton, about seventy miles 
southeast of San Francisco, prompted the Los Angeles Express to 
report that he was contemplating building a trunk line from Los 
Angeles to San Francisco through the San Joaquin Valley.12 An elec­
tric line through California's central valley connecting the south-
land with the Bay Area was never built. The exact reason is un­
known, but Harriman, who by mid-1903 had acquired a share of 
the PE, was on record of disapproving of the plan. If constructed, 
such a trolley route would have competed with the extensive SP 
steam railroad system, which already dominated the transit market 
in the agriculturally rich San Joaquin Valley. 
The continued growth of Huntington's trolley system finally 
pushed E. H. Harriman to act more aggressively. Huntington's ex­
pansions and mergings with smaller trolley lines began to cut in on 
the SP's existing market, threatening Harriman's plan of dominat­
ing southland transportation. If he could not halt the PE's rapid 
growth, Harriman's other option was to acquire an interest in the 
electric railway and share in its success. Such a move was not with­
out precedent. Throughout the nation, many steam railroads had 
found it advantageous to acquire interurbans, with which the rail­
roads once competed, and to integrate the trolleys' passenger ser­
vice and freight lines with the larger steam network. Although 
interurbans were not necessarily more efficient than steam rail­
roads, they were often run at four to six times the frequency and at 
one-half to two-thirds the fare of their steam rivals. Thus, trolleys 
had an advantage over steam railroads for short-haul traffic, and 
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they had their greatest success carrying passengers and freight for 
distances from ten to forty miles between outlying towns and major 
cities.13 
Although a rivalry later developed between these two railroad 
men, it was not the bitter clash of millionaire titans so often de­
scribed in contemporary accounts. Relations between the two men, 
in fact, remained amicable. Huntington, at Harriman's request, 
had stayed on as SP vice-president after leaving San Francisco in 
1901. After he resigned that post in 1904, he continued to serve as 
a director of the SP. Although each man was loath to give up any 
advantage, the men came to a joint ownership settlement in May 
1903 on the electric railroads in southern California. 
In the months leading up to the agreement, the two men had 
tried to negotiate a settlement via telegrams, regarding the re­
gional transportation market. Huntington stayed in close touch 
with William Herrin, SP attorney and Harriman's representative, 
but reaching an agreement was difficult. The major point of con­
tention was Harriman's desire to gain, and Huntington's steadfast 
unwillingness to grant, equal interest in the Pacific Electric Railway. 
Huntington wrote Harriman in January 1903: "Like to get trade 
closed up. Have made arrangements to use the San Gabriel Valley 
Road from Shorb [an SP station in Alhambra] to LA, but not until 
we own it. . .  . Spoke to Herrin, but he made the same request you 
did, that is, to allow you as much stock as myself, and which I told 
you on several occasions, I could not comply with." u 
Meanwhile, Harriman had been jockeying for a stronger nego­
tiating position. He not only wanted to share the Los Angeles mar­
ket with Huntington but also to surpass his rival. The Harriman­
backed activities were designed to provide the SP with an entree 
into the Los Angeles interurban field either by obtaining its own 
lines or by prodding Huntington to the bargaining table. Such 
machinations in the first months of 1903 included the SP's three-
cent-fare franchise proposal, the West Sixth Street franchise battle, 
and the SP's purchase of the Hooks' Los Angeles streetcar compa­
nies, which by the end of 1902 accounted for about 15 percent of 
the local market. 
Senator William A. Clark of Montana, organizer of the San 
Pedro, Los Angeles and Salt Lake Railroad, and the Union Pacific / 
Southern Pacific had been partners since July 1902, when the Clark 
syndicate and Harriman agreed to share equal ownership of the 
Salt Lake City to Los Angeles line.15 Acting for the SP, Clark ap­
plied to the Los Angeles City Council for eighty-three miles of 
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street railway franchises. If granted, these franchises would pro­
vide the SP with the basis for a substantial streetcar system. The 
proposed trolley was to operate over the entire eighty-three-mile 
area, providing service for a three-cent fare, with free transfers 
valid for transit over the whole system. This differed from the 
five-cent fare of the Los Angeles Railway and the PE trolley fares, 
which were based on several distinct fare regions that radiated 
from downtown Los Angeles in concentric circles. Travel within a 
zone cost five cents, and movement into each new PE zone cost an 
additional five cents. If the three-cent plan was approved, Clark 
and Harriman believed Huntington might make concessions to 
them rather than try to compete with a system designed to paral­
lel many of his companies' streetcar routes at a fare that promised 
certain losses. Huntington's PE countered this proposal by intro­
ducing a $6.25 coupon book valid for five hundred miles of street­
car transit. Although this move did not lower prices to the SP's 
proposed three-cent fare level, the plan cut rates on many trolley 
routes almost in half.16 
In June the council denied the SP's application. Its action was 
based on the belief that adequate trolley service could not possibly 
be provided with such a low fare.17 Further, if passed, the franchise 
would cause streetcar companies to restrict services to the most 
heavily trafficked routes where high passenger volume might make 
up for the minimal fare. Not surprised by the rejection of the SP 
proposal, Huntington said: 
The people don't want three cent fares. They would rather pay five cent 
fares and get good service than three cent fares and get unsatisfactory 
service . . . [N]o company can operate an electric road as it should be 
operated and maintained for three cent fares. It cost us 4 Vs cents the past 
year to carry passengers on the LA Railway Co.18 
While the council considered the three-cent fare franchise, 
Clark and Harriman attempted to acquire the Hooks' streetcar 
holdings, which the Huntington group was also trying to obtain. 
The Hooks owned the Los Angeles Traction Company, operat­
ing twenty-eight miles of track largely in the southwestern portion 
of the city; the twenty-mile interurban California Pacific, which 
was the only trolley operating between downtown and San Pedro; 
and the Los Angeles Pasadena Traction Company. The last firm 
owned no track or rolling stock but held the rights to build a line 
between Los Angeles and Pasadena. The Hooks also held a one-
half interest in the Los Angeles, Ocean Park and Santa Monica 
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Railway. Bids for the railway property came from both the Hunt­
ington and Clark / Harriman groups, but it was the latter syndicate 
that obtained the property. On 14 April 1903, the Hooks and Clark 
reached an agreement; Clark and Harriman purchased the street­
car companies for $1.75 million.19 The Los Angeles Times reported: 
Senator W. A. Clark has positively purchased the Traction Company as a 
nucleus for the Southern Pacific syndicate's operation in competition with 
H. E. Huntington for supremacy in the local street railway field. . . . The 
transfer is an important move in the campaign launched by the powerful 
transportation operators [Clark and Harriman] . .  . to overcome H.E. 
Huntington and possess themselves of the street railway traffic in Los 
Angeles and Southern California.20 
The final confrontation, prior to the Huntington / Harriman 
meeting and accord, occurred over the city's sale of the West Sixth 
Street franchise. Huntington had applied for this franchise, consid­
ered to be worth a maximum often thousand dollars, with the idea 
of laying track from downtown to Hollywood.21 On 3 May 1903, 
the franchise auction took place, and the bidding came from three 
camps—the Huntington group, the Hooks, and Harriman, who 
was represented by George G. Johnson, a local real estate man. 
The Hooks, having just sold out their existing properties to the 
Clark / Harriman group, hoped to reenter the market in another 
area of town. The opening bid was twenty-five hundred dollars, but 
the price quickly jumped to unrealistically high levels. The auction 
became a test of wills between Huntington and Harriman. Hunt­
ington's top offer was $100,000; Harriman's bid of $110,000 won 
the franchise.22 
The sale of the Sixth Street franchise and the exorbitant amount 
Harriman was willing to pay for it led Huntington to believe that 
he had to bargain with the SP magnate. The next day, the two 
men met in San Francisco. Rather than engaging in a potentially 
ruinous streetcar competition with Harriman, whose financial re­
sources exceeded his own, Huntington was willing to compromise. 
Three days later, an agreement was signed between the Huntington 
syndicate and Harriman. The accord called for the consolidation 
of the PE property and the SP's recently acquired street railways. 
Under its terms, the Huntington group's Los Angeles Land Com­
pany received the SP's San Gabriel Valley Rapid Transit Railway 
and track between Alameda, Los Angeles, and San Pedro streets. 
Harriman then agreed to transfer the Hooks' railroads and the 
Sixth Street franchise to the PE. In return, he was granted 40.3 
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percent of PE stock, an amount equal to Huntington's share. The 
May bargain shuffled PE ownership; Huntington and Harriman 
together held over 80 percent, with Hellman, Borel, and DeGuigne 
retaining a minority position. The owners of the PE, who now in­
cluded Harriman, paid the remaining $1.5 million that was due 
the Hooks for the streetcar companies; they then reimbursed the 
SP for the $110,000 it had paid for the Sixth Street franchise and 
the $250,000 down payment it had made for the Hook properties. 
Each stockholder paid in proportion to his percentage of owner­
ship in the Pacific Electric.23 
Huntington desired continued PE expansion. From March 1902 
to November 1903, the rapid growth of the interurban had con­
sumed $8.4 million, which had become available through the issu­
ance of bonds.24 Further PE extensions required more cash, but a 
depressed bond market in California and New York made the sale 
of additional bonds difficult. Harriman backed the building pro­
gram. Although he had initially acquired stock in the PE under his 
own name, Harriman had been operating for the SP, and in August 
the property was officially transferred to the Southern Pacific. But 
Hellman, Borel, and DeGuigne lacked Huntington's enthusiasm 
for continued expansion without the sale of new bonds. In June 
1903 they asked that no new construction be considered until the 
depressed condition of the money market had changed, but Hunt­
ington brushed the suggestion aside. He told Hellman that pur­
suant to an agreement with Harriman, he had no intention of 
stopping "in the middle of the stream."25 
Still hoping to build a vast trolley network, on 6 June 1903 
Huntington incorporated another new company, the Los Angeles 
Inter-Urban (LAIU) Railway. Its articles of incorporation called 
for construction and operation of 350 miles of track with lines to La 
Habra, Redlands, and Riverside and branches to Colton and San 
Bernardino. Other proposed roads included rails reaching Santa 
Ana, Newport, and the San Fernando Valley. The LAIU was au­
thorized to issue $10 million in bonds and was capitalized at $10 
million. Like the PE, the first stock subscription was for the mini­
mum required by California law to begin operations, $1,000 per 
mile of planned track, or $350,000. 
Initially wholly owned by Huntington and independent of the 
Pacific Electric, the LAIU was Huntington's attempt to bypass his 
obdurate partners, who grudgingly agreed to assessments allow­
ing electric railway construction to continue.26 However, the LAIU 
soon became an appendage of the PE. The depressed bond market 
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in New York and California made the sale of securities undesirable, 
and Huntington apparently made an agreement with the other PE 
shareholders that they would advance cash for the construction of 
rail lines and be compensated in a similar amount of LAIU 5 per­
cent bonds. Funds thus received were used to begin construction 
of LAIU lines as well as continue building PE lines. The LAIU be­
came, in essence, a construction arm for the growing interurban 
system. From 1903 to 1907, in return for LAIU bonds, Hunting­
ton and Harriman together provided the trolley company with 
$7.2 million. Before they sold their PE stock in December 1904, 
Hellman, Borel, and DeGuigne's combined contribution totaled 
$1 million. Although the LAIU operated its own rolling stock and 
maintained a semblance of a separate identity, it was intimately 
linked with the PE from its inception; by 1905 the officers of the 
two companies were identical.27 
Because Huntington had retained many interurban lines in his 
own name, he was able to transfer these holdings to the LAIU, 
which he originally completely controlled, rather than to the PE, 
which he shared with Harriman. The LAIU completed the build­
ing of the PE's Whittier and San Pedro lines. Then, in March 1904, 
the LAIU absorbed the Los Angeles Traction Company and its 
subsidiaries. The growing trolley firm also acquired and finished 
constructing the Los Angeles and Glendale Railway. In June the 
LAIU assumed control of two more Huntington-owned roads, the 
Riverside and Arlington Railway and the Santa Ana and Orange 
Motor Railway.28 
In 1904 the PE and LAIU built rail extensions to Huntington 
Beach and began building to Covina. Plans for additional tracks to 
Newport Beach, Balboa, and Santa Ana were also prepared. This 
construction was paid for by stockholder assessments. Although 
determined to continue building, even Huntington began feeling 
the financial pinch. He had sacrificed many opportunities to keep 
his personal funds flowing to the railroad. In April of that year, he 
wrote Patton: "I am throwing over my shoulder almost daily good 
investments simply for the reason that I am trying to have fewer 
investments instead of more. As you know, it is taking a great deal 
of money to carry on our railroad project, and I need all the money 
I can spare for the work."29 
In November 1904, Huntington sent a letter to all PE share­
holders stating that $250,000 was necessary to carry out LAIU 
construction and that each stockholder was required to pay the 
amount proportionate to his percentage of PE stock. Harriman's 
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and Huntington's shares were identical: each paid $101,000, and 
the minority owners were obligated for a total of $48,000. Con­
vinced that Huntington's ambition could not be contained, they 
were no longer willing to support any new rail projects. The PE 
and the LAIU were not paying dividends and seemed to be a tool 
for Huntington's land development companies. The three finan­
ciers were ready to quit the Pacific Electric altogether. Speaking for 
the group, Hellman wrote Huntington: 
You know very well that I am opposed to continued expenditures of 
money on these railways, but my views on this matter have been entirely 
ignored. I have concluded that I will make no further advances as a stock­
holder except under the compulsion of regular proceedings by way of an 
assessment. . .  . I do not wish to be an obstructionist; I am willing to sell 
my Pacific Electric Ry CO. stock and bonds of the Inter-Urban Company, 
which represent advances I have made to you and Mr. Harriman at a 
fair price.30 
According to the May 1903 agreement, which made the SP an 
equal partner to Huntington in the Pacific Electric, any PE share­
holder wishing to sell an interest had to first offer it to the existing 
owners, giving them the option to divide the stock among them­
selves in proportion to their current ownership in the company. 
On 7 December 1904, Hellman, Borel, and DeGuigne agreed to 
sell their entire interest in the PE—19,346.68 shares of PE stock 
and $995,480 worth of LAIU bonds—for $1.2 million. One-half 
of their holdings were purchased by Huntington and one-half by 
Harriman, acting for the SP.31 All the PE's capital stock was equally 
shared by Huntington and the Southern Pacific. Free of the inter­
urban, Hellman, Borel, and DeGuigne retained their interest in the 
Los Angeles Railway, the downtown system, because they expected 
that soon it would begin paying dividends. 
Under the expansive-minded Huntington, the Pacific Electric 
and Los Angeles Inter-Urban extended their rails and roadbeds 
into new areas. An equal partner in the PE, the Southern Pacific, 
led by Harriman, saw the advantages of an enlarged trolley system 
that could be integrated into its existing steam railway network, 
and the SP backed Huntington's building program. The Los Angeles 
Examiner commented: "Not withstanding his large interests in the 
Pacific Electric . . . Mr. Harriman has never been able to prevent 
H.E. Huntington from extending his lines as best suited his pur­
pose."32 By 1905, tracks reached Newport Beach and Santa Ana. 
In 1906 a branch was added to the Newport line connecting it to 
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Balboa. Midway through that year, the combined track of the two 
companies stretched over 449 miles of southern California; the 
LAIU operated 252 miles of track, and the PE held 197 miles. A 
line to Sierra Madre and an extension to the Oak Knoll section of 
Pasadena were completed in late 1906. 
If the SP were to consider blocking construction of an inter­
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urban route, the line to Covina was the most likely candidate be­
cause it would parallel SP tracks and travel through a heavily traf­
ficked corridor. Yet all Harriman said regarding this connection 
was: "All right, Huntington, if you want to build it, go ahead."33 
Covina was reached in 1907, and tracks were laid from Mon­
rovia to Glendora that same year. By February 1908, the LAIU 
had increased its track mileage to 311 miles, and the PE operated 
212 miles.34 
Although Harriman was apparently willing to support his part­
ner's interurban expansion program within the Los Angeles basin, 
when Huntington attempted to push into San Diego County, Harri­
man nixed the plan. The huge project involved the development 
of real estate in San Diego County—with transportation provided 
by a rail line from Los Angeles to San Diego and energy supplied 
by a locally built electric power plant. 
San Diego County's population rose from 35,100 in 1900 to 
61,700 in 1910. Huntington planned to take advantage of this ex­
pansion by extending his PE line from Santa Ana southward along 
the coast through thousands of acres that were to be acquired by 
a Huntington syndicate. Once in San Diego, it was proposed, the 
PE line would turn east and run to the fertile Imperial Valley. 
Power for this rail line as well as for the new homes was to be fur­
nished by harnessing the San Luis Rey River at Warner's ranch in 
northeastern San Diego County. 
In 1905 Pacific Light and Power purchased the forty-five­
thousand-acre Warner's ranch and the riparian rights of the San 
Luis Rey River in order to develop hydroelectric power. Hunt­
ington and Kerckhoff, in association with Colonel Ed Fletcher, a 
San Diego developer, and Los Angeles businessmen C. A. Canfield 
and H.W. Keller, formed the South Coast Land Company and 
proceeded to purchase vast stretches of land from Oceanside to 
Del Mar. Having obtained land through which the PE could lay 
track, Huntington had Kerckhoff and Keller, with the assistance of 
Fletcher, obtain a franchise from the San Diego City Council that 
granted rights to construct a railway to extend from Del Mar to 
San Diego.35 
Holding land, a rail franchise, and the right to build a hydro­
electric plant, the Huntington group appeared ready to begin 
development. The Hayes Land Company, owners of property in 
Oceanside, made use of Huntington's name and his plans in the 
introduction of their subdivision advertisement: 
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Henry PL. Huntington has purchased within the last two years over $2 mil­
lion worth of property. The South Coast Land Company, represented by 
millionaires Keller and Kerckhoff, who are now building a railroad from 
San Diego to Los Angeles, have invested over $2 million. . . . Huntington 
now owns the entire riparian rights to bring his sytem of car service from 
Los Angeles to San Diego.36 
But the key to the project, the rail extension from Santa Ana to 
San Diego, was vetoed by Harriman because it conflicted with the 
SP's large steam railroad interests in the area. From 1901 until his 
death in 1909, Harriman had been knitting together a vast railroad 
network. By 1902, his western railway empire included the Union 
Pacific (UP); the Southern Pacific; and a half-interest in the San 
Pedro, Los Angeles and Salt Lake Railroad. In fact, Harriman's 
only major rival in the southwest was the Atchison, Topeka and 
Santa Fe Railway (AT&SF). 
To ease, if not end, the competition with the Santa Fe in the 
southwest, Harriman sought an understanding with the rival rail­
way. When no cooperation was forthcoming, Harriman and a 
group of financiers, including Henry Frick, Otto Kahn, and Henry 
Rogers, purchased $30 million worth of Santa Fe stock in 1904. 
Owning about 14 percent of the Santa Fe, Harriman placed Frick 
and Rogers, who already served on the UP directorate, on the 
Santa Fe's board of directors. Because of his links to the Santa 
Fe, Harriman worked out a plan of compromise and cooperation 
between the SP/UP and the AT&SF. The agreements included 
an important pooling arrangement between the Harriman lines 
and the Santa Fe for the shipment of California's citrus crop. 
This accord eliminated the competition over citrus traffic. Thus, 
by 1906, Harriman had achieved a harmonious relationship be­
tween the two railroads, and he and his associates sold their Santa 
Fe stock.37 
Having only recently settled the regional railroad rivalry, Harri­
man did not want to upset the delicate balance by participating 
in the construction of an electric line into the San Diego area, 
where the Santa Fe had a major investment. If the PE built a trolley 
line from Los Angeles to San Diego, it would compete for passen­
ger traffic with the Santa Fe's existing line between the two cities. 
In addition, to attract freight as well as passengers, Huntington's 
group had proposed a branch of the PE's line to run from the San 
Diego coast eastward to the Imperial Valley. This planned track 
ran counter to the Harriman-backed plan for a steam line, the San 
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Diego and Arizona (SD&A) Railroad, which was to run through 
the same area. Harriman had become involved in the SD&A as a 
defensive move to keep this railroad from reaching its proposed 
destination of Yuma, which would give the city of San Diego a 
direct transcontinental rail linkage. All traffic out of San Diego had 
to travel the circuitous route north along the coast to Santa Ana 
and then east to San Bernardino. From there, shipments could be 
carried eastward over the SP line through Yuma or via the AT&SF 
route through Needles. If the San Diego to Yuma connection were 
made, the traffic on SP's southern transcontinental line running 
from Arizona northwest to Los Angeles would face competition 
from the proposed SD&A line from Yuma to San Diego. To avoid 
the threat of competition and disharmony because of a rivalry 
along the southern coast of the state, Harriman quashed the PE's 
plans to build to San Diego.38 In addition to Harriman's opposition, 
Huntington also faced a fight with John D. Spreckels, a wealthy 
San Diego businessman who controlled much of the city's streetcar 
network and did not relish the Los Angeles trolley entrepreneur 
entering the area.39 
Confronted with these obstacles, Huntington scrapped the 
whole San Diego project. The trolley line was never built; Hunt­
ington sold his interest in the South Coast Land Company; and in 
1911 the PL&P sold Warner's ranch and the riparian rights to the 
San Luis Rey River to developer William G. Henshaw.40 
With the exception of his failed San Diego scheme, Hunting­
ton directed where interurban lines were built. As had occurred 
earlier, towns reached by trolley lines grew rapidly. Santa Ana, for 
example, connected to Los Angeles by electric railway in 1905, saw 
its population rise from forty-nine hundred in 1900 to eighty-four 
hundred in 1910. Besides encouraging such expansion in existing 
cities, interurban routes also provided fertile ground along which 
new cities incorporated. In fact, because these transportation lines 
were viewed as essential to a community's success, all seventeen 
cities incorporated in Los Angeles County during the first decade 
of the twentieth century were located on trolley routes.41 
Huntington's interurban system was praised for its size and 
quality. The Los Angeles Herald quoted "a New Yorker not prone to 
enthusiasm" as saying that 
the people in the east do not know what a first-class electric railroad is. 
The Metropolitan system in New York is a go-cart compared with the 
Huntington system in Southern California. . . . While putting down the 
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most enduring kind of roadbed, laying the heaviest of steel rails with 
welded joints, supplying the largest and most comfortable electric cars, 
and employing the best paid labor, Mr. Huntington has not forgotten 
that which appeals to the eye.42 
Despite these accolades, the PE and LAIU were not profitable. 
Because many of Huntington's interurban lines were built ahead 
of demand and frequently passed through regions just beginning 
to grow, their earnings were generally poor. Between 1903 and 
1907, the PE's most profitable year was 1905, when the company's 
net earnings were $90,711; in the LAIU's best year, 1906, the firm 
lost $93,032. However, when people later moved into these devel­
oping areas, Huntington was among those willing to sell them real 
estate, and the profits from the Huntington Land and Improve­
ment Company made up for the poor earnings of the interurbans. 
The net earnings of HL&I, derived largely from land rentals and 
sales, increased from $151,000 in 1905 to $402,000 in 1907. The 
land company's return on investment rose from 4.8 percent in 1905 
to 12 percent in 1907.43 
Unlike his interurbans, Huntington's Los Angeles Railway, 
operating largely within the city limits, was profitable. This firm 
posted net earnings of $550,990 in 1904, $483,990 in 1905, 
$580,657 in 1906, and $370,264 in 1907; the railway's average 
return on investment for these four years was 7.8 percent.44 Hell-
man, Borel, and DeGuigne had kept their 45 percent interest in 
the Los Angeles Railway, hoping this company, which had not yet 
declared dividends, would not require cash advances and would 
soon start returning profits back to the shareholders. Like the PE, 
the LARY continued to expand but on a much smaller scale. In 
1903, it added eighteen miles of track. 
On 8 January 1904, John Muir, the Los Angeles Railway's 
general manager, died. Huntington's twenty-eight-year-old son, 
Howard, who had been the assistant to general manager Epes Ran­
dolph on the PE, was given the post. On 15 January, Howard wrote 
his grandmother: "Much to my surprise, I was selected GM of 
LARY Co. I think I am taking up some of the detail work that 
father was attending to during Mr. Muir's illness, and I hope to 
be able to take more of the load off father's shoulders as time 
goes on."45 
Howard Huntington served as the general manager from 1904 
to 1911, when a mental breakdown forced him to curtail his ac­
tivities. Although he retained the title until 1918, most of his work 
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was taken over by the assistant general manager. Lacking the busi­
ness skills of his father, Howard was an only adequate adminis­
trator. Unable to deal with complex situations, such as organizing 
the sharing of facilities between the PE and the Los Angeles Rail­
way, Howard referred complicated matters to his father. Henry's 
reply to one of Howard's 1907 letters was typical; he told his son, 
who faced an unresolvable problem, to wait until he had arrived in 
southern California, when he would solve it.46 
In spite of his mediocre managerial abilities, Howard carried 
out his father's expansion plans. New Los Angeles Railway routes 
were built to population centers developing northeast, south, and 
west of the central downtown area. A line from downtown to 
Garvanza (Highland Park) opened for service in May 1904. The 
Griffith Avenue line, several blocks east of the present campus of 
the University of Southern California, was extended south and 
reached Vernon Avenue by October 1905. Earlier that same year, 
in March, the company built northwest toward the growing resi­
dential section of Hollywood, using a private right-of-way from 
present-day Lafayette Park to Bimini Place.47 
The laying of rails out of the downtown area was expensive. 
Although profits were reinvested in the company, the extensions 
frequently required more financing. The Los Angeles Railway 
often borrowed from commercial banks or the Huntington Land 
and Improvement Company. Hellman questioned the wisdom of 
making capital investments financed through short-term loans. In 
May 1904, he told Howard Huntington that he did not want the 
railroad to borrow any more money for construction. Hellman 
wanted to slow the growth of the system to coincide with the avail­
ability of funds generated from internal operations. Howard re­
ported Hellman's views to his father; the elder Huntington, who 
considered the property his own and its policy his domain, angrily 
dashed off a note to Hellman: 
I hope that hereafter in all matters that pertain to the management of 
the property, you will take the matter up with me instead of with sub­
ordinates [Howard Huntington]. . . . There can be but one head in the 
management of the property, although of course I shall always be very 
glad to consult with yourself, Mr. DeGuigne, and Mr. Borel . . . but I 
think I understand the needs of the property and what is essential better 
than anyone else.48 
With a tight grip on the company, Huntington added to this 
streetcar network during the next two years. A route to Eagle Rock, 
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as well as the Cummings Street line extension southeast from the 
downtown core to Euclid and Indiana Street, were completed in 
1906. The following year, Huntington extended the Garvanza line 
with two branches, one on York Boulevard and the other on North 
Figueroa Street. Later in 1907, the West Ninth Street line was 
built down Tenth Street from Vermont to Grammercy. Through 
this building program, the Los Angeles Railway, operating within 
a radius of eight miles of the city's center, nearly doubled in size, 
expanding from 99.6 miles of track in January 1903 to 180.1 miles 
in January 1908.49 
The Los Angeles Railway's failure to declare dividends finally 
drove Hellman, Borel, and DeGuigne completely from the street­
car magnate's fold. In January 1907, the Pasadena Star News and 
the Los Angeles Evening News reported that Harriman and the SP 
had purchased the three financiers' 45 percent interest in the Los 
Angeles Railway. In February, the former owners retired from the 
company's directorate and were replaced by W. F. Herrin, J.E. 
Foulds, and Hellman's son, I.W. Hellman, Jr.50 
By 1907, Huntington and the Southern Pacific had become 
partners in the PE, the LAIU, and the LARY. Although each saw 
the Los Angeles Railway as primarily a downtown passenger tran­
sit system, Huntington and Harriman had different views on the 
electric interurbans. Because each partner wished to use the inter­
urbans for his own purpose and each desired to dominate the 
southland's transit market, Huntington and the SP did not consoli­
date all their streetcar operations. To Huntington, the interurbans' 
main purpose was to promote the sale of his real estate. For Harri­
man, the trolleys were part of the larger Southern Pacific system 
and were to be operated mainly as transportation companies. The 
SP's aim was to establish a monopolistic, or at least a tight oligopo­
listic, market. 
In July 1905, Huntington, operating alone, acquired the Los 
Angeles and Redondo Railway by purchasing all the outstand­
ing stock, 3,770 shares, and assuming the bonded indebtedness 
of $500,000 from local railroader Leman Thomas Garnsey. The 
former owner stayed on as president and general manager of the 
railway. In 1907 he supervised 57.5 miles of track, including two 
lines running from Los Angeles to Redondo.51 Huntington had 
bought and then operated this railway as part of his larger devel­
opment plans for the subdivision and sale of property in Redondo. 
Still desirous of obtaining trolley lines to unify electric and 
steam service in the area and prompted by Huntington's acquisition 
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of the Los Angeles and Redondo, Harriman moved to obtain the 
only remaining interurban in the entire region still independent of 
Huntington. In 1906 he negotiated with the Los Angeles Pacific's 
(LAP) owners, Moses Sherman and E. P. Clark, for their railway. 
The LAP held approximately 180 miles of track and operated in 
the western section of the county, including the popular areas of 
Hollywood, Santa Monica, Venice, Playa del Rey, and Redondo. 
By March 1906, an agreement was reached, and Harriman paid 
a reported $6 million to the line's owners, securing a controlling 
interest in the company for the Southern Pacific.52 
Huntington devoted vast amounts of time and money to his trol­
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ley companies because he saw them as essential to his development 
of real estate. Largely unhampered by land-use or zoning regula­
tions, which did not become effective until the 1920s, Huntington 
freely chose the areas he developed as well as the subsequent form 
of each development.53 As his trolleys were laying out the scope 
and shape of greater Los Angeles, his land firms were designing 
many of the region's communities. A large-scale subdivider, Hunt­
ington was involved in a myriad of land deals from 1903 to 1907, 
but several major real estate projects, each in a different part of 
the southland, illustrate his activities. 
Sometimes Huntington designed communities with distinct 
classes of people in mind. Various controls and deed restrictions— 
including racial exclusion, lot size and price, and the setting of 
minimum construction costs—were used to determine the makeup 
of a subdivision's residents.54 Three of his projects, all northeast 
of downtown Los Angeles—Oak Knoll, Oneonta Park, and Dolge­
ville—are representative of subdivisions planned for particular 
socioeconomic groups. 
For the wealthy, Huntington built the Oak Knoll subdivision, 
which today is a fashionable area split between Pasadena and San 
Marino. Initially established in the 1880s, the tract opened when 
the real estate boom of the decade had subsided, and the devel­
opment languished. In December 1905, Huntington and brokers 
William Staats and A. Kingsley Macomber formed the Oak Knoll 
Company and purchased the subdivision for $300,000.55 
The winding roads and landscaping begun earlier were com­
pleted; a Huntington interurban line was extended to the property; 
and, to introduce the wealthy potential residents to the develop­
ment, several acres were reserved for the construction of a luxury 
hotel, the Wentworth. Huntington opened the prestigious subdivi­
sion in 1906. Only Caucasians were to be allowed and Oak Knoll 
was reserved for single-family residences. Lots varied in size from 
one to ten acres; in price from $5,000 to $20,000; and, depend­
ing on size and location, minimum construction costs ranged from 
$6,000 to $15,000.56 
Hailed as one of the most exclusive subdivisions in the West, 
the Oak Knoll tract sold well through the remainder of 1906. The 
financial panic of 1907 had a negative impact on sales, however, 
and Staats closed the subdivision's sales office. The partially com­
pleted Hotel Wentworth opened in February 1907; because of cost 
overruns, it soon encountered financial troubles, and less than six 
months later it was declared insolvent and closed. 
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Toward the end of 1909, lot sales in nearby residential areas 
began picking up, and the Staats's Oak Knoll sales office was re­
opened on 6 November. Three weeks later, Huntington purchased 
the ninety-three-acre Oak Grove tract between Oak Knoll to the 
west and his San Marino Ranch to the east.57 The linkage of Hunt­
ington's name with the area encouraged purchases of property. 
After the Oak Knoll lots began selling again, Huntington gave 
the tract another boost in 1912. Much like William Ralston, who 
had saved a faltering real estate subdivision by building the luxu­
rious Palace Hotel in San Francisco, Huntington purchased the 
Hotel Wentworth and announced that Myron Hunt, the architect 
who had built Huntington's San Marino home, would double the 
building's guest capacity by adding two stories. With this demon­
stration of confidence in the area, Huntington assured the success 
of the Oak Knoll subdivision.58 
West of the elite Oak Knoll, Huntington Land and Improve­
ment laid out Oneonta Park—today an upper-middle-class sec­
tion of South Pasadena—as a community for the middle classes. 
Connected to downtown Los Angeles by the PE, this subdivision 
consisted largely of one-third and one-half acre lots. Buildings 
could only be constructed for single-family residential use, and the 
homes' minimum worth was set at $3,500.59 
Huntington also developed tracts of land for those of more 
modest means. In the present-day city of Alhambra, ten miles east 
of downtown Los Angeles, he established a model industrial town. 
This subdivision was linked to the Alfred Dolge Manufacturing 
Company, the felt venture Huntington had established in 1903 in 
an attempt to lure industry to southern California. Named Dolge­
ville, the town was laid out in a gridiron pattern with modest-sized, 
single-family residential lots selling from three hundred dollars to 
four hundred dollars each. The felt business was not very success­
ful, but it did attract several other industries to Dolgeville, and as 
Huntington had planned, many of the homesites were purchased 
by employees of the town's manufacturing plants.60 
Although Huntington's largest landholdings were in the San 
Gabriel Valley, his most successful real estate venture was in Re­
dondo Beach. Incorporated in 1892 and situated along the south­
west coast of Los Angeles County, Redondo Beach was originally a 
coastal development established by the firm of Vail and Freeman 
during the land boom of 1887. After the boom ended in 1889, 
the developers sold their interests in the undeveloped areas of the 
community to John C. Ainsworth and Robert R. Thompson of Ore­
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gon. The new owners incorporated three associated companies to 
develop the property: the Redondo Hotel Company, the Redondo 
Improvement Company, and the Los Angeles and Redondo Rail­
way. The last was sold to Leman Garnsey in 1894.61 
On 7 July 1905, Huntington announced his purchase of the 
Redondo Improvement Company, which owned 90 percent of the 
property in Redondo Beach, and his plans to spend millions on 
developing the area. Four days later, he obtained the Los Angeles 
and Redondo Railway. The association of Huntington's name with 
the coastal town and his expressed confidence in Redondo Beach 
set off a new speculative land boom lasting about two weeks. On 
20 July the Los Angeles Times reported: "A couple of weeks ago . . . 
the magic name of Huntington awoke this dreamer by the sea and 
for several days there was enacted the wildest schemes of mad 
speculation by feverish and frenzied speculators. . . . With char­
acteristic enterprise and liberal outlays of capital, Mr. Huntington 
will doubtless create here one of the finest resorts on the entire 
Pacific Coast." Then, explaining one of the reasons for the excite­
ment in Redondo, the Times continued: "Mr. Huntington is already 
double tracking the railroad [the Los Angeles and Redondo] and 
maintaining the wise policy of not advancing the price of lots [ap­
proximately ninety dollars each] from his original offering."62 
A buying frenzy ensued in which property often changed hands 
several times a day, and more than one hundred real estate offices 
set up shop on Front Street, some doing business out of hastily 
erected tents. As a result of the rash speculation, Huntington sold 
approximately $3 million of Redondo Beach property and almost 
immediately recouped his initial outlay for the real estate and the 
railway.63 In the midst of the craze over the Redondo project, Burke 
Holladay, Huntington's brother-in-law, wrote Harriet Huntington: 
Redondo has been a dead town. . . . The hotel never paid. . . . The name 
Redondo made a Los Angeles capitalist shy like a horse at an auto. But 
on Friday last, it came out that Mr. H. E. Huntington had bought the 
entire townsite of Redondo from the Redondo Land Co. and that he 
would offer it for sale. Oh! What a change in the twinkling of an eye. 
Immediately the people of Los Angeles rushed in droves to Redondo— 
to buy, buy, buy. . . . 64 
By the end of July, the boom had subsided, but Huntington 
continued to pour money into Redondo Beach. By 1907, a three-
story pavilion, which housed a giant ballroom, a restaurant, and a 
theater, had been completed, and in 1909 Huntington erected the 
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largest indoor salt-water plunge in the world. Because the Pacific 
Ocean was too cold for comfortable swimming most of the year, the 
plunge, opened every day of the year, provided three pools with 
heated water and more than one thousand small dressing rooms 
and steam and Turkish baths, and could accommodate two thou­
sand bathers at one time. The success of Huntington's Redondo 
Beach development was reflected in the city's expanding popula­
tion: the number of residents rose from the 1890 figure of 668 
to 855 in 1900; it then increased to 2,935 in 1910 and was 4,900 
by 1920.65 
Besides designing homogeneous communities or revitalizing 
areas like Redondo Beach, Huntington also participated in specu­
lative large-scale land development projects. Unlike Huntington's 
other land ventures, one involved a rare collaboration with others 
of the Los Angeles business community and did not immediately 
include electric railways. 
In November 1904, a group of prominent Los Angeles business­
men—including Huntington; Harriman; Kerckhoff; L. C. Brand, 
a developer of Glendale, a Los Angeles suburb; and Joseph Sar­
tori, president of Security Trust and Savings Bank—purchased the 
sixteen-thousand-acre Porter ranch in the San Fernando Valley. 
Each of the ten stockholders received a one-tenth interest in the 
firm. Forming the San Fernando Mission Land Company, the de­
velopers first took an option on the property on 28 November 1904 
and then assumed full control on 23 March 1905.66 
Because it was widely known that Huntington preferred work­
ing "quietly and alone," the Los Angeles Examiner observed: "The 
mystery of the enterprise [the San Fernando Mission Land Com­
pany] is how it happened that Messrs. Huntington and Harriman, 
who let no one into their land purchasing schemes, but bought up 
everything for themselves, consented to let eight others in on the 
'ground floor' so to speak."67 
Considered a long-term investment, the purchase of Porter 
ranch was predicated on the belief that the city government would 
build an aqueduct at some future date and bring water from the 
Sierras to the southland. If such a project were undertaken, the arid 
San Fernando Valley would be transformed into a well-watered 
plain ripe for subdivision. A $23 million bond issue to finance 
the aqueduct was passed by Los Angeles voters in June 1907, and 
water from the Owens Valley reached Los Angeles in 1913. In this 
context, Huntington's decision to work with others in the project 
becomes clearer. He joined the nine other syndicate members, all 
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major powers of the Los Angeles business community, because 
his participation could further his private interests. Subdivision 
in the San Fernando Valley would stimulate expansion and lead 
to an increasing population in the southland. Since this venture 
seemed likely to encourage general growth in southern California, 
Huntington would surely benefit.68 
In 1909, Harry Chandler, general manager of the Los Angeles 
Times, who was a member of the earlier land syndicate, took an 
option on 47,400 additional acres of San Fernando Valley land. A 
year later, Chandler and thirty-nine other investors formed the Los 
Angeles Suburban Homes Company and purchased the property. 
In 1911, the new company prepared a large section of land for 
subdivision, and the PF_ began construction of an interurban line 
to the valley. Although the syndicate's projects proved very profit­
able, Huntington began to withdraw from some business interests 
and in June 1912 received $130,000 for his one-tenth share of the 
San Fernando Mission Land Company, for which he had originally 
paid$15,000.69 
Often working with his real estate ventures, the Huntington-
controlled Pacific Light and Power followed a strategy of rapid 
growth. As Huntington explained to Kerckhoff in July 1904, in 
some cases, expansion should precede demand: 
We cannot afford to lag behind in the procession and should rather keep 
always a little ahead of it [demand for power]. If we need more power, 
by all means, let us contract for it; for our aim should always be to give 
the very best service we can and to give better service than anybody else does. 
While this may cost money in the beginning, it will be very profitable in 
the end.™ 
Such expansion through construction and acquisition was ex­
pensive, and financing was constantly a problem. The PL&P's 
major project was the construction of a hydroelectric power sta­
tion near Kernville on the Kern River, 120 miles northeast of Los 
Angeles in the Sierra Nevada Mountains. One of the largest power-
generating sites undertaken in the country up to that time, this 
facility's completion was hampered by more than funding. In April 
1903, work on the plant, which had only recently begun, was tied 
up by a lawsuit brought against the PL&P by two competing land 
companies, the Miller and Lux and Kern River firms. The former, 
established by Henry Miller and Charles Lux in the mid-nineteenth 
century, held a large land empire in the San Joaquin Valley and 
riparian rights on many parts of the San Joaquin and Kern rivers. 
The latter company owned property in the Kern River Valley. 
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The lawsuit charged that the PL&P's construction of a canal 
necessary to divert water to the hydroelectric plant would alter the 
normal flow of the Kern River and its flood waters, which annu­
ally fertilized and restored the valley's farmland. The Miller and 
Lux / Kern coalition asked for a perpetual injunction to disallow 
the diversion of water via the canal. Henry O'Melveny, attorney 
and stockholder of the PL&P, negotiated a settlement with the 
land companies in July 1904. The PL&P purchased water rights, 
promised to refrain from using water for irrigation purposes, and 
agreed to make the diversion canal watertight so that seepage 
would not affect the quality or quantity of the Kern River flow.71 
The conflict with the central California land companies slowed 
the Kern power project, and the eventual settlement called for a 
much more expensive cement canal. However, Huntington con­
veyed his pleasure about the outcome to O'Melveny: "I think from 
what you say that we have made a very good trade with Miller, Lux, 
and Tevis [representing the Kern River Land Company]. Certainly 
having clear title is worth a great deal to us."72 
The new, more stringent building requirements for the canal 
increased the PL&P's need for cash. In 1902 and 1903, attempts 
to sell Pacific Light and Power bonds to outside investors had not 
been successful. The stockholders ended up buying many of the 
bonds to provide funds for the construction costs; they hoped to 
resell them later on the open market when conditions improved. In 
January 1903, Huntington arranged for the cash-rich Los Ange­
les Railway, the company that held Huntington's PL&P stock, to 
purchase two hundred PL&P bonds, providing $200,000. 
Then, on 23 July, Kerckhoff wrote Huntington of DeGuigne's 
suggestion to assess the stockholders one dollar per share for six 
consecutive months to raise the $600,000 required to complete the 
project. This suggestion came before the three minority owners ex­
pressed doubts about the constant need for funds to finance Hunt­
ington's various projects. But the assessment was not acted upon 
immediately. Soon afterward, Kerckhoff acknowledged a Hunting­
ton note telling him that the LARY would take $50,000 more of 
PL&P bonds; this purchase, when combined with the $75,000 in 
bonds Kerckhoff had taken, allowed the Kern River project to pro­
ceed. As they had done earlier, the major shareholders took the 
bonds with the understanding that they could later resell the secu­
rities so long as they did not dump them at less than par value. 
Such action provided PL&P with the cash necessary without the 
need for stock assessments through 1903." 
By July 1904, the Kern power station had already cost $1.8 
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million, but it was still not ready to operate. With the additional 
expense of the lined canal plus cost overruns, the plant required 
another $500,000 for completion. Kerckhoff believed the earlier 
idea about assessing the stockholders was now the best way to pro­
ceed. Huntington approved DeGuigne's original plan, and Hell-
man and Borel consented to the assessments. With the money thus 
secured, the Kern River project went forward. In December 1905, 
the plant commenced operations, supplying the Huntington com­
panies, as well as parts of Los Angeles, with electricity.74 
Although Kern River was the PL&P's largest project, the com­
pany also sought to expand by acquiring other power firms. Be­
tween the end of 1903 and 1907, PL&P added the Mentone Power 
Company, owner of a hydroelectric plant north of Redlands, and 
the Riverside Power Company. The former was originally a Kerck­
hoff/ Balch venture before its merger with the larger Pacific Light 
and Power. With this enlarged generating capacity, PL&P sold 
approximately 90 percent of its electricity to commercial users, 
largely Huntington's railroads. It also provided current for light­
ing and other residential use in the southern and northeastern 
portions of Los Angeles County.75 
After the Kern project was completed, Huntington and Kerck­
hoff made plans for another power plant. In December 1906, in 
conjunction with Huntington's real estate developments in the area, 
PL&P began constructing a fifteen-thousand-kilowatt steam plant 
at Redondo Beach, which was completed in March 1908. By that 
date it was clear that PL&P's expansion program was paying off: 
the company's net earnings in 1906 were $359,662 and in 1907 
were $413,143.76 
As the PL&P electrical generating capacity was growing, Hunt­
ington expanded his other public utility business, water distribu­
tion. His San Gabriel Wine Company already owned the Alhambra 
Addition Water Company, a small firm providing water to parts 
of the San Gabriel area. In September 1907, Huntington incorpo­
rated the much larger San Gabriel Valley Water Company (SGVW). 
Capitalized at $2.5 million, all its stock was held by the Huntington 
Land and Improvement Company. Often operated in tandem with 
HL&I, SGVW provided water to many of the newly opened sub­
divisions. In February 1908, Huntington consolidated his holdings 
by transferring all the property of the Alhambra Addition Water 
Company to the SGVW.77 
To oversee the San Gabriel Valley Water Company, Huntington 
brought in George C. Ward, who had worked as chief engineer 
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on Collis Huntington's Raquette Lake Railroad. Remembering the 
words of his uncle, "Stick to Ward; you can trust him," Hunting­
ton had hired Ward in 1902 as the superintendent of his London 
Water Works in Washington Court House, Ohio. With a promise 
of a better job, Huntington lured Ward to California in 1905. Prior 
to heading SGVW, Ward had served Huntington in several other 
capacities. Initially brought out to southern California as the assis­
tant general manager of HL&I, Ward also worked for Huntington's 
street railways purchasing land and rights-of-way. Later, in 1910, 
Ward succeeded Patton as general manager of HL&I.78 
From 1903 to 1907, Huntington labored to expand the south-
land's urban economy by extending his business triad. With his 
spreading operations, he molded the basin. Because the city and 
county lacked regulations or commissions overseeing land use and 
dictating how or where development should take place, Hunting­
ton became the metropolitan planner of greater Los Angeles. His 
trolleys diffused the population and nurtured the growth of many 
suburban communities, his land firms rapidly transformed rural 
landscape into a variety of subdivisions, and his power firm pro­
vided electricity for the growing region. 
Although the Los Angeles Railway operated as a passenger-
carrying transit system in the downtown area, the interurban PE 
was used primarily to promote land developments. Because Hunt­
ington wished to dominate the region's transportation market, the 
PE was rapidly expanded, but because of the area's sparse popu­
lation, it was never profitable. The Los Angeles Railway, on the 
other hand, was profitable, but because Huntington reinvested all 
the profits back into the company, the LARY did not declare any 
dividends during this period. This lack of a return on investment 
combined with the PE's constant need for funds, finally drove Hell-
man, Borel, and DeGuigne to withdraw from both street railroad 
companies. 
The three junior partners were supplanted by the SP, which, led 
by Harriman, pursued the goal of monopolizing the transporta­
tion market within southern California by building a unified steam 
and electric railway system. Concerned about the competition for 
passengers and freight provided by the PE, the SP acquired a half-
interest in the interurban to control the trolley company's growth 
and make use of its extensive network of standard-gauge electric 
lines. Because it wanted to dominate the regional transit market, 
the SP generally approved of Huntington's rapid interurban ex­
pansion program within the Los Angeles basin. However, when it 
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was detrimental to the SP railroad system, such as the proposed 
trolley route to San Diego, the plan was blocked by Harriman. 
Attempting to sidestep the SP and act independently, Hunt­
ington incorporated a new trolley firm in 1903, the LAIU, and 
in 1905 purchased the Los Angeles and Redondo Railway. How­
ever, the LAIU did not remain independent of the PE. A de­
pressed economy in 1903 created a soft bond market, and unable 
to move the new railway's securities at a desired price, Hunting­
ton could not finance LAIU construction projects. So that building 
could commence on the LAIU and continue on the PE, which was 
also having difficulty selling bonds, Huntington decided to use the 
newly formed LAIU to act as a construction arm of the PE. Be­
ginning in July 1903, the PE shareholders advanced cash to build 
new PE and LAIU lines; in return, they received an equal amount 
of LAIU bonds. Unlike the LAIU, the Los Angeles and Redondo 
Railway remained a wholly controlled Huntington venture. In re­
sponse to the acquisition of this railroad, Harriman, still wanting 
to see the SP dominate area transportation, and unwilling to allow 
his partner / rival to gain an independent share of that market, ob­
tained a controlling interest in the Los Angeles Pacific, the only 
trolley firm remaining outside of Huntington's grasp. 
As the powerful SP concentrated on the region's transporta­
tion sector, Huntington was involved in various land developments 
and electric power projects. His profitable real estate ventures dur­
ing this period included the successful rehabilitation of Redondo 
Beach and his work with selected members of the Los Angeles 
business community in property acquisition in the San Fernando 
Valley. The growing power needs of Huntington's trolley lines and 
subdivisions were met by PL&P, which vigorously expanded its 
electrical generating capacity. The utility firm built a hydroelectric 
station on the Kern River and a steam plant in Redondo Beach. 
From 1903 to 1907, Huntington's streetcar companies, includ­
ing the PE, the LAIU, and the LARY, which he shared with the 
SP, plus his solely owned and controlled Los Angeles and Redondo 
line, expanded rapidly into new territories. In advance of railway 
construction, Huntington's land companies purchased real estate 
along the planned routes. Once tracks were laid, his properties 
were subdivided and sold, and his utility companies provided many 
of these new communities with water and power. Although Hunt­
ington knew where and when transit and power services would 
be extended to particular areas, he was not the sole beneficiary 
of his various projects. His courage and vision led him to pour 
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vast amounts of capital into southern California, and his develop­
ment of the area not only provided ample possibilities for others to 
profit from land speculation, but it also created thousands of job 
opportunities for residents of the Los Angeles basin. 
By the end of the period, Huntington was prepared to acquiesce 
to the SP and build only trolley lines that fit into the transit giant's 
plans. Control in the interurban field was ultimately turned over to 
the SP, and Huntington focused on the more lucrative businesses 
of intraurban transit, real estate sales and power development. 
6

Changing Course and Shifting Gears, 1908-1913

On 1 January 1908, the Los Angeles Herald applauded Huntington 
for his building of the Los Angeles basin: 
To Henry E. Huntington who is essentially a man who does things and 
does them well once he undertakes them, the city owes a large degree of 
its prosperity. He handles millions where the ordinary man handles dol­
lars. He is not one of those who waits for a place to grow up in a favored 
locality before he builds a railroad to it. He first builds the road, and then 
puts his shoulder to the wheel with the rest of the people and aids in the 
upbuilding of the town and the development of its enterprises.1 
Although Huntington's business career in southern California was 
at its peak in 1908, the entrepreneur had repeatedly said he wished 
to retire by 1910, and when that date arrived, he appeared ready 
to comply with his original plan. In April 1910, he told the Los 
Angeles Times: "I have been trying to get out of business during the 
past few years, and when my home [at the San Marino Ranch] is 
done, I am going to retire."2 But once his home was completed, he 
failed to follow through with his retirement plans. Thriving on the 
process of creation, Huntington the builder once confessed: "After 
all the great joy in life is in the creating; I expect to get pleasure 
in the thing that is accomplished, but it is in the making of it that 
the real thrill comes."3 This viewpoint made his early retirement 
improbable, and although he often contemplated such a move and 
began to delegate more authority to hired managers, Huntington 
remained actively in charge of his major commitments in southern 
California. 
Rather than marking the beginning of a life of leisure, the years 
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from 1908 to 1913 represented a period of transition and adjust­
ment for this metropolitan entrepreneur. Huntington labored to 
improve and develop the region and, of course, to gain wealth. 
After the SP blocked his original plans for an interurban system 
stretching from southern California to the Mexican border, he sold 
his interest in the trolley firm and turned to other ventures. 
The seeds for a new direction in his business career had been 
planted in 1903 and 1904, when E. H. Harriman acquired one-half 
interest in the Pacific Electric for the Southern Pacific. Huntington 
discovered that sharing ownership of the interurban with the SP 
worked well—the steam railroad company was prepared to spend 
millions of dollars to improve and extend the electric network— 
as long as the PE extensions he proposed did not conflict with the 
existing SP system or its long-range goals.4 When potential conflicts 
arose, however, Harriman and the SP were quick to scuttle any un­
wanted PE incursions. Huntington eventually realized the futility 
of fighting his trolley partner and in 1907 began negotiations with 
the SP to consolidate all the streetcar lines under one management 
or to separate completely the ownership of the urban LARY and 
the interurban PE. The subsequent business deal, finally consum­
mated in 1910, gave Huntington sole ownership of the Los Angeles 
Railway, and the SP received all the stock of the Pacific Electric. 
Out of the interurban business, Huntington then became more 
involved in other enterprises. Now he reorganized the Los Ange­
les Railway to provide more financing for improvements and ex­
tensions and incorporated a subsidiary, City Railway, to act as a 
construction firm serving the parent company. But unlike previous 
years when his trolleys were unhampered by government regula­
tory agencies, from 1910 onward, Huntington's streetcar company 
had to adjust to operating under the scrutiny of both state and 
municipal agencies. 
Meanwhile, Huntington remained active in real estate develop­
ment, subdivision, and sales, and the HL&I continued to generate 
profits. However, the Panic of 1907 and the recession that followed 
slowed land sales; HL&I lost money in 1909 and 1910. Toward 
the end of 1912, the economy began to recover, and, in 1913, 
HL&I netted more than $2 million. In spite of that year's earnings, 
HL&I's net return on investment for this six-year period averaged 
only 3.8 percent.5 
Yet, although HL&I did not record high profits on the basis of 
actual land sales, it did enjoy huge paper profit as the value of its 
unsold inventory of property skyrocketed. Because of HL&I's vast 
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assets, which rose in market value from $4.3 million in 1908 to 
$10.9 million by 1910, Huntington was able to borrow large sums of 
money through the issuance of HL&I debenture notes and bonds. 
He then financed Pacific Light and Power's building of the Big 
Creek power station, the largest hydroelectric-generating facility 
in the country, and his most ambitious project of this period. In 
addition to expanding its production and distribution of electricity, 
PL&P also entered the natural gas industry by purchasing several 
small companies and merging them into a subsidiary, the Southern 
California (SoCal) Gas Company. 
Huntington understood that electric railway profits were easily 
made by running trolleys through the more densely populated 
areas. In explaining to William Herrin why neither the LARY nor 
the PE should build a line on a particular street, Huntington wrote: 
"Wilshire Blvd. is laid out in large lots on which large houses will 
be erected. As you know, it is a street like Figueroa St. which is 
very unprofitable for street railways. It is the houses on 25 foot lots 
that bring in the nickels."6 He realized that because the PE and 
LAIU operated hundreds of miles of track that connected small 
communities to the downtown core, they were not likely to be big 
money makers. Yet as long as Huntington could decide the destina­
tion of future interurban lines and as long as the trolley companies 
were operated in close cooperation with his land firms, profits from 
eventual real estate sales made up for the poor earnings of the 
railroads. 
After the SP joined him in the ownership of the PE and the 
LAIU, Huntington was not always able to utilize the interurbans 
for the sole benefit of his own subdivisions, and the trolley be­
came more of a tool of the SP's transit system in southern Califor­
nia. Pacific Electric rail expansions proposed by Huntington were 
only approved by the SP if the extensions did not injure the steam 
railroad's existing regional transportation network and, of course, 
seemed promising as transit ventures. As the electric railways be­
came integrated into its network, the SP pushed to acquire full 
ownership of the PE/LAIU. Given the competitive situation, Hunt­
ington decided to negotiate with the SP. 
Ever since the SP had obtained an interest in the PE and then 
acquired a majority interest in the Los Angeles Pacific in 1906, 
area newspapers began speculating about an imminent consolida­
tion of the region's streetcar companies. In 1907, the Los Angeles 
Express reported that Huntington and Harriman's personal repre­
sentative, William Herrin, had conferred, "signaling the merger 
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between Huntington street railway companies and the Los Ange­
les Pacific Railway system, recently purchased by Harriman and 
undergoing improvements reaching into millions."7 
Talks had begun between Huntington and the SP in the spring 
of 1907. The following year, some preliminary deals were made 
to pave the way for the eventual consolidation. In June 1908, all 
the lines of the LAIU were leased to the PE. The two trolley com­
panies already shared the same ownership and management, and 
arrangements were made to expedite the integration of the two 
systems. The following year, Huntington further divested himself 
of the interurban business by selling the SP his trolley systems in 
Fresno and Santa Clara County.8 
Negotiations continued intermittently for over two years, but 
the talks did not halt the PE expansion program. In 1908, an elec­
tric line reached La Habra, a citrus-growing community twenty 
miles southeast of downtown Los Angeles; work was also completed 
on another line linking the two Orange County towns of Santa Ana 
and Huntington Beach. The following year, tracks were laid from 
Covina eastward to San Dimas and from La Habra eastward about 
ten miles to Stearn, a trolley stop southeast of present-day Yorba 
Linda. Unlike previous extensions that were financed by PE stock­
holder cash advances to the PE in exchange for LAIU bonds, these 
expansions were paid for by loans to the PE from its two owners, 
Huntington and the Southern Pacific. By 1910, the PE, including 
the leased lines of the LAIU, operated nearly nine hundred miles 
of track. Earnings, however, remained poor. In 1909, the PE's net 
income was only $75,000; the following year it lost $22,000.9 
As with the PE, Huntington expanded and improved the Los 
Angeles Railway. During 1908, the LARY extended the Seventh 
Street line northeast from Broadway to the Los Angeles River and 
built the Temple Street line in a northwest direction up Hoover 
Street to Virgil Avenue and then on to Monroe Street. 
Although a few short extensions were added the following year, 
the most important change introduced in 1909 was a new design 
of streetcar—the pay-as-you-enter (PAYE) car. In New York City, 
Huntington had been impressed with the operation of these cars. 
Always ready to adopt an innovation or new technology that might 
improve his streetcar system, he ordered his engineers to build an 
experimental PAYE car and test it in Los Angeles. In use in Port­
land and Montreal as well as New York, most PAYE cars had a box 
at the rear for the payment of fares. Passengers entered via the 
rear door, deposited the fare in the box, and when they arrived 
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at their stop, exited the trolley from either the front or rear door. 
This method of collecting fares allowed the conductor to remain at 
the back of the trolley while the motorman operated the car from 
the front. Most trolley accidents were caused by passengers trying 
to enter or exit a car while it was in motion, but the PAYE car 
made such mishaps less likely by placing employees at the front 
and rear of the car where they could insure that people did not 
try to get on or off the streetcar before it came to a complete stop. 
Satisfied with the success of the new car design, the Los Angeles 
Railway decided to transform thirty of its cars to PAYE type—the 
new Los Angeles Railway's PAYE cars did not have fare collection 
boxes; rather, entering passengers paid the conductor stationed at 
the rear door—and planned to convert more the following year.10 
In 1910, the LARY expanded two of its east Los Angeles routes; 
the Seventh Street line was extended further east across the Los 
Angeles River to Indiana Street, and the Santa Fe line was length­
ened a few blocks south to Randolph Street. By the end of that year, 
the LARY operated 222.5 miles of track and continued to be profit­
able. In 1908, the Los Angeles Railway's net income was $408,000, 
and the return on investment was 5.1 percent. Net earnings for the 
following two years are unavailable, but using the gross revenue 
figures for these years, less the operating expenses of 1908, the 
approximate net earnings for 1909 were $750,000 and $1,365,000 
for 1910.11 
By mid-1909, progress had been made in the negotiations to 
consolidate the streetcar companies in the Los Angeles basin, but 
on 9 September, E. H. Harriman died, and discussions were tem­
porarily halted. In the spring of the following year, negotiations 
were reopened. Huntington and the SP were near a settlement in 
July 1910, but an agreement was held up because Harriman's suc­
cessor at the SP, R. S. Lovett, considered Huntington's asking price 
for the Los Angeles and Redondo Railway too high.12 
Both sides dickered through the summer, but an accord was 
finally reached on 27 September and announced in November 
1910. The deal involved a complicated exchange of stock, bonds, 
and notes of the various street railways owned by Huntington and 
the SP. Turning over his 50 percent interest in the PE to the SP, 
Huntington received in exchange the SP's 45 percent interest in 
the LARY. This trade gave the SP complete ownership of the inter­
urban PE. Because the Los Angeles Inter-Urban had become a 
wholly owned subsidiary of the PE by 1908, all the LAIU lines 
were now also part of SP.13 Huntington, on the other hand, became 
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sole proprietor of the urban Los Angeles Railway. The Los Ange­
les basin's electric railway market was now divided by two major 
operators. The SP owned the metropolitan interurban lines, and 
Huntington controlled the city lines in the downtown core. 
Meanwhile, Huntington conveyed the Los Angeles and Re­
dondo to the SP for $750,000; then, to obtain the city lines of the 
Los Angeles and Redondo which were to be integrated into the 
LARY, he paid the SP $153,000 ($930,000 minus $777,000 of 
the Los Angeles and Redondo bonds, which the SP agreed to as­
sume). For the PE's downtown lines, Huntington paid $3,500,000 
minus the PE notes he held—representing loans he had made to 
the interurban company amounting to $3,276,000—which he sur­
rendered to the SP. In addition, since Huntington agreed to assume 
the $500,000 in outstanding bonds of these downtown lines, that 
amount was also subtracted from the purchase price. When these 
complex dealings were worked out, the SP owed Huntington about 
$113,000. Furthermore, Huntington received new consolidated PE 
bonds in exchange for $3,170,000 of Los Angeles and Redondo 
bonds and $2,563,000 of LAIU bonds.14 
Once the Southern Pacific had outright control of the PE and 
the LAIU, it merged them with its other regional streetcar proper­
ties—the Los Angeles Pacific, the Los Angeles and Redondo, and 
several smaller lines in San Bernardino County. On 1 September 
1911, in a move that was subsequently dubbed " The Great Merger," 
the SP incorporated a new PE firm, consolidating its southern Cali­
fornia trolley companies. Now owning the largest electric inter­
urban system in the world, with over 1,000 miles of track, the SP 
worked to integrate the trolley into its steam railroad network. In 
order to improve the interchange of passengers from the steam 
lines to the interurbans, the PE honored SP tickets for local ser­
vice.15 
The SP began concentrating on the interurban's freight-carry­
ing ability to take advantage of its many miles of standard-gauge 
trackage. Following its takeover of the PE, the SP actively began 
to solicit local freight business. Major products carried included 
citrus fruit, grain, gravel, hay, lumber, nuts, oil, sand, and vege­
tables. Already hauling the U.S. mail, the PE also started to operate 
a daily milk train. This freight operation soon became a significant 
source of the interurban's income. In 1911, the PE's freight reve­
nue was $519,226; in 1912, it was $1,164,654. By 1915, the PE's 
gross income from its hauling business had climbed to $1,203,956, 
or 13 percent of total revenue.16 The trolley also played an impor­
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tant role as an intermediary between the SP's steam railroads and 
ocean-going traffic. George W. Hilton and John F. Due, who have 
studied the nation's interurbans, noted that "the Pacific Electric 
served as a vast switching network for the Southern Pacific, and 
did a heavy carload business between Los Angeles and the port 
facilities at San Pedro." n 
Although the enlarged PE was considered a valuable addition 
by the Southern Pacific, it was not as financially successful as the 
original PE. In 1912, its first full year of operation, the new PE's 
net income was $71,000; the following year its net income rose to 
$478,000. However, in 1914, the railroad lost $610,000, and the 
PE showed a profit only once during the next twenty years.18 
Huntington's turning over full control of the PE to the SP 
seemed to represent a local victory for the Harriman forces. Yet 
the SP victory did not necessarily mean Huntington had been de­
feated. On the contrary, Huntington also came away from the 1910 
deal a winner. At the time of the settlement, the PE operated a 
large first-class trolley system that maintained rail routes radiating 
out in all directions from the downtown core to various suburbs of 
the Los Angeles basin. Because the PE had previously promoted 
many of his subdivisions and already had lines to areas where 
future Huntington real estate developments were planned, Hunt­
ington assumed that the trolley had served its purpose and saw no 
benefit in battling the SP for control of the PE. Whether or not he 
managed the interurban, the trolley system would still carry pas­
sengers to Huntington subdivisions. Besides, he correctly assumed 
that the SP would continue expanding the PE. On 11 November 
1910, speaking about the streetcar settlement and the PE's future, 
Huntington said: 
The Southern Pacific is now in control of the Pacific Electric. The Harri­
man interest in the LA Railway has passed. I was assured by R. S. Lovett, 
head of the Southern Pacific, in New York, that the same broad policy 
that had dominated the management of the PE in the past will be con­
tinued under the new regime, and I believe it. The people of Southern 
California may be assured of fair and liberal treatment in the future.19 
Finally, in giving up his interest in the financially draining PE, 
Huntington had more time and money to devote to his profitable 
Los Angeles Railway. 
Following the agreements of 1910, Huntington emerged with 
an enlarged Los Angeles Railway. From the PE, the LARY took over 
several miles of city rail routes, including lines on West Temple, 
Angeleno Heights, Crown Hill, West Sixth Street, and Brooklyn 
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Avenue. The LAIU transferred to Huntington's urban railroad the 
former Los Angeles Traction lines on West Adams, West Jeffer­
son, East Fourth, and East Eighth streets. In addition, the LARY 
received the lines of the Los Angeles and Redondo north of 116th 
Street. In addition to gaining 73 miles of track from the PE/LAIU 
and 49 miles from the Los Angeles and Redondo, the Los Angeles 
Railway obtained an additional 147 streetcars. Huntington's city 
transit system now comprised 345 miles of track, 25 percent of 
which were located on private right-of-way, and it had a fleet of 
525 cars.20 
To consolidate the new properties with the old and to provide 
funds to improve and expand the system, Huntington incorporated 
the Los Angeles Railway Corporation on 7 November 1910. Then, 
in early December, he established City Railway of Los Angeles to 
finance and construct rail lines to be operated under lease by the 
parent company.21 
With these new organizations, Huntington expanded and up­
graded his transit system. From 1911 to mid-1914, trackage oper­
ated by the Los Angeles Railway, capitalized at $20 million, in­
creased from 345 to 386 miles. Similarly, Huntington added over 
400 cars to his fleet. By June 1914, the Los Angeles Railway owned 
a total of 926 streetcars, 876 of which were passenger vehicles.22 
Possessing more miles of track, serving a larger area, and having 
a larger number of streetcars, the LARY's patronage dramatically 
increased. In 1908, the Los Angeles Railway carried 71 million 
revenue passengers; in the fiscal year ending June 1914, it trans­
ported 140 million. In addition to doubling its passenger business, 
the net operating earnings per car mile—before interest payments 
on the bonds were deducted—rose from $0,055 in 1908 to $0,073 
in 1914. However, the company's bonded indebtedness also vastly 
increased: prior to the formation of the Los Angeles Railway Cor­
poration, the firm's outstanding funded debt was $5 million; after­
ward, it rose to $20 million. This hike in the company's debt ex­
panded the annual interest payments from $250,300 in 1908 to 
$1,064,500 in the fiscal year 1914. The enlarged debt and cor­
responding high interest payments kept net earnings down, and 
the Los Angeles Railway's annual net income remained at approxi­
mately the same level it had been before the reincorporation in 
1910. Hence, the Los Angeles Railway netted $575,445 in 1912; 
$536,673 in 1913; and $582,142 in 1914. Based on the reported 
capitalization of $20 million, the LARY's net return on investment 
over this three-year period was only 2.8 percent.23 
Yet the LARY was actually much more profitable than it ap­
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peared on the company's financial statements. When the Los Ange­
les Railway Corporation was created in 1910, it had an authorized 
bonded indebtedness of $20 million. After assuming the $5 million 
in bonds of the Los Angeles Railway Company and the $500,000 
bonded indebtedness of the lines Huntington had purchased from 
the PE, the new Los Angeles Railway still had authority to issue 
$14.5 million in bonds. These remaining bonds were issued to 
Huntington's Los Angeles Railway Company for the property it 
transferred to the new corporation.24 
In 1911 Huntington issued $9.86 million of Los Angeles Rail­
way bonds and placed them in his personal account. Earning 5 per­
cent interest, the bonds paid Huntington approximately $490,000 
in 1912. He thus held a large block of Los Angeles Railway bonds 
for which he had advanced no cash, yet on which he received inter­
est payments. If the interest Huntington earned is added to the net 
income for 1912, the year's net return on investment rises from 2.9 
to 5.2 percent. Using the same calculation for the following two 
years, a period in which Huntington apparently sold $4 million of 
LARY bonds, the Los Angeles Railway's net return on investment 
was 4.7 percent in 1913 and 4.3 percent in 1914.25 
Several factors may account for Huntington's actions. In taking 
the bonds, he guaranteed himself a constant inflow of cash. Even 
if the railroad's net earnings declined in future years, the company 
was obligated to pay the interest on the bonded debt prior to pay­
ing the stockholders any dividends. As a bondholder, Huntington 
had a first lien on the Los Angeles Railway and assured himself a 
constant source of cash, which helped him finance his purchases 
of rare books, manuscripts, and artwork. 
For example, in 1911 he purchased a Gutenberg Bible, an 
acquisition that prompted a humorous exchange of letters between 
Epes Randolph and Huntington. Randolph wrote: "I have known 
for years that you were sadly in need of the influence imparted 
by a constant use of the Holy Writ, but I did not suppose that on 
short notice you would feel the need of $50,000 worth of it in a 
bunch." Huntington replied: "I note what you say about the Holy 
Writ. I certainly should not have paid $50,000 for that Bible if I 
had not needed it very much, although, as a matter of fact, I found 
that I could buy one for 10 cents, the contents of which would 
probably have done me as much good as the one I have."26 In addi­
tion to financing his book and art collecting, Huntington sought— 
in disguising profits by taking revenues as interest—to strengthen 
the position of his company against the city that had recently ac­
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quired the power to regulate streetcar fares and was contemplating 
a reduction. 
Huntington also removed cash from the company by directing 
the LARY to declare dividends for the first time. As the sole stock­
holder, he was paid the first dividend of $400,000 in fiscal year 
1912. This declaration was followed by a dividend of $800,000 in 
1913 and $300,000 in 1914. Yet, as his West Coast manager William 
Dunn reported to the California Railroad Commission, Hunting­
ton took the three-year total of $1.5 million in dividends in the 
form of City Railway bonds.27 This transaction allowed Hunting­
ton to keep the $1.5 million in cash in the company and provided 
him with securities that collected interest and could be used for 
collateral in any future borrowing. 
Until 1910, Huntington's street railroads were largely unre­
strained by governmental authority, and he was relatively free 
to manipulate the company's finances to his personal advantage. 
Although the California Railroad Commission had existed since 
1880, it did not have authority over street railways until 1911. The 
same was true of the city's Board of Public Utilities, which had been 
established in 1902 but was not given any real regulatory power 
until 1909. Then, reporting to the city council, the Board of Public 
Utilities was empowered to examine the financial records of utili­
ties companies, investigate charges brought against such firms, and 
recommend just and fair rates for utilities providing service in Los 
Angeles.28 
In early 1911, the city council commissioned the first study 
to examine Los Angeles transportation and offer recommenda­
tions to relieve downtown congestion. Bion J. Arnold, a munici­
pal transit expert, was retained to conduct the investigation. As 
part of the study, an Arnold employee requested the earnings 
record of the Los Angeles Railway for 1900—10. General man­
ager Howard Huntington believed it was best to cooperate with the 
Arnold people and provided the railway's gross earnings for the 
previous ten years. When Huntington was informed of his son's 
actions, he expressed consternation over divulging information: 
I would of course have preferred not to give Mr. Damon [manager of 
Arnold's Los Angeles office] the earnings for the year 1910, and I don't 
see how the back earnings could have been obtained when we did not 
have the books to refer to. Of course, I want you to treat Mr. Damon 
with a good deal of courtesy . . . but I don't like to give the earnings for 
the back years because I can see where a great deal of harm can come 
from it.29 
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Huntington had good cause to hide the LARY's profits. In the 
latter half of 1911, the city council was considering an investiga­
tion of the LARY's earnings to determine whether a fare reduction 
was in order. By the summer of 1912, at the council's request, the 
Board of Public Utilities prepared to examine the railway's finan­
cial records."1 
At the same time, the city council considered the possibility of 
purchasing the Los Angeles Railway. In March 1912, Councilman 
Haines Reed proposed that the city pay from $35 million to $40 
million to acquire the railroad. Two months later, the council ap­
pointed a committee to negotiate the acquisition of the Los Angeles 
Railway. Huntington met with the committee in May, indicating 
that he was prepared to sell the railway to the city, but $15 million 
separated Huntington's $40 million price and the city's $25 million 
offer. On 12 July, the Los Angeles Railway asked the city council to 
appoint an expert to make a valuation of the streetcar company's 
property to facilitate talks. To make this study, as well as examine 
the books of the LARY, the Board of Public Utilities again hired 
the Bion Arnold Company.31 
The Arnold report, completed by the company's Los Ange­
les representative, George Damon, was presented to the Board of 
Public Utilities on 9 January 1914. Unaware that Huntington had 
taken almost $10 million in Los Angeles Railway bonds without 
paying any cash, Damon accepted the net earnings recorded in the 
company's annual reports as the railroad's actual income. Because 
that figure was never outrageously high, the study concluded that 
the streetcar company was just becoming profitable; therefore, a 
reduction of the five-cent fare rate was not justified. Hence, Hunt­
ington's scheme of removing cash from the company by accepting 
interest on bonds helped protect the nickel fare. By making the net 
income to the sole owner appear substantially lower than it was in 
reality, Huntington thus disguised the true earnings of the LARY.32 
The report also provided the first independent valuation of the 
LARY. Considering the property and franchises of the firm as of 
1 January 1913, Damon set the value at $19,762,389. But the esti­
mate did not help in bringing the city council and Huntington to 
an agreement on the proposed sale of the railroad. By the time 
the study was finally completed, the city's interest in purchasing 
the Los Angeles Railway had subsided. Then, on 5 February 1914, 
Councilman Reed, the major proponent of a municipal purchase 
of the Los Angeles Railway, resigned from the council because of 
poor health. With Reed's retirement, the city's efforts to purchase 
the streetcar company subsided.35 
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During this time, Huntington continued developing and selling 
real estate. The Panic of 1907 ushered in a recession, and the econ­
omy was generally sluggish through 1913. The weak local economy 
hurt land sales. The usually very profitable Huntington Land and 
Improvement Company struggled through these lean years with 
comparatively low earnings. In 1908, the HL&I's net income was 
$182,117 but declined over the next three years. Net earnings for 
1909 fell to $32,562; in 1910, HL&I lost $49,110, and the follow­
ing year it lost $5,988. The next two years however, real estate sales 
picked up, and earnings rebounded. In 1912, the company netted 
$109,750, and in 1913, net earnings escalated to $2,102,275.34 
Huntington's biggest real estate sale during these years was 
in commercial rather than residential property, and much like 
Thomas Burke had done in Seattle, it was the result of successful 
land speculation. In January 1902, Huntington had wisely pur­
chased the nine-acre homestead of Orzo W. Childs, an early Los 
Angeles developer, located in the block of Main, Hill, Eleventh, and 
Twelfth streets in downtown Los Angeles. At the time he bought 
the property, for $200,000, it was in the heart of the older, wealthy 
residential area of the city. Aware that the business district was 
gradually moving in a southwesterly direction, Huntington cor­
rectly assessed that this property would eventually become part of 
the city's business section and vastly increase in value. In March 
1913, he cashed in on his foresight and sold this land to an invest­
ment company for $3 million dollars.35 
Huntington found it expedient to use the HL&I to borrow 
money to finance his other undertakings. From 1908 to 1913, he 
focused on the Pacific Light and Power Company, which entered 
the natural gas business and constructed the first phase of its mas­
sive Big Creek hydroelectric power project 240 miles northeast of 
Los Angeles in the Sierra Nevada Mountains. 
Until 1905, the natural gas industry in the Los Angeles area was 
dominated by a single firm, Los Angeles Gas and Electric Company. 
Hoping to break up the monopoly, Thaddeus S. C. Lowe, an inven­
tor, pioneer hot air ballooner, and builder of the Mt. Lowe Railway, 
formed the People's Gas and Coke Company. But Lowe's firm was 
too small and undercapitalized to compete with Los Angeles Gas 
and Electric, and it soon went bankrupt. Following an extremely 
cold winter in 1906, in which the local gas companies could not 
meet the local demand, a group of prominent businessmen, led by 
wealthy reformer John R. Haynes and banker J. F. Sartori, formed 
the City Gas Company in 1907. Capitalized at $1 million, City Gas 
was established to compete with Los Angeles Gas and Electric and 
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then to be sold to the city for cost plus 10 percent. However, the 
organizers of City Gas soon lost interest in the project. In August 
1908, the Domestic Gas Company, a subsidiary of Huntington's 
Pacific Light and Power, purchased the property and franchises 
for$l,350,000.36 
Huntington and Kerckhoff sought to expand the Domestic Gas 
Company as they had their other PL&P projects. To do so, they 
needed to increase the firm's supply of natural gas and extend its 
distribution system. Because of their work with the PL&P's hydro­
electric facility on the Kern River, Huntington and Kerckhoff knew 
of the rapid development of large oilfields in Kern County between 
1905 and 1910. While drilling for oil, vast deposits of natural gas 
were also found in Kern County's Buena Vista and Midway fields. 
Kerckhoff thought this natural gas could provide the PL&P sub­
sidiary with the additional supplies it needed to increase its market 
share of the Los Angeles gas business. In 1909, Domestic Gas fur­
nished about 10 percent of Los Angeles's natural gas, and the Los 
Angeles Gas and Electric provided almost 90 percent.37 
Plans to build a 120-mile pipeline to bring natural gas from 
Kern County to Los Angeles were prepared by PL&P engineers. 
Because of the project's estimated high cost of $1.5 million, plus 
the expenses of the proposed betterments and extensions of the 
distribution system throughout the Los Angeles basin, Huntington 
and Kerckhoff formed Southern California Gas Company, a larger 
subsidiary to succeed Domestic Gas. Capitalized at $10 million and 
having an authorized bonded indebtedness of $10 million, the firm 
was incorporated on 5 October 1910.38 
With additional capital available from sales of bonds—$6.4 
million was outstanding by December 1911—Southern California 
Gas proceeded to lay high-pressure gas mains in Los Angeles and 
Orange counties. Because Los Angeles Gas and Electric already 
controlled the downtown market, SoCal Gas concentrated on ob­
taining new business on the fringe areas of the city and in its sub­
urbs. In March 1911, it purchased Edison's Riverside Light and 
Fuel Company, and in August the parent PL&P transferred the gas 
business of its San Bernardino Gas and Electric to SoCal Gas. In 
addition to an expanding distribution system in Los Angeles and 
Orange counties, the PL&P's gas division was extended to Riverside 
and San Bernardino counties as well.'9 
On 18 November 1911, PL&P formed another subsidiary, the 
Midway Gas Company, to build a pipeline to transport natural gas 
from Kern County to Los Angeles. Once the line was completed 
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and gas was first delivered to the southland, on 28 April 1913, 
Midway Gas acted as a wholesaler, purchasing gas from Honolulu 
Consolidated Oil's Midway field or the SP's Buena Vista field and 
then sending it to Los Angeles. Although Midway Gas could sell 
its gas to any retailer in Los Angeles, it was under contract to first 
meet the natural gas needs of SoCal Gas.40 By 1914, the aggressive 
expansion of SoCal Gas had proved successful. When organized in 
1910, the firm's share of the Los Angeles gas market was slightly 
less than 10 percent; four years later, it had risen to 20 percent.41 
Although he was diversifying his energy holdings by moving 
into the field of natural gas, Huntington remained primarily inter­
ested in developing electric power. His entrance into electric power 
production was originally motivated by his desire to guarantee a 
source of power for his streetcars. But with the rapidly expand­
ing population of the Los Angeles basin, he believed that electric 
power generation and distribution could become very profitable. 
From 1908 to 1910, the gross earnings of PL&P rose from $1.8 
million to $2.1 million, but a larger amount of outstanding bonds 
increased interest payments and cut down net earnings. In 1908, 
PL&P's net income was $377,352, but by 1910, it had dropped to 
$248,366.42 
In order to provide electricity for more consumers and for the 
additional trolleys necessary to accommodate the growing area, 
Huntington decided to expand the steam plant at Redondo. When 
the $1 million addition was completed in December 1910, the 
generating capacity had been doubled, but this enlarged plant was 
only a stopgap measure. By the time the Redondo expansion was 
finished, PL&P was preparing to undertake a massive hydroelec­
tric development project designed to generate electricity at Big 
Creek, a branch of the south fork of the San Joaquin River in 
eastern Fresno County, and then to transmit the electrical current 
approximately 240 miles southwest to the Los Angeles basin. 
Aware of the potential of hydroelectric power, Huntington and 
Kerckhoff realized it was more efficient and thus cheaper than 
steam-generated electricity. For example, the cost of a kilowatt-
hour of power provided by the state-of-the-art Redondo steam 
plant was about four cents; the same amount of hydroelectric-
generated electricity was about 10 percent of one cent. Such a 
tremendous cost advantage led PL&P to investigate the likelihood 
of further hydroelectric development.43 
Huntington and Kerckhoff were introduced to the Big Creek 
area in 1902 by John S. Eastwood, hydroelecii k power pioneer and 
112 CHANGING COURSE AND SHIFTING GEARS 
engineer. Eastwood had told Kerckhoff of the tremendous possi­
bilities for power development in the Sierra Nevada Mountains in 
east Fresno County. When Huntington was informed of Eastwood's 
ideas for Big Creek, he promptly put the engineer on the PL&P 
payroll and sent him to make additional surveys and studies of 
the area. In 1905, Eastwood filed his report and proposed designs 
for hydroelectric power facilities with the PL&P. Busy expanding 
his trolley systems, Huntington lacked the time and capital to con­
sider the vast power project.44 But by 1910 Huntington had sold 
his interest in the financially draining PE. In addition, the city's 
demand for electricity continued to grow, and PL&P wanted to in­
crease its generating capacity to meet that demand. The time was 
propitious for Huntington to launch an enormous power venture. 
In January 1910, Huntington and partners Kerckhoff and 
Balch incorporated a new Pacific Light and Power Corporation. 
Established to absorb the property of the earlier PL&P, the firm 
was capitalized at $40 million, and it had an authorized bonded 
indebtedness of $40 million. Kerckhoff explained that the larger 
company was formed "to give us additional capital. Our old com­
pany was too small." One month after its incorporation, the new 
PL&P laid the groundwork for the Big Creek development. On 
23 February, PL&P acquired the water rights to Big Creek by pur­
chasing the company that held this franchise, Eastwood's Mam­
moth Power Company.45 
Ready to develop Big Creek, Huntington placed George Ward 
in charge of the project. In November 1910, PL&P hired the Bos­
ton engineering firm of Stone and Webster to oversee the Big Creek 
venture. Plans called for creating a reservoir by building three 
concrete dams to close off the outlets of a natural basin near the 
headwaters of Big Creek. Below this reservoir, a series of power­
houses were to be constructed. Water from this artificial lake would 
flow via pipeline downward more than 2,100 feet to a powerhouse. 
After turning two waterwheel generators in this plant, the water 
would drop another 1,900 feet by pipeline to a second powerhouse. 
Initial estimates for the first phase of the venture were $9.3 million. 
The capital was difficult to obtain. By October 1911, only $2.5 
million of a $10 million PL&P bond issue had been sold. The 
trustee of the mortgage, United States Mortgage and Trust Com­
pany, called on investment bankers William Salomon and Company 
to set up a syndicate and take the remaining $7.5 million of the 
PL&P bonds at 85 percent of their face value. The syndicate was 
formed and purchased the bonds for $6,375 million; Huntington 
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was a member and subscribed for $2.5 million of the securities. 
Meanwhile, because the PL&P had had difficulty raising money, 
the financially strong HL&I borrowed $1 million by issuing two-
year, 6 percent notes and loaned the money to PL&P to complete 
its Redondo steam plant expansion.46 
When capital became available, preliminary work on the project 
began, but PL&P had to surmount the lack of a good transporta­
tion system. The Big Creek area was fifty miles from the nearest 
railroad, and the only existing means of transporting the heavy 
equipment and tons of material was by mule teams. But, as PL&P 
learned during the construction of the Kern River hydroelectric 
station, that means of transit was slow and expensive. Huntington 
and Ward's solution was to build a spur line off the SP track from 
Fresno to Big Creek.47 
Stone and Webster began building the Big Creek Railroad on 
5 February 1912. The railway was to start at the SP station at El 
Prado, about twenty miles northeast of Fresno, and wind its way 
fifty-six miles further northeast to the site of Big Creek power 
station No. 1. After construction started, PL&P incorporated the 
subsidiary San Joaquin and Eastern Railroad (SJ&E) in March 
1912. Four months later in July, the railroad was completed. 
With the rail connection in place, the pace of construction on 
the Big Creek power facility rapidly increased. Powerhouse No. 1 
was originally scheduled to open in July 1913, but progress was 
slowed for several reasons, and the facility's debut was postponed. 
Because of the continuing steady growth of demand for electricity 
in the Los Angeles basin, PL&P management decided to increase 
the initial capacity of its Big Creek development from 40,000 to 
60,000 kilowatts. To finance the larger generators, PL&P issued 
$2.5 million of one-year, 6 percent notes in May 1913. But one 
month earlier, prior to the sale of its bonds, PL&P experienced 
a setback when a fire broke out in powerhouse No. 2. The blaze 
caused the building's just-poured concrete ceiling to collapse, re­
sulting in major damage to the structure.48 
The extensive repairs necessary on powerhouse No. 2 created 
another capital shortage. William Dunn, Huntington's West Coast 
manager, tried to solve the cash problem by negotiating for a 
$4 million loan for HL&I. On 14 July 1913, he told C. E. Graham, 
the East Coast manager, about the dilemma: "We shall be obli­
gated to stop work on Big Creek unless we get additional large 
sums of money. It is impossible to raise it here unless I am able to 
put through a HL&IC debenture loan, which we are working on 
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now." Noting that stopping work at Big Creek would cost PL&P "at 
least a half million extra," Dunn said that completing the project 
required a total of $2.5 million; beginning in August, $500,000 
would be spent in each of the succeeding five months. In addition 
to the immediate cash needed at Big Creek, HL&I had to repay 
$1.5 million of loans due in September.4' 
Fortunately for the PL&P, Dunn closed the $4 million loan deal 
with the banking house of E. H. Rollins and Sons by the end of 
July, and work on the Big Creek venture continued unabated. On 
2 September 1913, HL&I issued $4 million in 6 percent debenture 
notes, with maturities scheduled in equal $1 million installments 
over the next four years. The deal called for E. H. Rollins and Sons 
to purchase the $4 million in bonds at 92.5 percent of face value. 
This gave HL&I $2.2 million—$3.7 million minus $1.5 million 
that Rollins had advanced HL&I to meet its maturing loans and 
notes due in the fall—to invest in the Big Creek construction. The 
balance received from the loan was funneled to the project by the 
HL&I's purchase of PL&P first preferred stock.50 
Thus financed, the Big Creek project neared completion. On 
14 October, a generator in powerhouse No. 1 began delivering 
electricity to local circuits near the facility. But power from Big 
Creek could not be sent to southern California until 241 miles of 
transmission wires were strung from the hydroelectric station to the 
Eagle Rock substation in northeast Los Angeles. The transmission 
lines reached Los Angeles the first week of November. Then, on 
8 November, a failure at the Redondo plant caused it to shut down, 
and to make up for the power shortage, electricity from Big Creek's 
powerhouse No. 1 was sent to southern California for the first 
time. By mid-December, the two-year, $13.9 million project was 
completed. The three remaining generators of Big Creek's initial 
development were activated, and the new hydroelectric facilities 
provided the Los Angeles basin with 60,000 kilowatts of electricity, 
or a total of 80,400 horsepower. With the two additional power sta­
tions, PL&P had more than doubled its previous operating capacity 
of 75,000 horsepower.51 
During construction of its Big Creek facilities, PL&P net 
earnings began to increase. With the modern, efficient Redondo 
plant in operation, PL&P's net income was $594,634 in 1911 and 
$619,136 in 1912. The first dividend declared in 1912 amounted 
to only $72,232. Despite this first dividend payment and the like­
lihood of more payments once Big Creek was in operation, Kerck­
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hoff and Balch tired of waiting for a substantial return on their 
sizable PL&P investment of approximately $1.3 million. In addi­
tion, the bonds were difficult to move at low rates. Kerckhoff and 
Balch worried about the continuing problem of financing the mas­
sive power project. However, Huntington was sanguine about the 
prospects of Big Creek, the future of electricity, and the consider­
able return on investment he felt PL&P would eventually generate. 
Kerckhoff and Balch's anxieties ran counter to Huntington's 
optimism and led to a deal that separated the partners' power inter­
ests. Because Huntington believed in the future of hydroelectric 
power and wished to pour all available resources into Big Creek 
construction, he saw PL&P's subsidiary, Southern California Gas 
Company, which was not yet very profitable, as a drain on PL&P 
funds and thus a liability. Besides earning a return on investment 
of only 1.8 percent in 1912, SoCal Gas was largely financed by 
PL&P which held $4 million of its bonds and over thirty thousand 
shares of its stock. To free Huntington of the costly natural gas 
holdings and his nervous partners, his staff worked out an agree­
ment, which divided up the holdings of the three and broke up the 
power triumvirate established in 1902.52 
On 14 August 1913, the settlement was concluded. Huntington 
purchased the 33,000 shares of common and 1,250 of preferred 
SoCal Gas stock owned by PL&P. He then exchanged this stock, as 
well as his holdings of Midway Gas stocks and bonds, for Kerck­
hoff and Balch's interest in the PL&P. This interest consisted of 
985 shares of first preferred, 12,601 shares of second preferred, 
and 43,995 shares of common stock, as well as the SJ&E Railroad. 
The deal left Kerckhoff and Balch in control of SoCal Gas and 
the subsidiary Midway Gas, and Huntington gained sole control of 
PL&P," 
Following this stock exchange, Huntington left his southern 
California business interests under the watchful eyes of his lieu­
tenants—Dunn, Graham, and Ward—and headed for Europe to 
enjoy a few months of vacation. While in France, the sixty-three­
year-old Huntington once again followed in his Uncle Collis's foot­
steps. But this was not the usual type of business venture. Rather, 
on 16 July 1913, Huntington married his deceased uncle's widow, 
sixty-one-year-old Arabella Huntington, at the American Church 
in Parish 
Like the other transitions Huntington went through during this 
period, his marriage did not signal a retirement from business. 
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While he remained active in the financial end of his various enter­
prises in southern California, he increasingly relied on his man­
agers to run his many concerns. 
His marriage and the opening of the Big Creek hydroelectric 
development did, however, mark the close of another period in 
Huntington's business career. The years 1908-13 were ones of 
retooling and reorientation in southern California. Because the 
Southern Pacific, Huntington's equal partner in the Pacific Electric, 
wanted to use the interurban for its own advantage by integrat­
ing the trolley lines into its regional transit network, Huntington 
was no longer able to use the PE as a vehicle for his new subdivi­
sions. Deciding that the trolleys had already largely served their 
purpose in providing transportation lines to many of his develop­
ments, Huntington exchanged his interest in the PE for the SP's 
share of the LARY. 
Free of the PE, Huntington concentrated on expanding his 
profitable Los Angeles Railway amidst the first attempts of govern­
ment regulation of the streetcar industry. Aware of the continued 
population expansion of the Los Angeles basin, he entered the 
area's natural gas business and embarked on the enormous Big 
Creek hydroelectric power project designed to provide cheap elec­
tricity to meet increasing demand. 
Thus, unable to carry out his original trolley scheme, the ever-
versatile and optimistic metropolitan entrepreneur altered his busi­
ness strategies in southern California. Yet he remained the guiding 
force behind his various enterprises and a key developer of the Los 
Angeles basin's economy. 
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Twilight of the Business Triad, 1914—1917

Even though the San Marino mansion was ready to be occupied by 
1914, Huntington spent about half of his time away from southern 
California. He and Arabella planned to divide the year roughly 
into thirds: four months in the mansion Collis had bequeathed to 
Arabella on New York City's fashionable Fifth Avenue at Two East 
Fifty-seventh Street; four months at the five-hundred-acre Chateau 
Beauregard estate Huntington had leased for ten years near Ver­
sailles, France; and the remainder of the year in San Marino. How­
ever, the couple did not make the trip to France annually, and most 
years were divided equally between New York and California.' 
Over the period 1914 to 1917, Huntington retired from active 
participation in his southern California business empire. He turned 
over the daily supervision of his companies to his key managers, 
William Dunn and Charles Graham, but insisted on being kept 
informed about the disposition of his holdings and never relin­
quished the ultimate decision-making power. 
Like many other street railroads around the country, the Los 
Angeles Railway had been a money-making success from 1898 to 
1913. But beginning in 1914, the LARY, as well as the streetcar 
industry in general, began to experience difficulties. Inflation asso­
ciated with the economic boom created by World War I caused 
prices to rise. Operating expenses as well as trainmen's wages 
increased, but because the street railway's fare—five cents—was 
regulated by the California Railroad Commission, it remained un­
changed.2 The Los Angeles Railway's situation was further exacer­
bated by fewer riders because of an increase in the number of pri­
vate automobiles in use and competition from jitneys (automobiles 
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usually operating along trolley routes and charging a five-cent pas­
senger fare). Declining ridership and revenues meant lower profits, 
and the Los Angeles Railway, with a large debt outstanding, needed 
a new way to finance required improvements and planned exten­
sions. 
Like the LARY, Pacific Light and Power also needed cash, but 
for a different reason. With the opening of the Big Creek power 
stations, PL&P was capable of generating surplus electricity. To 
take advantage of this excess power, the firm expanded its distri­
bution system and continued development of its Big Creek hydro­
electric facilities. 
Dunn attempted to acquire the needed financing through two 
different means. He first petitioned the railroad commission for 
permission to reorganize the Los Angeles Railway and double its 
bonded indebtedness. Dunn then worked to obtain a $14 million 
loan for the Huntington Land and Improvement Company that 
would disperse the funds to the appropriate Huntington firms. 
But even with Dunn and Graham at the helm of his enterprises, 
Huntington still wished to extricate himself even further from busi­
ness affairs. He expressed a willingness to sell his companies to 
buyers offering a fair price. In September 1916, Huntington told 
the Los Angeles Examiner: "I am now out of business. I would like to 
sell all my interests and get clear of it."3 Nine months prior to this 
statement (although not publicly announced until December 1916), 
Huntington, through Dunn, had closed a deal merging his Pacific 
Light and Power Corporation to Southern California Edison. The 
two firms petitioned the California Railroad Commission for per­
mission to merge; the consolidation was approved in May 1917, and 
Huntington became SoCal Edison's largest shareholder, owning 38 
percent of the stock. 
Thus, by delegating control to his staff, Huntington eased him­
self out of the responsibilities of the business world and devoted his 
time to "fooling away money on books and other things that give 
me pleasure."4 As the aging streetcar magnate focused less on his 
southern California enterprises, he relied more heavily on William 
Dunn, who had begun working for him in 1901. Much like the 
other general managers, Randolph and Patton, Dunn and Hunt­
ington became close friends. Always important within the man­
agement team, Dunn grew to be Huntington's right-hand man. 
Placing complete trust in this man, whom he once referred to as the 
"soul of honor," Huntington refused to make important decisions 
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without first discussing them with Dunn and granted this associate 
absolute power of attorney.5 
While Huntington was in Europe on an extended honeymoon 
throughout the fall of 1913, Dunn began working on both the Los 
Angeles Railway reorganization and the $14 million HL&I loan. 
In December 1913, articles of incorporation were filed for the new 
Los Angeles Railway Company. The proposal was to merge the 
properties of Los Angeles Railway Corporation and its subsidiary, 
City Railway of Los Angeles. Under the plan, the company was 
capitalized at $20 million, and its authorized bonded indebtedness 
was $50 million. The new Los Angeles Railway intended to issue 
$23,544,000 in new bonds to retire the outstanding bonds of the 
two constituent companies. An additional $26,465,000 of bonds 
could be issued to cover future improvements. Dunn explained the 
reasons for the reorganization: "With the opening of the Panama 
Canal and the coming of people in 1915, this company must be 
ready for a greatly increased population. New cars must be built 
and lines extended. New substations must be built. Pacific Light 
and Power Co. must be in a position to go ahead with Big Creek 
development."6 
The Los Angeles Railway's application for reorganization came 
before the California Railroad Commission on 9 January 1914. 
The hearing opened with a discussion of the railroad's valuation 
because the company's ceiling for bonded indebtedness was based 
on the firm's assets. But the hearing was postponed until commis­
sion engineers could make an independent valuation of the LARY. 
A disparity existed between the company's estimate of the railway's 
value, placed at $26 million, and the city's engineers' estimate of 
$19.7 million. 
While the reorganization petition was stalled before the com­
mission, Dunn and Huntington succeeded in obtaining the large 
loan for the HL&I. The Huntington Land and Improvement Com­
pany was authorized to issue $14 million in 6 percent notes— 
secured by more than $40 million par value of Huntington-held 
stocks and bonds, including all the stock of the Los Angeles Rail­
way and City Railway of Los Angeles—due serially from December 
1914 to December 1927. The bond issue was jointly underwritten 
by the two investment banking firms headed by E. H. Rollins and 
Torrance Marshall. Huntington apportioned the incoming cash 
among his various companies. By May 1914, $8.4 million of HL&I 
notes had been sold; PL&P received $3.9 million, Los Angeles Rail­
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way obtained $150,000, and HL&I retained $967,000. Then, to 
repay personal loans he had earlier made to HL&I, Huntington 
assigned $3 million to his personal account. During the remain­
ing seven months of 1914, another $2.5 million HL&I bonds had 
been sold.7 
In August 1914, the railroad commission's engineering depart­
ment completed its study of the LARY and set the value of the 
property at $22.3 million. The commission also thoroughly inves­
tigated the firm's equipment and financing. Although it found the 
LARY's rolling stock and track to be in "excellent physical and 
working condition," the company's financing remained clouded. 
The financial records of the two companies to be merged had 
been destroyed because company officials believed they were no 
longer important. However, Edwin Edgerton, the commissioner 
who wrote the report on the Los Angeles Railway, noted: "I think 
the conclusion is justified therefore, that these books were either 
destroyed or allowed to be destroyed in order to avoid public reve­
lation of their contents."8 Whatever the reason for the books' de­
struction, the action did hide the fact that Huntington had credited 
his personal account with almost $10 million of the LARY's bonds 
without transferring any cash to the company. Thus, uncertain of 
the value of Los Angeles Railway bonds that Huntington held or 
how he obtained them, and believing the firm's general condition 
satisfactory, on 3 March 1915 the California Railroad Commission 
denied the proposed merger of City Railway with the Los Angeles 
Railway. 
While the commission considered the reorganization, the LARY 
encountered a new type of competition from automobiles known 
as jitneys. First appearing in Los Angeles in July 1914, they usually 
operated parallel to trolley tracks, picking up and carrying passen­
gers for fares of five cents each. Unfettered by government regula­
tion—they paid no taxes, licensing fees, or street maintenance as­
sessments—jitneys rapidly increased in popularity; by November, 
over eight hundred were operating in Los Angeles.9 
The street railways were affected immediately by the growing 
number of jitneys. In November 1914, Dunn claimed that "under 
present conditions, we [the Los Angeles Railway] cannot borrow 
any money for extensions or improvements. We have been trying to 
take care of these out of earnings, but these are reduced $600 per 
day or $219,000 per year." He added that current construction on 
extensions would cease and unprofitable lines would be abandoned 
because of jitney competition.10 
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By January 1915, competition for passengers had intensified as 
the jitneys' receipts reached an estimated $8,400 daily." The Los 
Angeles Railway was forced to lay off 100 men and stop construc­
tion of 250 of the new center-entrance style cars. In addition to 
the approximately 1,800 jitneys that were carrying about 150,000 
people daily, ownership of private automobiles in Los Angeles was 
also rising. Autos registered in the city rose from 17,000 in 1914 
to 47,000 in 1917. With more transportation choices, people rode 
streetcars less, and LARY's patronage fell from 140 million reve­
nue passengers in 1914 to 117 million in 1916 before rebounding 
to 123 million in 1917.12 
The material shortages and inflation brought about by World 
War I further worsened its situation. As operating revenues fell 
because of shrinking ridership, operating expenses rose, and inter­
est payments on bonded debt remained steady. Employee wages, 
which had averaged from twenty-five to twenty-seven cents per 
hour from 1910 to 1916, increased to thirty-six cents per hour 
by 1918. These factors combined to decrease Los Angeles Rail­
way's net income from $588,094 in 1914 to $312,712 in 1915, and 
$250,744 in 1916. The following two years, the firm operated in 
the red, losing $13,368 in 1917 and $501,225 in 1918.13 
Before the jitneys' advent and the onset of World War I, the 
LARY management had continued to follow Huntington's expan­
sion policy. In May 1914, the Los Angeles Railway extended its 
crosstown north-south Vermont line from Adams Street north to 
First Street. In July, it received a franchise to extend the Brooklyn 
Avenue line to the eastern city limits in Boyle Heights. Building 
on the line commenced because, as promised, the citizens of Boyle 
Heights had paid to reduce the grade and thus had prepared the 
way for the roadbed. But by October 1915, when it was clear that 
bonds to cover the cost of construction could not be sold, Hunt­
ington told Dunn: "Conditions have changed very materially, and 
1 gave instructions that no further work should be done." He ac­
knowledged that Dunn would have to renege on his promise made 
two years ago to the people of Boyle Heights. Although they had 
upheld their part of the bargain and graded the route, Hunting­
ton wrote Dunn emphatically: "I do not want another foot of track 
laid or any franchise accepted until we can receive bonds for work 
already done."14 
Work on this line, the only extension being built by the LARY 
in 1915, was stopped until February 1916, when the railroad com­
mission approved the City Railway's petition to issue $280,000 in 
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6 percent bonds to the Los Angeles Railway in payment for exten­
sions already built by the parent company for its subsidiary. City 
Railway bonds were credited to the Los Angeles Railway, and the 
firm completed the Brooklyn Avenue line eastward to the city limits 
later that year. But the LARY, which estimated that it lost $500,000 
in revenue to jitneys in 1915, constructed no further extensions 
through 1916.15 
As early as fall 1914, when jitney competition had emerged as 
a threat to the streetcars, the LARY and the PE sought legisla­
tion from the city council regulating the jitneys as public utilities. 
Making their case against the jitneys, the trolley firms presented 
several persuasive arguments. Jitneys ran almost exclusively along 
streetcar lines and only rarely made forays into lightly populated 
areas. This angered the trolley companies, which viewed this action 
as stealing patrons. Furthermore, unlike the streetcar companies 
that were required to pay licensing fees and taxes, jitneys were 
covered by no ordinance and paid no fees. Finally, as specified in 
their street franchises, the trolley firms paid for the maintenance 
and upkeep of the streets adjacent to their tracks. According to a 
1919 report done jointly by the California Railroad Commission 
and the Board of Public Utilities, Huntington's railway paid over 
$500,000, or about 8 percent of its gross revenue, annually, for the 
paving and upkeep of streets over which its trolley lines operated. 
Moreover, the report corroborated the company's claim that auto 
traffic, and not streetcars, were responsible for pavement damage.16 
With the powerful streetcar firms demanding a law regulating 
the jitneys, the city council began examining the issue in November 
1914. Four months later in March 1915, the council unanimously 
passed a jitney ordinance. Operators of jitneys were required to 
carry insurance and obtain a permit from the police that granted 
each driver a specific territory and route. Jitney owners responded 
by filing a referendum petition asking that the ordinance be put 
before the public in the upcoming June election. Huntington's com­
panies mounted a vigorous campaign to convince the electorate to 
uphold the new law. Pacific Light and Power, for example, issued a 
letter to all its employees extolling the virtues of the streetcars and 
disparaging the jitneys.17 
The public voted to retain the ordinance. Its enforcement less­
ened jitney competition but did not entirely eliminate this transit 
service. Surveying the situation, Dunn wrote Huntington in August 
1915: "The jitney fight is looking better all the time, and I hope 
within the next six months or a year the people will realize the effect 
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of this menace and finally get completely rid of it."18 Although 
Dunn was optimistic, the LARY's operating revenue continued to 
decline, falling from $7 million in 1913 to $5.9 million by 1916.l<( 
The Los Angeles Railway's poor performance led to a decrease 
in Huntington's cash income as well. To conserve cash in the com­
pany, the interest due on Huntington's Los Angeles Railway and 
City Railway bonds went unpaid in 1914. Because the financial 
situation did not improve, from 1914 through 1917, Huntington 
received none of the cash due on his railroad's bonds. Injune 1917, 
Dunn explained to Graham: 
Conditions with the LA Railway are such that the only way we can keep 
our heads above water is by not paying Mr. Huntington's coupons. . .  . I 
do not believe the coupons for last year, this year, and perhaps for several 
years to come, will ever be paid. The return of the company will show 
the exact figures to the government and also the absolute inability of the 
company to pay this bond interest.20 
By May 1917, LARY employees joined management in seeking 
stricter regulations of the jitneys. Two months earlier, in March, 
a committee of trainmen asked Howard Huntington and assistant 
general manager George Kuhrts for a pay increase to keep wages 
in line with wartime inflation and the rising cost of living. Manage­
ment decided to grant a seven and a half percent wage increase 
and promised another seven and a half percent pay raise if the em­
ployees helped eliminate jitney competition. Employees and their 
wives circulated initiative petitions seeking to place on the ballot a 
law forbidding jitneys from operating in the heart of the downtown 
business district. They obtained 35,000 signatures, and the election 
was held 5 June. The proposal passed, and starting 1 July 1917, 
jitneys were no longer allowed to operate in the commercial zone 
bounded by First, Main, Eighth, and Hill streets. Although the new 
ordinance drastically cut the number of jitneys in Los Angeles, the 
final act completely eliminating this competition came in summer 
1918. In July, the Los Angeles Board of Public Utilities ordered 
that, beginning 1 August, all existing licenses for jitneys operating 
next to trolley tracks were no longer valid. Because driving along 
the streetcar lines provided thejitney drivers with their only chance 
to attract enough passengers to earn a profit, this ordinance put an 
end to the city's jitney automobile passenger service.21 
During 1915 and 1916, the years of intense jitney competition, 
the LARY built only one extension. But in 1917, when the num­
ber of jitneys dramatic ally declined, the company expanded several 
,The Los Angeles Railway in 1919. Source: Report on Los Angeles Railway Investigation (Los Angeles 
1919). Courtesy of the Los Angeles City Archives 
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lines. The San Pedro Street line was extended south on South Park 
Avenue to Sixty-first Street, and the West Jefferson Street line was 
continued west from Fourth to Ninth Avenue. Operating revenue, 
which had been falling annually since 1913, rose to $6.6 million 
in 1918.22 
Meanwhile, Huntington's land development firm had also been 
experiencing financial difficulties. A depressed real estate market 
in the Los Angeles basin curtailed the property sales and profits of 
Huntington Land and Improvement Company. The fluctuations 
of the volatile real estate market were reflected in the number 
of new subdivisions opening each year. Between 1904 and 1913, 
Huntington had rapidly expanded the regional trolley network 
largely for the purpose of developing land and selling property. 
The development was fueled by the expanding population of Los 
Angeles, which rose from 175,000 to 500,000, or a mean of more 
than 30,000 people per year. Consequently, the real estate market 
boomed, and approximately five hundred new subdivisions were 
opened each year in the Los Angeles basin. But from 1914 to 1916, 
when the city's population growth slowed somewhat, increasing by 
15,000 annually, the number of newly opened subdivisions fell to 
approximately two hundred per year.23 
In this slowing market, HL&I occasionally took a less active 
role in selling its real estate and chose to establish exclusive con­
tracts with real estate firms to improve and then market particular 
properties. Realtor William M. Garland generally served as Hunt­
ington's chief sales agent, but over the years, several companies— 
such as Burbank and Baker, Henry S. Judson, and Frank Meline 
and Company—were used by HL&I to dispose of various prop­
erties. Because Huntington wished to maintain control over how 
his land was to be developed, contracts between HL&I and sales 
agents were very specific, laying out exacting building restrictions 
for each subdivision.24 
In addition to facing sluggish real estate sales, HL&I was re­
quired to make substantial interest payments on $14 million in 
outstanding loans. From 1914 to 1917, HL&I's interest payments 
averaged approximately $700,000 per year. With this large out­
flow of cash, HL&I's balance sheets recorded losses of $260,000 
in 1915, $428,000 in 1916, and $519,000 in 1917. In addition to 
paying interest, the principal matured serially each year. In 1914 
and 1915, $1 million was paid on the maturing notes; in 1916 and 
1917, the figure rose to $2 million.25 
However, the financial statements did not reveal the complete 
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story. Because commercial banks of the time did not provide long-
term financing to individuals purchasing homes or firms purchas­
ing property, HL&I frequently acted as a mortgage banker. When 
real estate was sold, HL&I often received a down payment and 
then fixed a payment schedule that included an interest charge 
plus principal. A buyer could thereby stretch the payments on 
the property purchased over a period of up to ten years. Be­
cause real estate profits were not recorded until final payments had 
been made to HL&I, it is difficult to judge accurately the com­
pany's performance in any year. Yet, the HL&I's statements of lot 
sales from 1914 to 1917 provide an estimate of the firm's activity. 
Huntington Land and Improvement and its subsidiaries—Dolge­
ville Land Company, Los Angeles Land Company, Huntington-
Redondo Company, Redondo Improvement, and San Gabriel Val­
ley Water—sold $489,000 worth of land in 1914; $192,000 in 1915; 
$458,000 in 1916; and $1.3 million in 1917.26 
Regardless of the profits HL&I eventually recorded, once all 
the payments for a given property were received, the firm, bur­
dened with a large debt, had cash shortages. The company had at 
one time obtained cash for Huntington's other enterprises through 
the issuance of its own notes and bonds, but when those securi­
ties came due, HL&I often did not have the cash required to meet 
these obligations. In July 1915, Dunn reported the financial straits 
of Huntington's Los Angeles operations to Graham and requested 
aid from New York: 
Our big trouble is going to come December 1st, when we have princi­
pal and interest of the Huntington Land & Improvement Company of 
$1,000,000 to pay. This absolutely must be met by sales of property or 
securities or by loan in New York. . .  . It is taking everything we can raise 
to meet payments in the way of interest, new rails for the Los Angeles 
Railway, and extension of service for the Pacific Light & Power. There 
is absolutely no sale of real estate, and under these conditions I cannot 
depend on any help from home.27 
Despite Dunn's dire forecast, HL&I met the principal and inter­
est due in 1915 by selling another $1 million of bonds. However, 
the following year it was unable to obtain the cash needed to pay 
the maturing securities, and Huntington advanced the company $1 
million to help pay the bonds due. 
Unlike Huntington's railroad and land companies, his Pacific 
Light and Power Corporation was successful during this period. 
Once the first phase of the enormous Big Creek hydroelectric 
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project was completed, the company upgraded older equipment 
and expanded its distribution system through construction and 
acquisition of smaller power companies. These changes facilitated 
sales of excess electricity generated by the new High Sierra power 
facility. 
After the Big Creek station opened in December 1913, PL&P 
expanded its distribution system into new areas of the Los Angeles 
basin. To the northeast, Huntington's power company purchased 
the distribution system in Glendora; to the northwest, it obtained 
the distribution networks of the town of San Fernando and the 
lines of the San Fernando Mission Land Company. PL&P also 
bought distribution systems in the towns of Compton and Hunt­
ington Beach.-" 
With Big Creek's enormous generating capacity, PL&P needed 
access to other areas to market its electricity. George Ward, the 
PL&P vice-president, sought to do this by purchasing control of 
Ventura County Power Company. Incorporated in 1906, VCPC 
owned utility networks in Ventura, Oxnard, and Santa Paula. In 
addition to providing electricity to this region, approximately sixty 
miles northwest of downtown Los Angeles, the diversified utility 
also supplied natural gas and water throughout Ventura County. 
Owning an electrical distribution system in a growing area, Ven­
tura County Power appeared to be the outlet PL&P required for 
its Big Creek electricity. Because Huntington's utility already had a 
substation in San Fernando providing power for PE trolleys in the 
western end of the valley, Ward and Huntington saw the possibility 
of building transmission lines west from the substation through 
Chatsworth and Simi Valley to link up with the distribution of 
Ventura County Power.29 
In early 1914, Ward began talks with VCPC management about 
the purchasing of their assets. By March an agreement was reached, 
and Ward acquired a controlling interest of Ventura County Power. 
Huntington traded forty-six dollars of PL&P first preferred stock 
for every share of Ventura County Power preferred stock. Then, 
for every share of preferred stock purchased, he received approxi­
mately two shares of the Ventura common stock. Two years later 
in June 1916, he acquired a central California outlet for PL&P's 
abundant electricity. In a deal similar to one it completed with Ven­
tura County Power, Huntington purchased a controlling interest 
in the southern San Joaquin Valley firm of Mt. Whitney Power and 
Electric.30 
In addition to these new markets and outlets for sales, PL&P 
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sold excess electric power to Southern California Edison and Los 
Angeles Gas and Electric, the other two major utilities operating in 
the Los Angeles basin. Selling more electricity, PL&P's net earn­
ings rose from $308,000 in 1914 to $651,000 the following year. 
The return to investors also escalated; PL&P declared dividends of 
$186,000 in 1914 and $300,000 in 1915.31 
As PL&P increased its delivery system, management also be­
came interested in developing the Big Creek region as a recreation 
area. Huntington Lake, the reservoir PL&P had created to store 
water for the hydroelectric power stations, provided a beautiful 
setting for an outdoor vacation retreat. Because the area lacked a 
hotel, PL&P decided to establish a nonutility subsidiary to build 
and operate an inn on the southwest shore of the High Sierra lake. 
The rustic Huntington Lodge opened for business on 4 July 1915, 
and Huntington installed H. M. Nickerson, assistant manager of 
the Huntington Hotel in Pasadena, as manager of the new retreat. 
However, because of heavy snows in winter and poor access roads, 
guests had to take buses to the lodge from the end of the rail line, 
and the lodge was only open for the summer season. Not very suc­
cessful, the hotel never met the high expectations of Huntington 
and PL&P executives.32 
Regardless of PL&P success, several factors led Huntington to 
consider selling the growing firm. By nature an organizer and con­
solidator, he had had a longstanding desire to merge the three 
major power companies of the Los Angeles basin—SoCal Edison, 
PL&P, and Los Angeles Gas and Electric—into a giant utility cor­
poration. In 1915, he was pushed to attain this goal by two key 
events. With its Owens Valley Aqueduct Project underway, the city 
of Los Angeles decided to build hydroelectric power stations along 
the aqueduct route. The city planned to supply this municipally 
generated power to its residents either by purchasing the distri­
bution systems of the three power companies in Los Angeles or 
by building a parallel delivery network. These plans acted as the 
catalyst for merger talks between SoCal Edison and PL&P. As the 
discussion of consolidation between the two firms continued, Hunt­
ington became seriously ill, and his declining health led his staff to 
concentrate on selling the power company. 
In December 1916, the date of the eventual consolidation be­
tween SoCal Edison and PL&P, John B. Miller, president of the 
former company, said: "Many times in the past ten years, nego­
tiations toward consolidation of these properties have been taken 
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up but only recently has an understanding been reached by which 
Mr. Huntington, principal owner of Pacific Light and Power stock, 
and I have been able to work out a satisfactory basis for a merger."33 
But talks toward combination had begun even earlier than Mil­
ler recalled. As early as 1902, when Huntington and Kerckhoff first 
incorporated the PL&P, they considered buying SoCal Edison and 
Los Angeles Gas and Electric. However, no deal could be made with 
the former, and the latter's proposal—the insistence on selling both 
its electric and gas business together as a package—was unappeal­
ing to PL&P.14 The following year, Huntington and Kerckhoff dis­
cussed the possibility of uniting PL&P with SoCal Edison. In June 
1903, Kerckhoff noted that SoCal Edison was developing a large 
amount of water power, "below us at Kern River," and explained 
that additional hydroelectric stations would be valuable suppliers of 
electricity to Huntington's growing railway system. Furthermore, 
Miller was "anxious for consolidation if it can be carried out along 
fair lines." Yet, Kerckhoff saw problems with the merger and wrote 
Huntington: "Mr. Miller suggests a new corporation to take over 
the two companies. Owing to the fact that you always wanted a 
majority of the companies you are in, I do not believe a proper 
recognition could be made of your desires or of the value of your 
business if a new corporation were formed."35 
Nothing came of these talks, but Huntington tried several more 
times to put together a larger utility company that could be oper­
ated more efficiently and be free from competition. In 1908, PL&P 
made another bid to acquire SoCal Edison. This time, however, 
both Huntington and Harriman—who, because the SP held 45 
percent interest of the LARY, which in turn owned 51 percent of 
PL&P, had some influence over management of PL&P—believed 
the price Edison was asking for its common stock was too high. 
Setting aside the idea of combining with SoCal Edison, PL&P man­
agement considered a proposition from C. O. G. Miller, president 
of Pacific Lighting Corporation, to sell its subsidiary, Los Angeles 
Gas and Electric.36 
In February 1909, a proposal was drawn up to consolidate 
PL&P and its subsidiaries—Kern River Power Company and Do­
mestic Gas—plus the Kerckhoff-controlled San Joaquin Light and 
Power Company with the Pacific Lighting Corporation and its sub­
sidiaries—Los Angeles Gas and Electric and Pasadena Consoli­
dated Gas. The plan called for the creation of a $50 million corpo­
ration, with \ luntington and Kerckhoff leading the new enterprise. 
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For some reason, the deal was called off, and another Huntington 
attempt to combine the electric utilities in the Los Angeles basin 
failed.37 
Merger talks were not taken up until 1915, when PL&P and 
SoCal Edison were driven into negotiations by the city's plans to 
sell its own hydroelectric power. In 1910, the city council, at the 
Los Angeles Board of Public Works' request, placed a $3.5 mil­
lion project proposal before the electorate. The proposal was to 
construct a hydroelectric power station in the San Francisquito 
Canyon, about forty miles northwest of downtown Los Angeles 
along the Owens Valley Aqueduct route. Over the strident opposi­
tion of Los Angeles's three privately held power companies, which 
feared municipal competition, voters approved the proposition by 
a wide margin of seven to one.38 
Local government officials entered into negotiations with the 
three power companies in 1912 to purchase their distribution sys­
tems within the Los Angeles city limits in order to market their 
municipal electricity to residents. Unwilling to surrender their 
customers in Los Angeles, the power companies refused to sell 
their delivery systems but offered to purchase and distribute city-
generated electricity. This proposal was unacceptable to the city; 
negotiations stalled, and the following year a $6.5 million bond 
issue was placed on the ballot to provide funds for Los Angeles 
to construct its own distribution network within the city. Uniting 
against the proposition, PL&P, SoCal Edison, and Los Angeles 
Gas and Electric put together an aggressive campaign that stressed 
the expense of a municipal distribution system largely paralleling 
their extant private networks. The power companies then reiter­
ated their offer to purchase municipal generated electricity and 
lease their distribution systems to the city. The utility firms' efforts 
proved successful, and the proposal failed to receive the necessary 
two-thirds majority. But the city government refused to give up, 
putting another plan to construct an electrical distribution system 
before Los Angeles voters the following year. Supporters empha­
sized the $3.5 million already invested in the San Francisquito 
hydroelectric facility, and the bond issue passed.39 
Los Angeles then possessed the funds to construct its own dis­
tribution system, and the power companies, with the threat of mu­
nicipal competition looming on the horizon, reopened negotiations 
with the city. The electric firms proposed leasing their networks to 
the city as the first gradual step toward outright municipal owner­
ship. Desiring an immediate transfer of the companies' systems, 
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the city rejected the offer, but talks continued. Then, deciding to 
concentrate on acquiring only the SoCal Edison distribution net­
work—which, excluding the railroads, supplied approximately 47 
percent of the electricity in Los Angeles—the city council asked 
the California Railroad Commission to set a price on the company's 
system.40 
As the railroad commission began to assess the value of its dis­
tribution system and severance charges, SoCal Edison president 
John Miller, concerned that the loss of business in Los Angeles 
might bankrupt SoCal Edison, sought to enlarge his market out­
side the city limits. He reopened merger talks with PL&P in 1915. 
Miller's timing was propitious; the sixty-five-year-old Huntington's 
strategy of divestment remained the same as it had been since 
1910 when Charles Graham, his East Coast agent, wrote a prospec­
tive buyer about another Huntington company: "Mr. Huntington's 
policy is that anything he has can be bought at a price."41 
Negotiations began in the spring of 1915 and continued 
through the fall. In October, when Huntington was stricken with 
a serious illness, his staff redoubled its efforts to arrive at a settle­
ment with SoCal Edison. The deal had been held up by Hunting­
ton's refusal to trade his PL&P stock and bonds without receiving 
some type of guarantee about the continuance of cash dividends 
on SoCal Edison stock. In December, Miller broke the logjam by 
proposing to create a new class of SoCal Edison second-preferred 
cumulative 5 percent stock. This offer quelled Huntington's wor­
ries, because the new preferred stock would actually yield a higher 
annual return than he had received on his PL&P preferred stock 
and bonds combined. Huntington's income from his PL&P secu­
rities in 1915 was $527,000; the 5 percent earnings of the SoCal 
Edison stock were anticipated at $601,000 per year. Dunn closed 
the deal with Miller, selling PL&P to SoCal Edison on 30 Decem­
ber 1915.42 
According to the terms of the consolidation, Huntington turned 
his PL&P securities—46,175 shares of first-preferred stock, 96,602 
shares of second-preferred stock, 104,685 of common stock, $5 mil­
lion PL&P bonds, and $1.4 million in PL&P notes—over to SoCal 
Edison. In exchange, Huntington became the largest shareholder 
of the utility firm, receiving 120,299 shares of $100 par value 
SoCal Edison second-preferred stock, which included full voting 
rights plus $4 million in cash due in installments in 1916 and 1917. 
Huntington's staff arranged this cash payment schedule, providing 
timely funds for HL&I notes maturing during the next two years.43 
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Details of the merger were worked out in the ensuing months. 
In December 1916, PL&P and SoCal Edison applied to the Califor­
nia Railroad Commission for the right to consolidate operations, 
and the city continued its drive to build or acquire a distribution 
system to market its electricity. In June 1915, the railroad commis­
sion fixed the value of the SoCal Edison distribution system at $4.75 
million and set severance charges—the estimated loss of business 
SoCal Edison would sustain by surrendering distribution of elec­
tricity to the city of Los Angeles—at approximately $1.65 million. 
The city council felt the price for purchasing SoCal Edison's dis­
tribution system was too high and began constructing a municipal 
distribution network. By October 1916, the city again had tried to 
acquire the distribution system of the three major power compa­
nies in Los Angeles by offering them $10 million. But the power 
firms insisted on $12 million, and no deal was made. With settle­
ment unlikely in the future, one electric company, Los Angeles Gas 
and Electric, withdrew from negotiations with the city. 
In December, directors of both PL&P and SoCal Edison met 
to discuss another city proposal to pay $8.27 million for the two 
companies' distribution systems in Los Angeles plus $1.145 million 
in severance damages. Over the next few months, the city added 
more money to the pot. In addition to the purchase price, which 
with interest totaled nearly $12 million, the agreement called for 
the two power companies to operate the distribution systems under 
lease for a period of five years, sharing the revenue with the city. 
In addition, the city would not be producing enough electricity 
to supply Los Angeles even after the San Francisquito hydroelec­
tric station began operating in mid-1917. Therefore, the offer 
committed the city to purchase, over each of the next two years, 
58,814,000 kilowatt-hours of electric power at a rate varying from 
0.5 cents to 1.22 cents per kilowatt-hour for a minimum annual 
payment of not less than $717,000. On 30 April 1917, the city and 
the two power companies signed the agreement.44 
Three weeks later, the railroad commission approved the mer­
ger of PL&P and SoCal Edison. The enlarged SoCal Edison had 
a capitalization of $75 million and served more than 100 cities, 
towns, and rural communities in southern California. Company 
president John Miller said: "By the merger of these companies 
great economies can be effected; waste eliminated; the stockholders 
and investments stabilized and the consumers will . . . share in all 
the above benefits, but will, with the unification of the two systems 
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with their large and diverse sources of power, have guaranteed 
service in excellence and continuity the peer of any of the world."45 
Free of the electric power business, Huntington devoted more 
time and money to enlarging his library. By 1917, he had amassed 
a huge private library of rare books and manuscripts. Although his 
major foray into book collecting began after 1900, Huntington's 
interest in books was apparent by the 1870s when he had assembled 
a library of the major nineteenth-century authors, which was then 
worth approximately $1,800. Although forced to surrender this 
collection before the end of the decade, he remained interested 
in books.46 
While residing in San Francisco during the 1890s, Hunting­
ton became more serious about collecting books, but it was after 
the turn of the century that his book purchases increased signifi­
cantly. His taste in books was eclectic, and he acquired, for example, 
early editions of Chaucer and Montaigne and first editions of Issak 
Walton's life of Dr. Sanderson (1678) and Bishop Burnet's death of 
the earl of Rochester (1680).47 
In 1904 Huntington obtained the Charles Morrogh collection 
of fine printing and the John Morschhauser library. Huntington's 
next major block purchases took place in 1908 and 1909 when 
he acquired one-quarter of the Henry W. Poor library. Concen­
trating mainly on early British and American literature, Hunting­
ton then bought the 2,100-volume E. Dwight Church library and 
the Robert Hoe library in 1911. From 1914 to 1917, he added 
several major private collections. In 1914, he bought the Kemble-
Devonshire collection of English plays from the Duke of Devon­
shire. The following year, he obtained the 20,000 volumes of the 
Frederick Halsey library; in 1916 he acquired part of the Pem­
broke library; and in 1917 he purchased the Bridgewater library.4" 
A builder, in railroads, the power industry, and real estate, Hunt­
ington moved rapidly, combining many smaller holdings into large 
consolidated enterprises. These characteristics carried over into his 
career as a collector of rare books and art. 
Although relying on prominent book dealers such as Isaac Men­
doza, George D. Smith, and A. S. W. Rosenbach to assemble his 
library, Huntington decided which collections to purchase, basing 
his decisions on what he liked: "I buy books simply for my own 
pleasure, and it is merely a case of buying whatever I do not have, 
whenever the opportunity is offered." But his purchases were soon 
based on more than personal whim; pouring over catalogs and 
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studying the subject, Huntington became an educated collector. In 
fact, the last book he looked at before he died was the Short-Title 
Catalogue of Books Printed in England, Scotland, and Ireland, 1475­
1640.*9 
In addition to determining what would be part of the collec­
tion, Huntington worked rapidly to piece together an unequaled 
library, establishing one of the largest libraries of English literature 
in the world. 
Huntington also purchased a number of eighteenth-century 
English paintings, mainly through art dealer Joseph Duveen. He 
appears to have liked British art, but this taste seems to have been 
influenced by Arabella. Although the two were not married until 
1913, their correspondence from 1908 until their wedding indi­
cates they were operating closely together, selecting various works 
of art. Once begun, the collection focused on British portraits by 
such painters as Gainsborough, Reynolds, and Romney.50 
In addition to building fine collections of books and art, Hunt­
ington built beautiful gardens at the San Marino estate. Landscape 
architect William Hertrich was hired to develop the land. Overseen 
by Huntington, Hertrich created lily ponds, a cactus garden, and 
palm garden, and laid out a Japanese garden on the grounds.51 
Thus, between the years 1914 and 1917, Huntington retired 
from active participation in his southern California business em­
pire. Remarried in 1913, he began spending less time in greater 
Los Angeles because his new wife preferred living in New York, 
and his southland business triad was now managed largely by 
William Dunn with the assistance of Charles Graham. Although he 
had moved away from the business world, Huntington remained 
a builder even in retirement. Days once spent planning railroad 
routes, preparing subdivisions, or contemplating power stations 
were devoted to planning library acquisitions, purchasing paint­
ings, and expanding his botanical gardens at the San Marino estate. 
8

Organized Labor, 1900-1920 
Many aspects of the southern California economy lured Hunting­
ton to the region. The area possessed a warm, dry climate con­
ducive to a tourist industry; its citrus orchards were booming; tre­
mendous potential existed for growth and expansion; and, thus, 
large profits were a possibility. Equally as important in enticing 
Huntington to the Los Angeles basin was its lack of strong labor 
organizations and therefore its relatively low labor costs. "One rea­
son Mr. Huntington invested heavily in the southern part of the 
state was his dislike of labor conditions in San Francisco and his 
preference for the open shop. He was a quiet but determined oppo­
nent of any outside interference in business and had no use for . . . 
labor organizations, and no sympathy for strikes."' 
During the first two decades of the twentieth century, Hunt­
ington, the largest employer in the rapidly growing Los Angeles 
basin, squared off with his workers in a series of confrontations 
over unionization. The conflict pitted his dictatorial paternalism 
against labor's desire for recognition in the sprawling Los Angeles 
metropolis. In his continuing drive to stamp out unions, Hunting­
ton, whose widespread southern California business empire em­
ployed more than five thousand workers, used several tactics uti­
lized by other entrepreneurs of the time. He fired workers who 
were involved in unions, made use of strikebreakers, joined other 
employers in local and national anti-union organizations, and tried 
to placate his work force with various paternalistic programs. 
The vastness of the Los Angeles basin also helped shape Hunt­
ington's labor strategy, for he encouraged internal divisions among 
his workers, counting on their diffusion throughout the southland 
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to frustrate attempts to resolve differences and unite against him. 
This dispersal, however, eventually thwarted Huntington as much 
as his workers, because he found it impossible to stamp out worker 
unrest spread over such a large geographical area. The ultimate 
outcome was no resolution of the conflict between Huntington and 
his employees.2 
Huntington adhered to a "no concession to labor" policy, which 
had been shaped by his experiences during the Pullman Strike in 
1894. He had come to believe that negotiating with a union was 
tantamount to turning over the running of a company to orga­
nized labor, and brought this anti-union attitude with him when 
he entered the Los Angeles basin's trolley and electric power busi­
nesses. His ventures in the vast, sparsely settled area required a 
decentralized organizational structure, with workers operating out 
of numerous carhouses and power substations.3 
Huntington's first encounter with labor in southern California 
came in 1901 when the Los Angeles Railway's platform men—con­
ductors and motormen—demanded that their hourly wages be in­
creased from twenty cents to twenty-two and a half cents per hour. 
In June these employees accepted the company's counterproposal 
of a progressive wage scale based on seniority—men with under 
four years' experience were paid twenty cents per hour, those with 
four years received twenty-one cents, and workers withfive or more 
years at the LARY earned twenty-two cents per hour.4 These gradu­
ated pay levels tied to seniority became an obstacle to a unified 
labor movement. Rather than identify with other platform men, 
many individual workers focused on their own situation and en­
deavored to remain with the company so as to increase their wages. 
Their views were reinforced by Huntington's announcement that 
he would fire any employee who joined a union.5 
Later in 1901, the Los Angeles Council of Labor tried to orga­
nize streetcar workers in the Los Angeles basin. Created in 1890 
as a representative body of labor in Los Angeles, the council's goal 
was to form new unions and gain the affiliation of established ones. 
This attempt to unionize trolley employees, as well as another in 
1902, was put down by Huntington and other street railway owners 
by firing those who joined the organization.6 
Although anti-union, Huntington did not view himself as anti­
labor. He maintained a benevolent attitude toward employees. In 
1902, the trolley magnate wrote to the Los Angeles Railway's Com­
mittee of Trainmen: "It is the duty of every employer to endeavor 
to treat those whom the fortune of life has made his employees, 
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with as exact a measure of fairness and justice, as the limitations 
of human nature and intelligence permit, and such has been and 
always will continue to be my own determination."7 Despite such 
rhetoric, once in southern California, Huntington allied himself 
with other major "enemies of organized labor." A chief member 
of this camp was Harrison Gray Otis, owner and publisher of the 
Los Angeles Times. Huntington heartily approved of Otis's bombas­
tic anti-unionism and frequently corresponded with the newspaper 
publisher on the subject of labor. He also provided generous mone­
tary support to various employers' associations pledged to smash­
ing unions in Los Angeles. 
Otis had been conducting the fight against organized labor 
since the 1880s. His primary aim was to keep the Los Angeles Times 
union-free. Leading the city's struggle against unions, Otis viewed 
strikers as deserters who should be "denied a job," "blacklisted," 
and "driven from the community."8 He used his newspaper to 
spearhead the business community's effort to make Los Angeles a 
model open-shop city, helping to create an atmosphere of battle 
between capital and labor. Whether for protection or to threaten 
others, Otis rode through the city in a luxury automobile with a 
cannon mounted on it." 
When Huntington came to the Los Angeles basin, he instinc­
tively sought out men whose conservative views paralleled his. Both 
he and Otis were convinced that honest American laborers were 
being led astray by radical, un-American "dictators—otherwise 
known as labor leaders"—who sought to undermine an owner's 
rightful control of a company. In addition to the almost-daily pub­
lication of bellicose anti-union editorials, the Los Angeles Times fre­
quently quoted the views of powerful businessmen on the labor 
situation in the southland. In June 1904, Otis printed Huntington's 
position: "I believe in free labor, and 1 shall employ no man who 
owes allegiance to a labor organization. . . . There is not a union 
man on our payroll now. I cannot trust a union man because he is 
not a free agent."10 
Huntington also collaborated with other prominent labor foes, 
including David Parry, the president of the National Association 
of Manufacturers (NAM). Established in 1895, the NAM originally 
promoted trade and commerce, but by 1903 it had turned stri­
dently ami-union. Huntington agreed with the ideas of the NAM, 
and he joined Parry in demanding legislation outlawing boycotts 
and protecting strikebreakers and nonunion workers." 
Huntington became an active- member and generous supporter 
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of national and local anti-union employer associations that stressed 
the open shop. Nationally, he belonged to the NAM and the Na­
tional Street Railway Association; locally, he did battle against orga­
nized labor as a member of the Los Angeles Merchants' and Manu­
facturers' Association and the local branch of the Citizens' Alliance. 
The Merchants' and Manufacturers' Association, or M&M, was 
formed in the 1890s to encourage business and industry in the 
Los Angeles basin, and it was initially neutral in disputes between 
employers and workers. But in 1902, after observing a union-
orchestrated boycott against the Los Angeles Times, the M&M began 
to look less favorably on labor organizations. A year later it hard­
ened its position against labor, publicly condemning boycotts and 
pledging both moral and financial aid to members under union 
attack.12 It also pressured unwilling businessmen to follow its open-
shop policies. With membership as high as 80 percent or more of 
the Los Angeles business community, the M&M coerced firms by 
withholding bank credit, denying advertising space in the Los Ange­
les Times, delaying shipments of needed supplies or raw materials, 
and encouraging people to buy from rival companies.13 
Working closely with the M&M was the Citizens' Alliance, estab­
lished in Dayton, Ohio, and originally known as the Order of the 
Bees. Citizens' Alliances were part of a national open-shop move­
ment that rapidly spread to hundreds of cities across the United 
States. The alliance was brought to Los Angeles in 1904 by Herbert 
George, who had already set up such groups in Denver and San 
Francisco. Once established, the Los Angeles Citizens' Alliance 
(LACA) grew quickly.14 Two months after its founding, the LACA 
had approximately six thousand members making it, in propor­
tion to the area's population, one of the strongest alliances in the 
country. Membership was open to any company, employer, or citi­
zen who did not belong to a labor union; most of the city's major 
businessmen joined the Citizens' Alliance. Huntington, however, 
did much more than sign on with the organization; he made an ini­
tial contribution of $1,000 and promised to provide, if necessary, 
another $250 annually. This money, along with other donations, 
went into a war chest used to support members who became vic­
tims of a strike or boycott. The LACA gave members one dollar 
per day for each worker who walked off the job.15 
With these alliances, Huntington hoped to crush unions in 
southern California, but in 1903, he found himself battling labor 
on several fronts. Following the Council of Labor's unsuccessful 
unionization attempts, San Francisco organizers came to Los Ange­
les, created Local No. 203 of the Amalgamated Association of 
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Street Railway Employees, and soon claimed two hundred mem­
bers. Huntington responded by firing all employees who joined 
the union.16 In March when some of the dismissed employees at­
tempted to call a strike, Huntington obtained police help to break 
up the assembled workers, and, to avoid further trouble, ordered 
his managers to fire any employee seen talking to labor organizers. 
The following month, the union asked the Los Angeles Railway for 
recognition, reinstatement of the dismissed workers, and reason­
able wages and hours. When the company refused, a strike order 
was issued for 29 April, but Huntington once more averted major 
trouble by asking the police for help. Officers went aboard street­
cars and deterred most motormen from walking off the job. Thir­
teen LARY employees were fired. Then, after hiring detectives to 
spy on the local street railway union and prevent its revival, Hunt­
ington rewarded his loyal employees with a wage hike of nearly 10 
percent.17 
Huntington utilized similar tactics to put down attempts to orga­
nize a union among trainmen employed by the interurban Pacific 
Electric in 1902 and 1903. In May 1903, after Huntington fired 
those involved and rewarded nonstrikers, a group of thirty-five 
trainmen on the Long Beach line issued a statement of allegiance: 
"It is our desire to be always faithful in the discharge of duty; 
and [we] trust, that should the circumstances be repeated, you 
will feel assured of our unchanging loyalty and personal interest 
in the advancement of all that pertains to the PACIFIC ELEC­
TRIC RY. Co."18 
This momentary quieting of the trainmen did not end Hunting­
ton's labor problems with the PE. The Amalgamated Association 
of Street Railway Employees decided to assist the Mexican laborers 
working in the Huntington construction gangs to organize a sepa­
rate union. Mexican laborers had long been hired to lay track in the 
southwestern United States because their wage rate, $1.00 to $1.25 
for a ten-hour day, was significantly less than other minorities, such 
as the Chinese, who demanded up to $1.75 per day for the same 
work. Although in 1901 PE officials had initially paid Mexican 
workers $1.85 per day to guarantee themselves a sufficient supply 
of labor to carry out the planned expansions, by mid-decade, as 
construction of the interurban lines slowed, large numbers of track 
layers were no longer needed, and wages fell to the level that other 
railroads were paying. In 1904, for example, Huntington noted 
that a Mexican laborer, costing $1.25 per day, was much cheaper 
than a white laborer who averaged from $2.00 to $2.50 per day.19 
On 23 April 1903, Lemuel Biddle, secretary of the Los Angeles 
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Council of Labor, announced the formation of the Mexican Federal 
Union. Within a week the new organization boasted nine hundred 
members and a $600 bank account. The morning after its creation, 
union representatives went to a PE superintendent and demanded 
a wage increase for the Mexican track layers on the Main Street 
line. Laborers were working day and night to complete this line 
for the annual Los Angeles Fiesta to be held in early May. The 
1903 Fiesta was especially important because President Theodore 
Roosevelt was expected to attend. Caught off guard by the union's 
demands, PE management agreed to its wishes: wages were raised 
from seventeen and a half cents per hour to twenty cents per hour 
for week days, thirty cents per hour for night work, and forty cents 
an hour for Sundays. But when Huntington, who was in San Fran­
cisco on the morning of the agreement, learned of the concessions, 
he abrogated the deal. The union promptly called a strike, and all 
seven hundred Mexican laborers working on the Main Street line 
walked off the job.20 
The PE retaliated by firing the strikers and replacing them with 
Japanese, black, and white laborers whom it paid twenty-two and 
a half cents per hour. Again, Huntington received police protec­
tion for strikebreakers. The strike quickly collapsed, and the Main 
Street line was completed in time for the Fiesta.21 
Despite his swift action against strikers, Huntington was faced 
almost immediately with yet another labor dispute. On 1 May 1903, 
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, represented 
by Local No. 61 in Los Angeles, issued demands to the Home 
Telephone Company, Sunset Telephone and Telegraph Company, 
Southern California Edison Company, and Los Angeles Traction, 
as well as Huntington's Los Angeles Railway, Pacific Electric, and 
Pacific Light and Power Company. The union called for a closed 
shop, wage increases, an eight-hour workday with time-and-a-half 
overtime pay, and the establishment of union regulations for ap­
prentices. When the companies rejected the union's demands on 
5 May, about five hundred Los Angeles linemen struck. The strike 
quickly spread from the Los Angeles basin to much of southern 
California. The dispute dragged on into the fall of 1903 before a 
settlement was finally reached.22 
Huntington, however, was unwilling to have his companies 
brought to a standstill and, rather than wait for negotiations to end 
the strike, decided on individual action. The Los Angeles basin 
lacked a large reserve of qualified laborers ready to assume the 
positions of the skilled workers on strike, but Huntington tapped 
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into labor pools as far away as the East Coast. He operated much 
like a large corporation, transferring workers into struck plants or 
jobs from non-union facilities.23 To induce these workers to come to 
the Los Angeles basin, Huntington offered to pay their transporta­
tion costs, promised the linemen the same three-dollar-per-day 
wage they received in the East, assured them free room and board, 
and agreed to pay their fare home if they wished to return.24 He 
successfully quashed the strikes in his firms, noting in 1905 that 
"this country is having marvelous growth and yet quite healthy. . . . 
Our people here stand together and work together, and we are 
practically free from Union domination. Our different companies 
have between four and five thousand men employed and not a 
union man among them. Once in a while one joins a union, but he 
does not remain with us long."25 
Huntington's strategy of employing vigorous anti-union tactics 
and allying himself with like-minded businessmen proved success­
ful. From the end of 1903 through 1909, he had no clashes with 
labor. His constant efforts to weaken unions in southern Califor­
nia led the Central Labor Council in 1907 to single out the trolley 
magnate: "In the city of Los Angeles is gathered some of the most 
notable and powerful enemies of organized labor in the United 
States, and probably the most wealthy and vindictive among them 
all is Henry E. Huntington."26 
The council's statement notwithstanding, Huntington followed 
a paternalistic policy in dealing with his work force, a policy that 
he used to strengthen his stand against unions. Like many other 
wealthy businessmen of the era, he realized the importance of less­
ening the sense of impersonality brought on by increasing plant 
size and tried to maintain close contact with his employees.27 When 
in Los Angeles, he spent hours talking to his workers and riding his 
streetcars, seeking ways to improve the system. In a 1930 interview, 
Myron Hunt, one of the architects who designed Huntington's San 
Marino home and library, remembered: "Mr. Huntington derived 
much pleasure from talks on the back platform with conductors or 
on the front platform with the motorman while riding into town. 
He would get suggestions on the system or just exchange a few 
words with his men."28 
Concerned with his workers' well-being, Huntington offered 
laborers several employee-benefit programs. Similar programs 
were already in place in many firms throughout the country; 
companies such as H.J. Heinz, National Cash Register, and Inter­
national Harvester led the way with welfare plans that were 
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fairly successful in limiting union activity. These benefit pack­
ages often provided housing, hospitals, athletic facilities, movie 
theaters, schools for employee children, profit sharing, and pen­
sions.29 Huntington's policy of welfare capitalism was an attempt 
to improve the workers' quality of life, increase their loyalty, im­
prove their attitude toward the job and the company, and, most 
importantly, avoid unions.30 
One of the earliest aspects of Huntington's paternalism was a 
voluntary medical insurance program for employees of the Los 
Angeles Railway. To participate, workers had fifty cents taken 
from their paychecks each month. The company physician not only 
treated sick employees but also kept a check on malingering. The 
plan's benefits included "medical and surgical treatment, medical 
and surgical dressings, artificial limbs and appliances, and treat­
ment for serious injury or illness." Through the health program, 
Huntington also hoped to mold better employees and create moral, 
upright citizens. Toward this end, the LARY did not extend medi­
cal benefits to ailments resulting from activities considered either 
improper or immoral. Maladies such as venereal disease or injuries 
caused by intemperance or fighting were not covered by the insur­
ance plan.31 
Another element of the LARY's fringe-benefit scheme, and 
possibly the most important, was the establishment of recreational 
facilities for employees. Like many other entrepreneurs, Hunting­
ton had at least two reasons for building recreational clubhouses. 
First, out of a sense of guilt, employers occasionally felt obligated 
to reward employees who worked long and grueling shifts. To im­
prove the motorman's life, Huntington set up indoor and outdoor 
recreational facilities. Second, Huntington reasoned that after the 
workday ended, employees had some free time, time that might 
be detrimental to the firm if workers engaged in drinking and 
gambling. Worse still, they might attempt to organize a union. To 
occupy workers' free time and channel their energies away from 
destructive activities Huntington considered it an inexpensive and 
wise investment to provide a variety of diversions.32 The Los Angeles 
Herald in 1908 commented approvingly on the firm's recreational 
program: "This way of looking after the ease of the employees is 
one of the best investments of the management because it is real­
ized that this little recognition of the men and their comfort has 
been the means of winning their loyalty and securing the best work 
from the best class of men."33 
Clubhouses were built at several division headquarters, adja­
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cent to carbarns. The recreational centers included libraries, card 
rooms, swimming pools, movie theaters, pool tables, tennis courts, 
and restaurants where food was served at cost.34 Because the facili­
ties were established at scattered locations, workers of the various 
divisions were prevented from fraternizing and possibly creating a 
union or organizing a strike. 
In addition to these employee recreational complexes, the Los 
Angeles Railway organized an interdivisional baseball league. De­
signed to create team spirit within each division, the league also 
boosted company morale. Management reinforced employees' ties 
to their individual divisions by holding annual competitions to see 
which division could maintain the best trolley safety record with 
the fewest accidents.35 This creation of a competitive atmosphere 
among divisions also inhibited workers from cooperating with one 
another to form a union. 
Another reflection of the LARY's paternalism was its company-
sponsored employee organization. Called the Los Angeles Railway 
Recreation Association, the group was strictly a social club. All em­
ployees and officers were eligible to join the organization, which 
sponsored a company band and put on events such as monthly 
dances, discussions, picnics, and "smokers" (informal social gather­
ings for men). Although the organization was companywide, events 
were most often held separately within each division. 
The struggle between capital and labor was renewed, however, 
in the explosive year of 1910. In June, Los Angeles experienced 
its largest strike to date when workers engaged in the metal trades 
walked off their jobs. To assist metal trade employers and encour­
age them not to compromise with the strikers, the M&M promised 
financial aid. Along with many other area employers, Hunting­
ton was concerned with the outcome of this strike and, according 
to Socialist leader and trade union lawyer Job Harriman, contrib­
uted $100,000 to the M&M's fund to support struck employers.36 
Probably to placate his railway work force during the conflict 
(it continued for two years and resulted in only modest gains for 
strikers),'7 Huntington held a large company picnic at Redondo 
Beach for all LARY employees. The outing, which became an 
annual event thereafter, was sponsored by the Los Angeles Rail­
way Recreation Association, and all the costs—including PE trolley 
transportation to and from the festivities—were borne by Hunting­
ton. Typically, the picnic involved a baseball game, aquatic sports, 
and a dance, with music provided by the Los Angeles Railway 
Company band.38 
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Following the strike of 1910, tensions between employers and 
workers increased, and the Amalgamated Association of Street 
Railway Employees strove to take advantage of this rift by organiz­
ing Los Angeles trainmen and creating Carmen's Local No. 410. 
The new organization joined with the Central Labor Council in 
1911 to lobby for a state law limiting the workday to ten hours on 
both local and interurban railways. Local 410 failed to gain many 
adherents from the Los Angeles Railway, because management 
made it clear that workers who joined the union would be fired. 
Yet labor leaders remained determined. By 1913, Amalga­
mated, using the same issue of a shorter workday, renewed its 
efforts to organize Huntington's carmen. This time the company 
fended off the attempt by obtaining between two thousand and 
three thousand trainmen's signatures on petitions against the pro­
posed legislation. In 1914, however, it was disclosed before the U.S. 
Commission on Industrial Relations that the carmen had been co­
erced into signing the petition out of fear of losing their jobs if they 
refused.39 
Because the call for a shorter workday failed to gain union 
members, labor organizers took up the issue of wage rates. In 1914, 
hourly pay of the Los Angeles Railway trainmen started at twenty-
five cents an hour; then, from the workers' second through their 
sixth year of service, wages were increased a penny annually. The 
maximum wage was thirty cents per hour. In appearances before 
the Commission on Industrial Relations, a Los Angeles Railway 
spokesman claimed that the firm paid high wages. Its pay scale was 
comparable to lines in other large cities such as St. Paul, Minne­
apolis, Chicago, Denver, and Portland; however, the LARY paid 
lower wages than the local street railroads in San Francisco and 
Oakland, two California cities with strong trainmen's unions.4" 
Attempting to improve this situation, the Amalgamated Asso­
ciation of Street Railway Employees continued its drive to organize 
the workers of the Los Angeles Railway in 1915. This effort failed 
when company management again made it clear that employees 
who joined the union would be fired. The firm then moved to ame­
liorate the growing labor unrest by adopting the company union, a 
strategy being used by a number of employers around the country.41 
Known as the Cooperative Association of Employees of the Los 
Angeles Railway, it was organized in early 1917. Huntington chose 
General Manager George Kuhrts as the group's president, and the 
other officers were elected by the workers. The union established 
a board selected by workers to air employee grievances and make 
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recommendations to management. Although it made employee de­
sires known to management, the union had no administrative au­
thority, and it served in a purely advisory capacity. It did, however, 
create a fund that combined company contributions with the an­
nual one-dollar union dues to purchase employees' uniforms and 
watches, expenses previously borne by individual workers, and it 
established a voluntary life insurance plan.42 
The company union, however, did not address the problem of 
inflation that accompanied World War I. In an attempt to keep their 
employees' pay on a par with the rising cost of living, and thereby 
prevent union gains, the LARY raised wages between 1915 and 
1918. By mid-1918 the hourly minimum of twenty-five cents had 
been increased to thirty-eight cents, and the maximum of thirty 
cents per hour had been raised to forty-four and a half cents.43 But 
the pay increases averaged only 50 percent over a period when the 
cost of living had risen nearly 75 percent. The loss of the workers' 
purchasing power encouraged unions to organize trainmen. 
The Amalgamated Association of Street Railway Employees 
made significant gains in 1918 among LARY's platform men when 
the organization's vice-president, Ben Bowbeer, arrived from San 
Francisco to launch a major unionization effort. With the sup­
port of wage adjustment boards and the Mediation Commission, 
established under President Woodrow Wilson in 1917, the federal 
government moved toward upholding workers' right to organize. 
Armed with such backing, labor leaders redoubled their efforts to 
set up unions, and in Los Angeles, Bowbeer succeeded in gain­
ing adherents to Amalgamated Division 835. The union applied 
to the National War Labor Board (NWLB) in the fall of 1918 for 
an increase in wages and an eight-hour workday. The Los Ange­
les Railway, however, claimed that because it was only an intrastate 
firm, the national board had no jurisdiction over it, and it would 
not be bound by the agency's decisions.44 
Before the NWLB made its recommendation, Huntington was 
looking ahead to a strike. Still implacable about negotiating with 
unions, he explained how he wanted the possible walkout handled: 
If the Los Angeles Railway employees strike, and are violent, I would 
attempt to run as few cars as possible. I have no doubt but that we will 
receive protection from the Police Department. If say two-thirds of the 
men remain loyal, I would discharge every agitator, and see to it that 
they never have another day's work with the Railway Co. We have always 
treated our men fairly, and now when it conies to a fight, if it is a fight, I 
want you to stay with them to the finish.4"' 
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In the spring of 1919, the NWLB handed down its decision. 
It called for wage increases and the institution of collective bar­
gaining but rejected the eight-hour day. The Los Angeles Railway 
stood by its earlier statement and declined to act on the board's 
recommendations. By July, however, in an attempt to fend off a 
strike, officials decided to grant a wage increase, which was higher 
than the NWLB's suggestion, for the company's conductors and 
motormen. They raised the beginning salary of platform men to 
forty-one cents per hour and the maximum to forty-seven cents. 
But the union remained dissatisfied because the Los Angeles Rail­
way did not establish a plan for collective bargaining.46 The union 
then sent a list of additional demands—including an eight-hour 
day with time-and-a-half for overtime, and seventy-five cents per 
hour for conductors and motormen—to general manager Kuhrts. 
Management refused the wage increase but agreed to talk to a 
committee representing the workers themselves and not Amalga­
mated Division 835. Fearing a strike, the company hired 50 special 
law enforcement officers and began training 150 of its manage­
rial personnel in streetcar operation. The workers did not accept 
the company's offer, and in August approximately one-third of the 
streetcar motormen and conductors walked off the job.47 
Following Huntington's "no concession" policy, Los Angeles 
Railway management insured the continuance of the open shop by 
using managerial staff, as well as hiring additional motormen to 
maintain streetcar operations, and refusing to negotiate with the 
union. The strike was broken and full service restored by mid-
September.48 
Although Huntington rarely played an active management role 
after 1917 because he was devoting more time to his art collection 
and library, he continued to promote the open shop. In 1922, he 
told the New York Chamber of Commerce that there was no fight 
between capital and labor. The problem was the union organizers: 
"There would be but little difficulty between the employer and the 
employed if it was not for the pernicious influence of men who 
seek to control all workingmen, and so control the industries, and 
so control the country."49 
Yet Huntington failed to crush his employees' will to fight for 
a permanent labor organization. Regardless of the tactics he em­
ployed to counter labor activities, his workers continued seeking 
union representation to obtain increases in payscales and better 
working conditions. 
Conclusion: The Huntington Legacy

Like many other wealthy men of the era, such as Andrew Carne­
gie, J. P. Morgan, and Henry Frick, Henry Huntington spent his 
last years accumulating a priceless library and art collection. Along 
the way, he also established and endowed an institution that made 
his treasures available to scholars and the public. From 1917 until 
his death in 1927, Huntington concentrated on enriching the aes­
thetic, cultural, and intellectual landscape of southern California. 
Having amassed a fortune with his business triad, he wanted to 
build a monument to himself and his wife as well as return some 
of the fruits of his wealth to the people of the area. He once ex­
plained to financier and later Secretary of the Treasury Andrew 
Mellon: "I give my whole thing, my collection to California. I made 
money with the streetcars; I made money with the subdivisions; 
and I want to leave my money to America in memory of my wife 
and me."' 
Huntington spent several months each year in New York and 
was undoubtedly impressed by the many philanthropic monuments 
being established by the city's wealthy entrepreneurs. Some, like 
the Rockefeller Foundation, were devoted to eradicating disease 
and aiding education; others, like the Morgan Library or Frick 
Museum, presented collections of great literary masterpieces and 
valuable artwork to both scholars and the public. 
As early as 1906, Huntington was thinking about the future 
of his expanding rare book and manuscript collection. He had 
already considered giving his library to the public but was not 
sure of the method of disposition. It was George Ellery Hale, solar 
astronomer and creator of the Mount Wilson Observatory, who 
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convinced him to build the Huntington Library and Art Gallery in 
San Marino. 
Hale had left his faculty position at the University of Chicago 
and the directorship of the Yerkes Observatory in Williams Bay, 
Wisconsin, to set up and take charge of the Carnegie Institution's 
Mount Wilson Solar Observatory in the mountains just north of 
Pasadena in 1904. Once in southern California, he also worked to 
strengthen the area's arts and sciences. Hale first labored to trans­
form the Throop Polytechnic Institute in Pasadena (renamed the 
California Institute of Technology in 1920) into a major scientific 
research-oriented university. But he was also interested in the re­
gion's facilities for studies in the humanities and hoped to establish 
a first-class library in the southland.2 
On 3 October 1906, at a dinner given in Huntington's honor by 
the city of Pasadena, the trolley magnate was seated next to Hale. 
That evening, the two men discussed book collecting, and Hunt­
ington asked Hale whether he should donate his library to a New 
York institution or install it in southern California. Hale, seeing an 
opportunity to fulfill his dream of making Pasadena a center for 
the arts and sciences, favored bringing the collection to the West 
Coast. Huntington listened carefully to the scholar's recommenda­
tions but made no commitments, and the two did not discuss the 
topic again for six years.3 
In 1912, Hale and a group of culturally minded citizens orga­
nized an art and music association in Pasadena, and Huntington 
was named to the group's board of directors. Huntington tried to 
attend the meetings whenever he was in southern California, and 
Hale was given numerous opportunities to coax the millionaire 
to bring his library west. Hale also decided to talk with members 
of Huntington's family. On 14 February 1914, he wrote Arabella 
praising her son Archer's creation of the Hispanic Society of 
America Museum in New York and asked to be introduced to him. 
(Collis Huntington had adopted Archer, Arabella's son by a previ­
ous marriage.) The correspondence led to a meeting on 16 April. 
After seeing Archer in the morning, Hale was accompanied to 
the Hispanic Museum by Henry Huntington in the afternoon. As 
they toured the collections, Huntington surprised the scientist by 
describing a provision in his will that left the San Marino estate, in­
cluding his art and book collections, to the people of southern Cali­
fornia. The institution was to be administered by the Los Angeles 
County Board of Supervisors.4 
Although pleased with Huntington's decision to set up his li­
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brary in the Los Angeles basin, Hale did not approve of the county 
supervisors overseeing the institution. To dissuade Huntington 
from leaving his library in the hands of politicians, Hale played 
on Huntington's prejudices against organized labor. Stressing that 
the current board of supervisors knew little or nothing about rare 
books or fine art, Hale wrote Huntington on 17 April: "The out­
look for the future is little better, and it would be much worse 
if by any unfortunate chance the labor leaders acquired any such 
power [municipal political office] as they have in San Francisco." 
As an alternative, Hale offered the idea of a board of trustees 
selected by Huntington to supervise the library and art collection. 
Three days later, Huntington responded to Hale, noting: "Some 
of your suggestions are most excellent, and I will take them under 
consideration."5 
Encouraged by Huntington's note, Hale followed up with sev­
eral other letters explaining the advantages of forming a board 
of trustees similar to those overseeing such organizations as the 
Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Institution. In May 1914, 
he emphasized the international importance of Huntington's col­
lections to the fields of art, history, and literature and tried to 
convince the millionaire to build a research library. Several months 
passed before Huntington returned Hale's letter. Then, in October, 
Huntington wrote the scientist: "Your letter of May 11th reached 
me as I was sailing to Europe, and during the summer I have given 
your suggestions some thought. I am not ready to reply, but it is 
quite possible that you have planted a seed."6 
After Huntington returned from Europe in late 1914, Hale 
spoke with him several times about the library. He also discussed his 
ideas with Huntington's close business associates Patton and Dunn, 
whom he felt might be able to influence the millionaire. In March 
1916, after again speaking with Huntington, Hale sent an outline 
of what he termed a "concrete plan" for the creation of the research 
library and a board of trustees.7 Pleased with the recommenda­
tions, Huntington responded: "The mode of organization is in line 
with my ideas, and I hope, with the aid of Mr. Archer Huntington, 
to develop and formulate some such plans."8 Two years passed 
uneventfully, then in March 1918 Hale met with Huntington to 
discuss further the library plans. Three months later, the scientist 
presented a lecture on Huntington's library to the Pasadena Art 
and Music Association. After a general discussion of book collect­
ing, Hale praised Huntington for acquiring the Church, Chew, and 
Hoe libraries, which he collectively termed "the crown jewels of 
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English literature." After the talk, he sent Huntington a transcript 
of his address.9 
Fourteen months after this speech, the scientist's lobbying finally 
paid off; Huntington informed Hale of his plans to establish the 
library in San Marino and asked the astronomer to be one of the 
trustees. On 31 August 1919, the first trust indenture creating 
the Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery was signed. 
The institution was to be a "free public library, art gallery, museum, 
and park, containing objects of artistic, historic, or literary interest, 
and its object was to advance learning in the arts and sciences, and 
to promote the public welfare." Its original trustees were Howard 
Huntington, Archer Huntington, William Dunn, George Hale, and 
George Patton.10 
From 1919 until the founder's death in 1927, several addi­
tional indentures were signed preparing for the library's status as 
a public institution. In 1922, Huntington transferred all his books 
and manuscripts as well as his paintings, sculpture, tapestries, and 
antique furniture, to the trustees. Two years later, the Board of 
Trustees formally accepted the art gallery, the library, and the con­
tents of the two buildings, which in 1924 had an aggregate value 
of $4,043,964." 
In 1923 the board created a permanent endowment, and Hunt­
ington provided the library with numerous securities. The fund 
held 2,550 shares of the Huntington-Redondo Company, 1,350 
shares of Rodeo Land and Water Company, 10,000 shares of 
Southern California Edison preferred stock, and 3,664 shares 
of the Hammond Lumber Company. The endowment was also 
given a sizable number of bonds. Listed at face value these in­
cluded $1,092,000 worth of City Railway of Los Angeles bonds, 
$2,830,000 worth of Los Angeles Railway bonds, $142,000 worth 
of PE bonds, and $3,000,000 worth of Newport News Shipbuild­
ing and Dry Dock Company bonds. The market value of these 
securities was between $9 million and $10 million.12 
Meanwhile, as work progressed on the library building and 
plans were laid to create a research staff and prepare the institution 
for scholars, Huntington lost two immediate family members and a 
close business associate. On 27 March 1922, he was shaken by the 
death of his only son, Howard. One week after the death, Dunn 
told Graham of Huntington's sadness: "Mr. Huntington is taking 
the loss terribly hard, but is, I believe pulling up a little all the 
time."13 Henry M. Robinson, president of First National Bank of 
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California and a trustee of Caltech, succeeded Howard Huntington 
as a trustee of the Huntington Library. 
Two years later, Huntington lost his wife. Arabella, who had 
been ill since December 1923, died on 16 September 1924. De­
scribing Huntington's state following her death, George Hapgood, 
a personal secretary of the millionaire, wrote to art dealer Joseph 
Duveen about Huntington's trip to New York: "We arrived yester­
day after a rather trying trip, but Mr. Huntington stood the strain 
better than I thought he would. The house seems desolate, and 
it will be a long time before he becomes adjusted to the new con­
ditions."14 Eleven months later, in August 1925, William Dunn, 
Huntington's right-hand man and close friend, died. Robert A. 
Millikan, a Nobel prize winner in physics and president of Caltech, 
succeeded Dunn on the Huntington Library's Board of Trustees. 
Emotionally weakened by these deaths, Huntington's health 
rapidly deteriorated. His prostate problems, which had bedridden 
him in 1915, recurred in 1924. In the fall 1925, he was taken to 
see a specialist at Philadelphia's Lankenau Hospital by the chief 
surgeon of the Los Angeles Railway, Ernest A. Bryant. Huntington 
underwent what was believed a successful operation and returned 
to southern California to recuperate in late November.15 
The seventy-five-year-old Huntington did not recover rapidly 
but remained optimistic. In February 1926, he wrote the wife of 
J. E. Brown, a deceased employee: "While I am still under the doc­
tor's care [a full-time nurse had moved in to take care of him], I 
expect soon to be up and about and as active as ever, but it has 
taken a long time for the wound to heal, and until it is fully closed, I 
prefer to be cautious."16 By May, Huntington was still convalescing 
in the upstairs portion of the San Marino house and had not yet 
ventured downstairs. Although Huntington's condition improved 
somewhat in the summer, and he began to receive visitors, he never 
fully regained his health. 
In late April 1927, Huntington decided to return to Lankenau 
Hospital for a consultation to see why a complete recovery had not 
taken place. It was decided that a second operation was needed, 
but the situation did not appear life threatening. On 4 May Hunt­
ington wrote: "I am to be operated on tomorrow, but there is very 
little danger of it not being successful. I do not know how long 
I will be in the hospital but not probably more than two or three 
weeks."17 Huntington never rebounded from this second opera­
tion, and three weeks later, on 2^ May 1927, he died.18 
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Thus ended the life of Henry Huntington, a builder who capped 
a lifetime of creation by establishing the library, art collections, 
and botanical gardens. Although not the entrepreneur's greatest 
achievement, the institution remains his most visible and best-
known contribution to metropolitan Los Angeles. 
In 1908, Huntington had explained why he chose to build his 
many enterprises in the southland: "When I went to California 
years ago, I traveled east, north, and south from one end of the 
state to the other, even going off the beaten paths by team and 
studying every section carefully. I came to the conclusion then that 
the greatest natural advantages, those of climate and every other 
condition, lay in Southern California, and that is why I made it my 
field of endeavor."19 Although this statement reveals that Hunting­
ton had shown foresight in investing in the Los Angeles basin, it 
does not tell the whole story. 
By 1900, Huntington was a middle-aged man who had distin­
guished himself in the railroad business and, because of a huge 
inheritance from his uncle, was also quite wealthy. Many people 
quite properly believed he would retire to a life of luxury and 
philanthropy. But Huntington appears to have been a builder by 
nature, a man driven to create, and the evidence suggests that the 
shadow of Collis weighed heavily upon him. 
Huntington's close ties to his uncle during their nearly thirty-
year association were undoubtedly instrumental in shaping his sub­
sequent career. Besides acquiring important administrative skills, 
Huntington thought these years with Collis were the best of his 
life.20 He spoke frequently and fondly of his early railroad days, 
particularly when discussing his uncle. Journalist Otheman Stevens 
remembered: "I found his [Huntington's] dominant emotion con­
cerned his uncle C. P. Huntington. He invariably spoke of him with 
a certain degree of awe, almost reverence. He showed me some 
portraits of C. P. Huntington one day, and regarded them almost 
as a zealot would look at a saint's picture."21 These photographs 
most likely included the two of Collis that adorned Huntington's 
office in the Los Angeles Railway Building.22 
Success at several positions with Collis's railroads aided the 
nephew's climb up the managerial ladder, and it appeared that 
Huntington would eventually attain his dream and succeed his 
mentor as president of the Southern Pacific Railroad. When Collis 
died unexpectedly in 1900, Henry explained the tremendous loss 
this way: "The shock of his death was the severest blow I have ever 
received, for I loved him as a boy loves his own father and received 
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from him the kindest treatment that any son could possibly get."23 
The loss was compounded, however, by the majority stockholders 
of the SP, who were unwilling to see the Huntington influence con­
tinue at the railroad, and dashed Henry's hope of following his 
uncle as company president. 
Yet Huntington remained influenced by the memory of Collis. 
Either driven to get out from under his uncle's shadow and suc­
ceed by himself, or merely pushed by his own creative energy, 
Huntington worked obsessively to establish a business kingdom that 
might eclipse that of his famous relative. Whether or not his many 
business successes in the Los Angeles basin could be considered a 
memorial to Collis, one of his other endeavors was specifically to 
honor his deceased associate. Upon his death in 1927, Huntington 
left a sizable endowment for the establishment of the Collis P. and 
Howard E. Memorial Hospital to be built in Pasadena.24 And sev­
eral years earlier, in 1913, perhaps in a subconscious attempt to 
mirror his life, Huntington married his uncle's widow, Arabella. 
Although it is debatable whether Huntington's achievements 
actually surpassed those of his uncle, his role in developing the 
Los Angeles basin is clear. In 1917, John B. Miller, president of 
Southern California Edison, provided the best contemporary as­
sessment: 
Mr. Huntington has been the direct means of bringing more money 
to this community than any other person. He built the great Pacific 
Electric Railway system, which linked Los Angeles to the surrounding 
towns which, with transportation abreast with the best in the world, be­
came places of importance and the homes of thousands of prosperous 
people, aiding to make Los Angeles the Metropolis of the Southwest. . . . 
Mr. Huntington [later] concentrated his Southern California interests in 
the Los Angeles Railway. . .  . He is principal owner of the Huntington 
Land and Improvement Company, one of the great real estate developing 
organizations of the region, and he has many other interests interwoven 
with the very fibre of our financial and industrial life.25 
Indeed, as Miller had suggested, Huntington's contribution to the 
creation of metropolitan Los Angeles was enormous. His many 
enterprises and far-reaching influence shaped urban life of south­
ern California. So prevalent were his southland projects and so 
successful were his ventures that he became linked with prosperity 
and progress. The Huntington name and the perceived image 
of boosterism, investment, and development in the Los Angeles 
metropolitan area were virtually interchangeable terms between 
1902 and 1917. 
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Town/Area 1890 1900 1910 PE Arrives 
Alhambra 5,021 1902 
Azusa — 863 1,477 1907 
Burbank Township 2,996 3,048 12,255 1904-1911 
Glendale 2,746 1904 
Huntington Beach 815 1904 
Long Beach 564 2,252 17,809 1902 
Monrovia 907 1,205 3,576 1903 
Newport Beach 445 1905 
Pomona 3,634 5,526 10,207 1909-1912 
Redondo Beach 603 855 2,935 1903a 
San Fernando 1,110 1,326 2,134 1911 
Township 
San Gabriel 1,713 2,501 8,550 1902 
Township 
Santa Ana 3,628 4,933 8,429 1905 
Santa Monica 1,580 3,057 7,847 ca. 1896a 
Whittier 585 1,590 4,550 1903 
a
 Dates mark the arrival of a streetcar line but not the PE. 
Source: Glenn Dumke, "The Growth of the Pacific Electric and Its Influence upon the Development 
of Southern California to 1911" (M.A. thesis, Occidental College, 1939), p. 121. 
Huntington built his business empire upon a foundation of an 
extensive trolley system that covered the downtown core of Los 
Angeles and radiated outward to neighboring settlements. Because 
growth and development followed the spreading trolley tracks, 
Huntington controlled how, when, and where the Los Angeles 
basin expanded. The positive relationship between a trolley link 
and community growth is shown by historian Glenn Dumke's chart 
(above) indicating how the population of selected suburbs rose after 
the PE's arrival. 
Taking advantage of his trolleys, which were rapidly carrying 
the growing population to the suburbs, Huntington formed several 
land companies and power firms. A major landholder in south­
ern California, he purchased vast stretches of rural land along the 
PE's planned routes; once the interurban tracks were laid, he sub­
divided, creating a variety of communities designed for different 
classes of home buyers. 
His utility firm, Pacific Light and Power, supplied approxi­
mately 85 percent of the electricity it generated to the street rail­
roads. But PL&P also furnished electricity for business and resi­
dential use; in 1913 it provided the city of Los Angeles with 20 
percent of its electrical needs besides serving cities in the San 
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Gabriel Valley. Southern California Gas, a FL&P subsidiary, sup­
plied nearly 20 percent of the natural gas consumed in Los Angeles 
when Huntington sold it in 1913.26 
Thus, Huntington's major interests in southern California were 
in the critical sectors for regional growth. The three legs of 
his business triad—trolleys, real estate development, and electric 
power generation and distribution—determined the spatial layout 
of greater Los Angeles. Operating this well-oiled development 
machine in an era when land-use and zoning statutes were largely 
absent, Huntington became the Los Angeles basin's metropolitan 
planner. 
In addition to frequently deciding the direction of development 
and its subsequent form, Huntington was also involved in a num­
ber of other businesses that promoted growth in the southland. He 
became involved in local agriculture, industry, the hotel business, 
and many leading civic and social organizations. With these various 
enterprises, he was one of the region's largest business employers. 
An ardent advocate of the open shop, Huntington employed strike­
breakers and hired labor spies and provided employee-benefit pro­
grams to keep his companies free of union organization. Thus, 
he became a dominant force in thwarting attempts of organized 
labor to gain a foothold in the Los Angeles basin. Because the 
business community was successful in keeping strong unions out 
of Los Angeles, labor costs were approximately 30 percent lower 
than in closed-shop San Francisco. This was undoubtedly a factor 
in attracting businessmen to the Los Angeles basin. 
Directly involved in so many different large-scale projects dur­
ing the first two decades of the twentieth century, Huntington 
was by far the foremost urban developer in the area. Theodore 
Dreiser's depiction of his protagonist, Frank Algernon Cowper­
wood, and his many enterprises in The Titan could be used to de­
scribe Huntington's varied commercial ventures in southern Cali­
fornia. "How wonderful it is that men grow until, like colossuses, 
they bestride the world, or, like banyan trees, they drop roots from 
every branch and are themselves a forest—a forest of intricate 
commercial life, of which a thousand material aspects are the evi­
dence."27 
Huntington and other entrepreneurs shared an "appetite for 
risk," invested in a number of different businesses, and had the for­
tune of being in the right place at the right time.-" But Huntington 
was also exceptional in that he possessed a fine management back­
ground secured during his years of railroad service under the guid­
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ance of Collis Huntington. Clearly, his connection with his uncle 
was important for Huntington's career. However, without the assis­
tance of his uncle, with his determination, drive, and energy, Hunt­
ington likely would have been a successful businessman, possibly 
remaining a merchant in the hardware business. Rarely making a 
poor investment, he had a keen sense of timing and astute business 
skill. Huntington used these abilities to quintuple the market value 
of the fortune he had received from his uncle's will. In August 
1928, his estate was appraised at $43 million, a figure that did not 
include the Huntington Library and Art Gallery in San Marino or 
his boyhood home in Oneonta, New York, which he had converted 
into a library and public park. Although the value of the Hunt­
ington Library and Art Gallery is difficult to ascertain, in 1927, 
for insurance purposes, the contents of the art gallery alone were 
valued at $15.1 million, and the library collections were worth at 
least another $15 million.29 
Huntington's years with the railroads also taught him to think 
on a grand scale and in terms of building entirely integrated sys­
tems. These views, combined with the large inheritance, led to the 
creation of his southern California business triad that was unique 
in its scope, impact, and success. Although Huntington rarely dis­
cussed his business strategies, it is apparent that he came to south­
ern California with the notion of transforming the basin into a 
thriving metropolis, a master plan to accomplish this goal, and the 
financial resources to carry it out. 
Although many businessmen worked in specific ways to ex­
pand their respective urban economies, Huntington arrived in the 
Los Angeles basin with a vision for developing the entire area. 
To avoid possible interference from associates, he almost always 
chose to operate alone or in small syndicates that he dominated 
through control of a particular firm's stock. Because Huntington 
believed Los Angeles could "extend in any direction as far as you 
like," he proposed joining the "whole region into one big family" 
by blanketing it with trolley lines, transforming the landscape into 
neat suburban communities, and providing for future growth by 
constructing huge hydroelectric facilities to produce excess power. 
Although other businessmen, such as Moses Sherman in Los 
Angeles or Borax Smith in Oakland, had used streetcars to pro­
mote real estate projects, their operations did not approach Hunt­
ington's in size or success. Sherman had operated several inter­
urban lines in southern California over the years. However, none 
was profitable—in fact, most of his trolley firms went bankrupt— 
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and the largest system he ever operated was the 180-mile Los 
Angeles Pacific. In northern California, Smith established the ex­
tensive Key Route interurban network. Although successful in the 
borax business, he was not familiar with railroads, and because of 
some poor financial decisions lost control of his trolley empire and 
fell into bankruptcy. 
However, Huntington's operations were so much larger in scope 
—spanning the entire Los Angeles basin—and were established 
in such a short period of time that they did not merely design 
and promote Huntington subdivisions, they designed and pro­
moted metropolitan Los Angeles. Although the southland would 
have expanded into a major urban center without Huntington, 
because other entrepreneurs lacked his bold blueprint for overall 
regional development or the ability to carry it out, the area would 
have grown more slowly. With slower growth, vast suburban sprawl 
would have awaited the automobile and may have resulted in a 
differently shaped basin dominated by a downtown core. 
His enterprises were so huge and his impact on the Los Angeles 
basin so great that Henry Huntington remains in a class by him­
self, the metropolitan entrepreneur. Sketching the outline of the 
area, Huntington directed the development of greater Los Ange­
les; then, involved in a number of other businesses, acted as a cata­
lyst for its rapid economic expansion. He was the person with the 
right training, managerial skills, and financial resources who ar­
rived in the right area at the right time. Huntington inherited vast 
wealth, but was no rentier; he used those resources to fund increas­
ingly ambitious projects. The vast outlays of capital that he put into 
the southland's infrastructural industries in such a short period of 
time, combined with his vision, managerial expertise, and business 
acumen, provided the impetus that propelled southern California 
into the leading population, commercial, and cultural center on the 
West Coast. 
Today, the Huntington name remains prominent in southern 
California. Examples include the Huntington Library, Art Collec­
tions, and Botanical Gardens, Huntington Drive, the Huntington 
Hotel, Huntington Beach, and Huntington Park. In addition, many 
people in the area still have fond memories of riding the Pacific 
Electric trolley cars. Yet these namesakes and recollections of the 
interurbans fall short of conveying Huntington's importance to the 
southland. Henry Huntington must be remembered as the entre­
preneur who envisioned and then established the modern contours 
of metropolitan Los Angeles. 

Appendix A

Henry E. Huntington's Net Worth

The following figures are the only data available. They come from Hunting­
ton's personal balance sheets. Huntington's net worth rose considerably from 
1900 to 1902 because of his inheritance following Collis Huntington's death in 
1900 and the final settlement of the estate in 1903/1904. After 1919, Hunt­
ington's personal wealth decreased because of philanthropic activities. That 
year he established the library as a separate institution and provided it with a 
healthy endowment of stocks and bonds. From 1919 until his death in 1927, 
Huntington transferred the San Marino Ranch, his house and the library 
building, his book and art collections to the trustees of the library. 
In addition to Huntington's major investments in southern California, he 
held and traded large blocks of stocks and bonds in major U.S. corporations. 
Over the years, these included U.S. Steel, Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry 
Dock Company, the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad, Iowa Central Railroad, 
the Colorado and Southern Railroad, and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. 
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Percentage 
Derived from 
Amount of Percentage SoCal Business 
Year Net Worth Increase Increase and Investments 
1898 $ 738,000 
1901 8,037,900 
1902 14,277,300 
1903 14,319,800 $ 42,500 .003 .075 
1907 16,546,700 2,226,900a .13 .49 
1908 24,107,600 7,560,900b .31 .69 
1909 25,446,000 1,338,400 .05 .63 
1910 50,483,000 25,037,000c .49 .84 
1911 57,770,400 7,287,400d .26 .85 
1912 59,238,900 1,468,500 .02 .87 
1913 60,918,500 1,679,600 .03 .77 
1914 62,145,700 1,227,200 .02 .82 
1915 63,260,900 1,115,200 .02 .85 
1916 64,432,600 1,171,700 .02 .84 
1917 64,825,000 392,400 .006 .85 
1918 65,138,800 313,800 .005 .88 
1920 62,530,900 
1921 45,548,900 
1923 45,115,100 
1924 40,447,500 
1925 37,777,100 
1928 42,613,000 appraisal of Henry E. Huntington estate 
Total percentage increase from 1907 to 1918—the period after Huntington had inherited all the 
securities and properties from his uncle and prior to his establishment of the library trust—was 393 
percent over eleven years, or an average increase of 13.2 percent per year. 
a
 Figure represents increase over four-year period. 
b Large increase due to carrying LARY stock on personal balance sheet for first time in 1908 and a 
doubling of the stock in 1907. 
c
 Extraordinary increase resulted from a reincorporation of the LARY following Huntington's deal 
selling the PE to the SP and a tripling of the LARY's stock. 
d Large part of increase due to LARY bonds taken by Huntington. 
Appendix B

Chronology of Henry E. Huntington s Major

Projects in Southern California

Date 
1898 Huntington syndicate purchases Los Angeles Railway and merges other 
small local lines with it 
1901 LARY Pico Street line built to Wilton Place 
Huntington syndicate incorporates Pacific Electric Railway and plans to 
build a system of 452 miles 
1902 LARY Washington line built to Western 
PE Pasadena "Short line" opened 
Long Beach line opened 
Huntington syndicate incorporates Pacific Light and Power 
Huntington incorporates Huntington Land and Improvement Com­
pany 
Huntington purchases Orzo W. Childs property in downtown Los Ange­
les 
1903 PE Monrovia and Whittier lines finished 
Huntington acquires stock of San Bernardino Valley Traction Co. 
Harriman acquires Hook's streetcar system—the Los Angeles Traction 
Co., largely operating in the southwest portion of Los Angeles and 
the interurban California Pacific running between downtown and San 
Pedro—and outbids Huntington for Sixth Street franchise 
Southern Pacific granted 40 percent interest in PE 
Los Angeles Inter-Urban Railway incorporated 
PL&P acquires Ontario and San Bernardino Gas and Elei trie 
Huntington buys San Marino Ranch 
1904 LARY Highland Park line opens 
PE extension reaches Huntington Beach 
Huntington and syndicate buy Porter ranch in San Fernando Valley 
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1905 LARY Griffith Avenue line reaches Vernon Avenue 
PE lines reach Newport Beach and Santa Ana 
PE Building opens at Sixth and Main Streets in downtown Los Angeles 
PL&P Kern Power Station opens 
Purchases Warner ranch in northeast San Diego County 
Huntington buys Los Angeles and Redondo Railway and Redondo Im­
provement Co. 
1906 LARY Eagle Rock line completed 
Cummings Street line built southeast to Indiana Street 
PE line reaches Balboa 
Line extended to Sierra Madre 
Line built to Oak Knoll 
Huntington syndicate buys Oak Knoll property 
1907 LARY Ninth Street line built on Tenth Street to Grammercy 
PE tracks reach Covina and Glendora 
Huntington and Harriman discuss possible sale of PE to SP 
1908 LARY Seventh Street line built to Los Angeles River 
Temple Street line built up Hoover to Monroe Street 
PE line reaches La Habra 
Huntington sells interurbans in Fresno and Santa Clara County to SP 
PL&P Redondo steam plant completed 
Domestic Gas, a PL&P subsidiary, buys City Gas Co. 
1909 LARY PA YE cars introduced 
PE line from Covina to San Dimas completed 
1910 LARY Seventh Street line built to Indiana Street 
Santa Fe line extended to Randolph Street 
Los Angeles Railway Corporation formed 
City Railway of Los Angeles, a subsidiary of LARY, incorporated 
PE/SP deal—Huntington and SP agree to trade stock: former now owns 
all LARY stock; latter owns all stock of PE

Los Angeles and Redondo Railway transferred to PE

PL&P reincorporated

Southern California Gas Company incorporated

1911 PL&P sells Warner ranch and riparian rights of San Luis Rey River 
1912 Los Angeles City Council talks to Huntington about purchasing LARY 
Huntington sells Childs property 
Sells interest in Porter ranch 
Purchases Hotel Wentworth 
1913 PL&P Big Creek hydroelectric facility opens 
Huntington trades his interest in SoCal Gas to Kerckhoff and Balch for 
their interest in PL&P 
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1914 LARY Vermont line extended from Vernon to First Street 
Jitney competition begins 
PL&P buys distribution systems in San Fernando, Compton, Huntington 
Beach, and Glendora 
Acquires controlling interest in Ventura County Power Company 
Huntington Hotel, formerly the Wentworth, opens 
1915 PL&P opens Huntington Lodge at Big Creek 
Huntington closes deal with SoCal Edison, merging PL&P and SoCal 
Edison 
1916 LARY Brooklyn Avenue line completed to Boyle Heights 
PL&P acquires controlling interest in Mt. Whitney Power and Electric 
1917 LARY no longer competes with jitneys in major downtown area; new 
ordinance forbids jitneys from operating in main commercial zone of 
downtown Los Angeles 
PL&P merger with SoCal Edison approved by California Railroad Com­
mission 
1918 LARY no longer competes with jitneys; autos no longer allowed to oper­
ate next to trolley tracks 
1919 Huntington creates trust to establish Henry E. Huntington Library and 
Art Gallery in San Marino 
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Express, 10 Dec. 1913; Los Angeles Times, 7 Jan. 1914; and California Railroad 
Commission, Opinions and Orders, 1 Jan. to 29 May 1915, 272-85. 
7 Los Angeles Tribune, 3 Dec. 1913; Los Angeles Herald, 31 Dec. 1913; and 
Walker's Manual of California Securities, 1920, 186—87. See also William Dunn 
to HEH, 27 Apr. 1914, Huntington Vault Material, box 1. 
8 Edgerton, quoted in California Railroad Commission, Opinions and Or­
ders, 1 Jan. to 29 May 1915, 284. 
9 John Miller, Fares, Please! A Popular History of Trolleys, Horsecars, Streetcars, 
Buses, Elevateds, and Subways (New York: Dover Publications, 1960), 147-49; 
and Lewis, "Street Railway Development," 2: 114-17. For an examination of 
jitneys' impact on the West Coast, see Carlos Schwantes, "The West Adopts 
the Automobile: Technology, Unemployment, and the Jitney Phenomenon of 
1914-1917," Western Historical Quarterly 16 (July 1985): 307-26. 
10 Dunn, quoted in Los Angeles Examiner, 13 Nov. 1914. 
11 Schwantes, 308-9. 
12 See Los Angeles Times, 8 Jan. 1915; Lewis, "Street Railway Development," 
2: 126; and Los Angeles Railway Annual Reports, 1914-18, HEH 2/2. 
196 NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 
13 Fogelson, 167; and Los Angeles Railway Annual Reports, 1914—18, 
HEH 2/2. The railroad's operations for this period in terms of earnings and 
expenses per car mile follow: 
Gross Revenues Expenses Net Earnings 
Year per car mile per car mile per car mile 
1914 23.26 cents 16.02 cents 7.24 cents 
1915 21.60 " 14.94 " 6.66 " 
1916 20.72 " 14.04 " 6.68 " 
1917 20.26 " 14.95 " 5.31 " 
1918 20.86 " 17.44 " 3.42 " 
14 HEH to William Dunn, 11 Oct. 1915, HEH 12574; 14 Oct. 1915, 
HEH 12575. 
15 California Railroad Commission, Opinions and Orders, 1 Jan. to 30 Apr. 
1916, 194-96. See also Swett, "Los Angeles Railway," 43. 
16 Railroad Commission of the State of California Engineering Depart­
ment, Application 4238: Report on the Service, Operating, and Financial Conditions 
of the Los Angeles Railway Corporation (Los Angeles, 1919), 10, 29-30; Miller, 
Fares, Please!, 115-22; and Lewis, "Street Railway Development," 2: 115-22. 
17 Los Angeles Tribune, 3 and 13 Apr. 1915. 
18 William Dunn to HEH, 3 Aug. 1915, HEH 11717. 
19 Los Angeles Railway Annual Reports, 1914-18, HEH 2/2. 
20 See William Dunn to Charles Graham, 22 June 1917, HEH 11677; and 
Charles Graham to William Dunn, 16 Jan. 1915, HEH 11900. 
21 Lewis, "Street Railway Development," 2: 123-24; Los Angeles Herald, 
4 May 1917; and Swett, "Los Angeles Railway," 43-44. Following the suc­
cessful election in June 1917 banning jitneys from the business district, the 
LARY granted the second pay raise. Together, the two wage hikes added 
approximately $240,000 to the Los Angeles Railway's payroll. 
22 Los Angeles Railway Annual Reports, 1913-18, HEH 2/2; and Swett, 
"Los Angeles Railway," 43-44. 
23 Mark. S. Foster, "The Decentralization of Los Angeles during the 
1920s" (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 1971), 182; and Board 
of Public Utilities, City of Los Angeles, Annual Report, 1916 /1917, 25. 
24 See, for example, agreement between HL&I and Baker and Burbank, 
Huntington Land and Improvement Company, Board of Directors Minutes, 
8 Jan. 1906, HEH 1/F41/A; agreement between Huntington-Redondo Com­
pany and Henry S. Judson, Huntington-Redondo Company, Board of Direc­
tors Minutes, 6 Feb. 1914, HEH l/H/20; and Oak Knoll Marino Sales Pam­
phlet, HEH 194420. 
25 See the Huntington Land and Improvement Company's monthly bal­
ance sheets, l/DD/1-5. 
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26 The HL&I balance sheet of December 1923, HEH l/DD/5, records 
more than $1 million in unrealized real estate profits prior to 1913. Statement 
of lot sales in California, Huntington Vault Material, box 4. 
27 Quoted from letter from Charles Graham to HEH, 2 Aug. 1915, HEH 
11966. 
28 California Railroad Commission, Opinions and Orders, 1 Jan. to 30 June 
1914, 350-54, 380-84, 778-79, 1307-08. 
29 Myers, 64-66. 
30 George Ward to Charles Graham, 26 Mar. 1914, George Ward to HEH, 
16 May 1914, HEH 11/7/2; and Los Angeles Times, 1 Apr. 1914. The distribu­
tion of Ventura County Power Company's stock was as follows: 
common stock preferred stock 
prior to deal 
outstanding 8,101 3,817 
unissued 6,899 6,183 
total 15,000 10,000 
following deal 
HEH owned 6,980.6 3,371.8 
owned by outsiders 1.120.4 445.2 
For information on HEH's acquisition of Mt. Whitney Power and Electric 
Company, see Los Angeles Tribune, 6 Sept. 1916; and Myers, 98—99. 
31 See Huntington Vault Material, box 3. 
32 Los Angeles Examiner, 4July 1915; and Redinger, 46—47. 
33 John B. Miller, quoted in Los Angeles Times, 2 Dec. 1916. 
34 See William Kerckhoffto HEH, 20 Jan. 1902, HEH 13237; and William 
Kerckhoff to HEH, 24 Mar. 1902, HEH 8441. 
35 William Kerckhoffto HEH, 25 June 1903, HEH 8452. 
36 Ibid., 24 Oct. 1908, HEH 8456. 
37 HEH to William Kerckhoff, 19 Feb. 1909, HEH 8219; and printed pro­
spectus of proposed new corporation, HEH 8220. For information on Pacific 
Lighting and C O  . G. Miller, see Charles M. Coleman, P. G. andE. of Califor­
nia: The Centennial Story of Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 1852—1952 (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1952), 46-49. 
38 Van Valen, "Owens River Aqueduct Story," 290-311. 
39 Fogelson, 233-35, and Myers, 148. 
40 Board of Public Utilities, City of Los Angeles, Annual Report, 1913/ 
1914, 17; see also Fogelson, 234-36; and Myers, 147-48. 
41 Charles Graham to George C. Luebbers, regarding proposed sale of 
HEH's Safety Insulated Wire and Cable Company, 17 May 1910, Huntington 
Vault Material, box 3. 
42 Huntington was hampered with an enlarged prostate in October 1915, 
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but he recovered in early 1916, and the expected surgery was not required (see 
William Dunn to Charles Graham, 14 and 18 Oct. 1915; and Charles Graham 
to William Dunn, 15 Oct. 1915, HEH 11906). For information on Miller's 
proposal of creating a new issue of SoCal Edison second-preferred stock, see 
Charles Graham to HEH, 14 and 15 Dec. 1915; and Charles Graham to A. N. 
Kemp, 16 Dec. 1915, Huntington Vault Material, box 2. 
43 See memorandum between HEH and John B. Miller, 30 Dec. 1915, 
HEH 7773; and California Railroad Commission, Opinions and Orders, 1 Apr. 
to 1 Aug. 1917, 262-71. When HEH sold his shares in the PL&P to SoCal 
Edison, only a small percentage of PL&P stock was held by outsiders. 
PL&P Stock Total Outstanding HEH-Owned 
First-preferred 50,000 46,175 
Second-preferred 99,750 96,602 
Common 105,595 104,685 
44 See Los Angeles Examiner, 4 Dec. 1916; Los Angeles Times, 24 Mar. 1917; 
California Railroad Commission, Opinions and Orders, 1 Apr. to 1 Aug. 1917, 
401-14; and Myers, 150-51. 
45 John B. Miller, quoted in Southern California Edison pamphlet, The 
Greater Edison (1917), 4. 
46 This library, which consisted of works by such authors as John Ruskin, 
William Thackeray, Charles Dickens, Walter Scott, and George Bancroft, was 
mentioned by relatives of S. P. Franchot, HEH's partner in the St. Albans saw­
mill, in letters to the Huntington Library in the 1920s and 1930s. The library 
came into Franchot's possession as part of the dissolution of the sawmill part­
nership. See N.V.V. Franchot to Robert Schad, 4 May 1929; Mrs. N.V.V. 
Franchot to Robert Schad, 17 June 1937; and Robert Schad to Caroline Holla­
day, 31 Oct. 1938, HEH 19/3. 
47 James Thorpe, "The Founder and His Library," Huntington Library 
Quarterly 32 (August 1969): 299. 
48 See Donald C. Dickinson, "Mr. Huntington and Mr. Smith," The Book 
Collector 37 (Autumn 1988): 366-93; and John E. Pomfret, The Henry E. Hunt­
ington Library and Art Gallery from Its Beginnings to 1969 (San Marino, Calif.: 
Huntington Library, 1969), 7-20. 
49 HEH, quoted in Thorpe, 301, 303. 
50 See Robert R. Wark, "Arabella Huntington and the Beginnings of the 
Art Collection," Huntington Library Quarterly 32 (August 1969): 309-31. For 
more on Arabella's influence on HEH, see notes of Collis Holladay's talk to 
Junior League Docents, October 1968, HEH 19/3. 
51 For information on the creation of the Huntington gardens, see William 
Hertrich, The Huntington Botanical Gardens (San Marino, Calif.: Huntington 
Library, 1949). 
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CHAPTER 8 
1 Louise Ward Watkins, Henry Edwards Huntington: A Character Sketch of 
a Great Man (Gardena, Calif.: Spanish American Institute Press, 1928), 12. A 
copy of this work is available at the Huntington Library. 
2 Over the past twenty years, historical studies of California labor have 
proliferated, but most emphasize workers' responses to industrialism. Rela­
tively few have focused on the labor policies of large employers, as well as the 
workers' efforts to unionize, thereby integrating business and labor history. 
See, for example, Luis L. Arroyo, "Industrial Unionism and the Los Ange­
les Furniture Industry, 1918-1954" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los 
Angeles, 1979); Joel Franks, "Bootmakers and Shoemakers in Nineteenth-
Century San Francisco: A Study in Class, Culture, Ethnicity, an ' "^pular 
Protest in an Industrializing Community" (Ph.D. diss., University of Califor­
nia, Irvine, 1983); Michael Kazin, Barons of Labor: The San Francisco Building 
Trades and Urban Power in the Progressive Era (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1987); John A. Lawrence, "Behind the Palaces: The Working Class and 
the Labor Movement in San Francisco, 1877—1901" (Ph.D. diss., University of 
California, Berkeley, 1979). 
3 The low density and dispersed nature of metropolitan Los Angeles com­
pared with other areas across the nation is discussed in Fogelson, 143. In 1930, 
the San Francisco / Oakland metropolitan district, which was approximately 
one-half the size of the Los Angeles metropolis, had a central city-to-outlying 
suburb population ratio of thirty to one; the Los Angeles ratio was only three 
to one. 
4 Lewis, "Street Railway Development," 2: 222; and Stimson, 237. 
5 For discussions on the various methods employers used to block workers 
from a unified movement, see David Gordon, Richard Edwards, and Michael 
Reich, Segmented Workers, Divided Workers: The Historical Transformation of Labor 
in the United States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 138-44. 
See also Sanford M. Jacoby, Employing Bureaucracy: Managers, Unions, and the 
Transformation ofAmerican Industry, 1900—1945 (New York: Columbia Univer­
sity Press, 1985). 
6 Lewis, "Street Railway Development," 2: 184—85; and Stimson, 237. 
7 HEH to Los Angeles Railway Committee of Trainmen, 11 Dec. 1902, 
HEH 7686. 
8 Robert Gottlieb and Irene Wolt, Thinking Big: The Story of the Los Angeles 
Times, Its Publishers, and Their Influence on Southern California (New York: G. P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1977), 50. For additional information on Harrison Gray Otis, 
see David Halberstam, The Powers That Be (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 
94-122; and Richard C. Miller, "Otis and His Times" (Ph.D. diss., University 
of California, Berkeley, 1961). 
9 Halberstam, 109. 
10 Los Angeles Times, 21 June 1904. For an example of Otis's editorials, see 
Los Angeles Times, 29 Mar. 1903. 
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11 See HEH to David Parry, 14 Sept. 1903, HEH 7861; David Parry to 
HEH, 5 Oct. 1903, HEH 9614. 
12 Stimson, 255-56; and Charles Wollenberg, "Working on El Traque: 
The Pacific Electric Strike of 1903," Pacific Historical Review 42 (August 1973): 
360. 
13 Philip Taft, Organized Labor in American History (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1964), 222. 
14 See Stimson, 258; and David Montgomery, Workers' Control in America: 
Studies in the History of Work, Technology, and Labor Struggles (New York: Cam­
bridge University Press, 1979), 61. 
15 Stimson, 258. 
16 See Los Angeles Times, 12 and 20 Feb. 1903; and Lewis, "Street Railway 
Development," 2: 185. 
17 Los Angeles Times, 26, 29 Mar., 29, 30 Apr., 8 May, and 7 Oct. 1903; 
Lewis, "Street Railway Development," 2: 184-86; Stimson, 267; and Perry and 
Perry, 71. For more on the practice of using labor spies, see Charles K. Hyde, 
"Undercover and Underground: Labor Spies and Mine Management in the 
Early Twentieth Century," Business History Review 60 (Spring 1986): 1—27. 
18 Pacific Electric Railway Company Trainmen to HEH and Epes Ran­
dolph, 2 May 1903, HEH 9572. 
19 HEH to Andrew B. Hammond, 25 Jan. 1904, HEH 5534; Wollenberg, 
358-62; and Crump, Ride the Big Red Cars, 142-43. 
20 Los Angeles Record, 24 and 25 Apr. 1903; and Los Angeles Times, 25 Apr. 
1903. 
21 Wollenberg, 365-67; and Stimson, 267. 
22 Los Angeles Record, 2, 5-8 May 1903; Los Angeles Times, 6-9 May 1903; 
Stimson, 262; and Cross, Labor Movement in California, 280. 
23 See Michael Kazin, "The Great Exception Revisited: Organized Labor 
and Politics in San Francisco and Los Angeles, 1870-1940," Pacific Historical 
Review 55 (August 1986): 381; and James R. Green, World of the Worker: Labor 
in Twentieth-Century America (New York: Hill and Wang, 1980), 11. 
24 Los Angeles Record, 11 May 1903; and Los Angeles Times, 12, 13, 19, 
24 May 1903. 
25 HEH to George Miles, 1 Mar. 1904, HEH 12835. 
26 Central Labor Council of Los Angeles, Los Angeles—A Model Open Shop 
City (Los Angeles, 1 Nov. 1907), 3. A copy of this pamphlet is in the Huntington 
Library. 
27 See Stuart D. Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism: 1880-1940 (Chi­
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 12-14. 
28 Transcript of interview with Myron Hunt, 1 Feb. 1930, HEH 19/3; see 
also Marcosson, 20. 
29 For background on welfare capitalism, see Irving Bernstein, The Lean 
Years: A History of the American Worker, 1920-1933 (Boston: Houghton Mif­
flin Co., 1960), 157-89; Brandes; David Brody, Workers in Industrial America: 
Essays on the Twentieth-Century Struggle (New York: Oxford University Press, 
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1980); Charles W. Cheape, Family Firm to Modern Multinational: The Norton 
Company, a New England Enterprise (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1985); Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, "Industrial Recreation, the Second World War, 
and the Revival of Welfare Capitalism, 1934-1960," Business History Review 60 
(Summer 1986): 232-57; Morrell Heald, The Social Responsibilities of Business: 
Company and Community, 1900-1960 (Cleveland: The Press of Case Western 
Reserve University, 1970); Daniel Nelson, "The Company Union Movement, 
1900-1937: A Reexamination," Business History Review 56 (Autumn 1982): 
335—57; and Gerald Zahavi, "Negotiated Loyalty: Welfare Capitalism and the 
Shoemakers of Endicott Johnson: 1920-1940," Journal of American History 71 
(December 1983): 602-20. 
30 For a sketch of sundry programs of welfare capitalism on various steam 
railroads, see Walter Licht, Working for the Railroad: The Organization of Work 
in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 28-29, 
137-47,201-12. 
31 Los Angeles Railway Company Regulations of Medical Department, Effective 
October 1,1902 (N. p., n.d.). A copy of this document is available in the Hunting­
ton Library. See also Brandes, 100-101. For more on forms of company social 
control and attempts to Americanize the work force, see Stephen Meyer III, 
The Five Dollar Day: Labor Management and Social Control in the Ford Motor Com­
pany, 1908-1921 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981); and 
Herbert G. Gutman, Work, Culture and Society in Industrializing America (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1977), 5-9. 
32 Similar thinking of other businessmen is described by Brandes, 75—77. 
33 Los Angeles Herald, 8 Jan. 1908. 
34 Los Angeles Examiner, 6 and 17 Sept. 1911; Los Angeles Express, 11 Sept. 
1911; Los Angeles Times, 10 and 19 Sept. 1911, 14 Dec. 1915; and Los Angeles 
Herald, 9 Dec. 1915. See also Swett, "Los Angeles Railway," 42. 
35 See the weekly issues of the Los Angeles Railway's employee newspaper, 
Two Bells, June through October 1920. Publication of this newspaper began in 
June 1920. For a satire on management's use of interdivisional competition to 
build company pride and improve work performance, see Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., 
Player Piano (New York: Delacorte Press, 1952). 
36 Stimson, 340-41. 
37 Ibid. The metal trades strike ended in 1912. Although the metal work­
ers did not achieve their goal of the eight-hour day, they did make small wage 
gains, but their pay continued to lag behind workers in San Francisco. 
38 Los Angeles Herald, 17 Sept. 1911, 17 Aug. 1914; and Los Angeles Tribune, 
2 4 Aug. 191!?. Although the company picnic brought together employees from 
all the firm's divisions, the event took plate only once a year and did not pro­
vide a forum for the airing of worker dissatisfactions. Huntington's employees 
appear to have approved of these fringe benefits, yet the various aspects of 
welfare capitalism did not seem to permanently reduce labor resistance. Orga­
nized labor largely opposed such programs. Although Huntington desired to 
improve working conditions through paternalism, he also wished to extend 
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his domination over his laborers. According to Daniel Nelson, welfare capi­
talism can be viewed as a move by management—akin to its earlier steps to 
increase its control over production—to gain further control over the worker. 
See his Managers and Workers: Origins of the New Factory System in the United 
States, 1880-1920 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1975), 120-21. 
39 Perry and Perry, 71—72; Los Angeles Examiner, Los Angeles Times, and Los 
Angeles Tribune, all for 13 Sept. 1914. 
40 Perry and Perry, 73; and Lewis, "Street Railway Development," 2: 228. 
Compared with union scale for various trades in Los Angeles, the LARY's 
wage rate for platform men of twenty-five to thirty cents per hour (with a 
sixty- to seventy-hour work week) was low. See chart below taken from Perry 
and Perry, 246. 
UNION WAGE RATES AND HOURS IN LOS ANGELES, 1913 
Rate per Hour Hours Worked 
Occupation in Cents per Week 
Bricklayers 75 44 
Building laborers 34.4 44 
Carpenters 50 48 
Cement finishers 62.5 48 
Compositors 
Book andjob 46.9 48 
Newspaper-day work 62.5 45 
Electrotypers 
Molders 50 48 
Finishers 50 48 
Granite Cutters 62.5 48 
Inside wiremen 50 48 
Painters 43.8 48 
Plasterers 75 44 
Plumbers 56.3 48 
Sheet metal workers 56.3 44 
Structural ironworkers 50 48 
Typesetting 
Book and job 58.3 48 
Newspaper 62.2 45 
41 Nelson, "Company Union Movement," 340-47; and John R. Com­
mons, Don Lescohier, and Elizabeth Brandeis, History of Labor in the United 
States, 1896-1932 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1935), 337-41. 
42 Lewis, "Street Railway Development," 2: 185-88. 
43 Perry and Perry, 75. 
44 Ibid., 76; and William Dunn to HEH, 2 Dec. 1918, HEH 11728. 
45 HEH to William Dunn, 5 Dec. 1918, HEH 10964. 
46 Los Angeles Times, 4 and 8 July 1919, and Los Angeles Record, 17 and 
23 July 1919. 
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47 In addition to involving the intracity LARY, the strike included em­
ployees of the interurban Pacific Electric as well as those of the steam railroads 
entering Los Angeles. See Perry and Perry, 78, 86; and Los Angeles Times, 15 
and 16 Aug. 1919. 
48 Los Angeles Times, 26-30 Aug., 24-26 Sept., 26 Oct. 1919; Los Angeles 
Examiner, 28-30 Aug. and 26 Sept. 1919. 
49 HEH to New York Chamber of Commerce, 27 Nov. 1922, HEH 12855. 
CHAPTER 9 
1 Quoted from transcript of interview with HEH's valet, Alfonzo Gomez, 
tape F, 7 Feb. 1959, HEH 19/1. 
2 For information on Hale, see Helen Wright, Explorer of the Universe: A 
Biography of George Ellery Hale (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., L J V ;  . 
3 Ibid., 372-73. 
4 George Hale to Arabella Huntington, 14 Feb. 1914, C. M. Campbell (sec­
retary of Arabella Huntington) to George Hale, 15 Apr. 1915; and George 
Hale to HEH, 17 Apr. 1915, George E. Hale Collection (hereafter cited as 
GEH), box 22, California Institute of Technology Archives. 
5 George Hale to HEH, 17 Apr. 1914; and HEH to George Hale, 20 Apr. 
1914, GEH Collection, box 22. 
6 George Hale to HEH, 11 May 1914; and HEH to George Hale, 5 Oct. 
1914, GEH Collection, box 22. 
7 George Hale to HEH, 28 Mar. 1916, HEH 2370. 
8 HEH to George Hale, 22 Apr. 1916, GEH Collection, box 22. 
9 Wright, 380; and Pomfret, 43. 
10 See the Trust Indenture establishing the Henry E. Huntington Library 
and Art Gallery, 30 Aug. 1919, HEH 27/4, and HEH Institutional Archives 
12.5.4. 
11 Pomfret, 46-51. 
12 Ibid., 51-52, 64-65. 
13 William Dunn to Charles Graham, 3 Apr. 1922, HEH 11668. Howard 
Huntington died of stomach cancer; see journals of Edmund Burke Holladay, 
1922, HEH 10968. 
14 George Hapgood to Joseph Duveen, 29 Oct. 1924, HEH 10834. 
Arabella Huntington had been in poor health from about 1916. According 
to Burke Holladay, Arabella had rheumatism and sciatica. See journals of 
Edmund Burke Holladay, 1914-24, HEH 10968. 
15 See journals of Edmund Burke Holladay, 1925-26, HEH 10968. 
16 HEH to Mrs.J.E. Brown, 15 Feb. 1926, HEH 12507. 
17 HEH to Mrs. Lasalle Pickett, 4 May 1927, HEH 7900. 
18 See journals of Edmund Burke Holladay, 1927, HEH 10968. 
19 Los Angeles Examiner, 27 Nov. 1908. 
20 Transcript of interview with Alfonzo Gomez, tape J, 11 Apr. 1959, 
HEH 19/1. 
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21 Otheman Stevens to Robert Schad, 11 July 1929, HEH 19/3. 
22 Few photographs were hung on the walls of HEH's office in the Los 
Angeles Railway Building. One was a shadowbox frame of Collis Huntington, 
and another was the picture of Collis, HEH, and a newsboy on a New York 
City street in 1895. See transcript of interview with Emma Quigley, 21 Apr. 
1967, HEH 19/1. 
23 HEH to Rev. Dr. Jacob Voorsanger, 30 Aug. 1900, HEH 8130. 
24 HEH left $2 million to build the hospital. See the Last Will and Testa­
ment of Henry Edwards Huntington, 1 Aug. 1925, HEH 27/3. 
25 John B. Miller, quoted in The Greater Edison, 5-6. 
26 Board of Public Utilities, City of Los Angeles, Annual Report, 1912/ 
1913, and 1913/1914. 
27 Theodore Dreiser, The Titan (1914; reprinted., New York: New Ameri­
can Library, 1965), 428. 
28 The descriptive phrase "appetite for risk" comes from Connie Bruck's 
article about businessman William Farley. See Connie Bruck, "The World of 
Business: The Billion-Dollar Mind," New Yorker, 7 Aug. 1989, 78. 
29 See Pomfret; HEH Institutional Archives 12.7.6; and HEH personal 
balance sheets, HEH 11/2/1-4. 
Bibliography

MANUSCRIPT COLLECTIONS 
Graves, Jackson A. Papers. Huntington Library, San Marino, California. 
Hale, George E. Papers. Archives, California Institute of Technology, Pasa­
dena, California. 
Huntington, Collis P. Papers. Microfilm, Huntington Library, San Marino, 
California. 
Huntington, Henry E. Papers. Huntington Library, San Marino, California. 
This collection was my major primary source and includes Huntington's 
personal and business papers. It contains family and business correspon­
dence, as well as papers related to steam and electric railroads, real estate, 
electric power development, the Huntington Library and Art Gallery, 
and Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company. The collection 
is divided into a catalogued and an uncatalogued section. 
The catalogued portion consists of 22,490 items arranged chrono­
logically from 1840 to 1970 in two hundred boxes. Largely personal 
and business correspondence, these papers are identified by call num­
bers preceded by the abbreviation of the collection's name. The Henry E. 
Huntington Collection is thus referred to as the HEH Collection. 
The larger uncatalogued section of this archive includes 
1. The official financial reports of the various Huntington companies. 
This encompasses annual reports, ledgers and journals, cash books, 
and minutes of directors' meetings. 
2. Huntington's personal financial records. 
3. The papers of Robert O. Scliad, librarian at the Huntington Library, 
205 
206 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
pertaining to the life of Henry Huntington. Labeled the Hunting­
ton Biographical Project, these papers were gathered mainly between 
1929 and 1933. Interviews with people who knew Huntington were 
conducted as recently as the 1970s and are included here. Unlike the 
catalogued half of the HEH Collection, which is listed in the manu­
script card catalog, the uncatalogued portion is listed and explained 
in a Summary Report and Inventory Sheet for the HEH Collection. 
4. Four uncatalogued boxes of material known as the Huntington Vault 
Material. 
5. Three uncatalogued ledgers and journals of the Huntington Land and 
Improvement Company. 
Huntington, Henry E. Institutional Papers. Huntington Library, San Marino, 
California. 
Hutchings, Jean. Papers. Riverside Municipal Museum, Riverside, California. 
Los Angeles Board of Public Utilities Files, Los Angeles City Archives, Los 
Angeles. 
Los Angeles Railway Corporation Collection, Huntington Library, San 
Marino, California. 
Ward, George C. Papers. Huntington Library, San Marino, California. 
Watkins, Louise Ward. Papers. Huntington Library, San Marino, California. 
Willard, Charles D. Papers. Huntington Library, San Marino, California. 
INTERVIEW 
Interview with Harriet Doerr, Pasadena, California. 14 July 1989. 
U.S. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS 
U.S. Census Office. Thirteenth Census of the United States: 1910: Abstract of Cen­
sus and Supplement for California. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1913. 
. Fourteenth Census of the United States. 1920. Vol. 2: Population. Washing­
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922. 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA DOCUMENTS 
California Railroad Commission. Annual Reports, 1911—25. 
. Case No. 4002: Report on the Local Public Transportation Requirements of 
Los Angeles. Los Angeles, 1935, Huntington Library. 
-. Case No. 4461: Report on Urban Mass Passenger Transportation Facilities 
and Requirements of Los Angeles. Los Angeles, 1940, Huntington Library. 
. Orders and Opinions, 1911-25. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 207 
California Railroad Commission Engineering Department. Application 4238: 
Report on Service, Operating, and Financial Conditions of the Los Angeles Railway 
Corporation. Los Angeles, 1919, Los Angeles City Archives. 
Ready, Lester S., J. O. Marsh, and Richard Sachse. Joint Report on Street Railway 
Survey, City of Los Angeles to Railroad Commission of the State of California. Los 
Angeles, 1925, Los Angeles City Archives. 
CITY OF LOS ANGELES DOCUMENTS 
Board of Public Utilities, City of Los Angeles. Annual Reports, 1909-25. 
.Minutes, 1909-25. 
NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS 
California Outlook 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle 
Electric Railway Journal 
Journal of Electricity, Power, and Gas 
Los Angeles Evening News 
Los Angeles Examiner 
Los Angeles Express 
Los Angeles Financier 
Los Angeles Herald 
Los Angeles Realtor 
Los Angeles Record 
Los Angeles Times 
Los Angeles Tribune 
New York Morning Herald 
New York Times 
New Yorker 
Oneonta (N.Y.) Star 
The P. E. Magazine 
Pasadena Star News 
Pomona Times 
San Francisco Bulletin 
San Francisco Call 
San Francisco Chronicle 
San Francisco Examiner 
Southern California Business 
Sunset 
Tracks 
Two Bells 
208 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
BOOKS AND ARTICLES 
Abott, Carl. The New Urban America: Growth and Politics in Sunbelt Cities. Chapel 
Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, 1981. 
Aitken, Hugh G. J. "The Entrepreneurial Approach to Economic History." 
In Approaches to American Economic History. Edited by George Rogers Taylor 
and Lucius F. Ellsworth. Charlottesville, Va.: University of Virginia, 1971. 
Pp. 1-16. 
Akin, Edward N. Flagler: Rockefeller Partner and Florida Baron. Kent, Ohio, and 
London: Kent State University Press, 1988. 
Angel, William D., Jr. "To Make a City: Entrepreneurship on the Sunbelt 
Frontier." In The Rise of the Sunbelt Cities. Edited by David C. Perry and 
Alfred J. Watkins. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977. Pp. 109-28. 
Armstrong, Christopher, and H. V. Nelles. Monopoly's Moment: The Organiza­
tion and Regulation of Canadian Utilities, 1830—1930. Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1986. 
Arnold, Bion J. Report on the Improvement and Development of the Transportation 
Facilities of San Francisco. San Francisco: The Hicks-Judd Co., 1913. 
. "The Transportation Problem of Los Angeles." California Outlook, 
4 Nov. 1911: 2-20. 
Athern, Robert G. Union Pacific Country. Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 
1971. 
Banham, Reyner. Los Angeles: The Architecture of Four Ecologies. New York: 
Penguin Press, 1971. 
Barrett, Paul. The Automobile and Urban Transit: The Formation of Public Policy 
in Chicago, 1900-1930. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983. 
Baur, John E. Health Seekers of Southern California, 1870—1900. San Marino, 
Calif.: Huntington Library, 1959. 
Bernstein, Irving. The Lean Years: A History of the American Worker, 1920-1933. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960. 
Blackford, Mansel G. "Civic Groups, Political Action, and City Planning in 
Seattle, 1892-1915." Pacific Historical Review 49 (November 1980): 557-80. 
. The Politics of Business in California, 1890—1920. Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 1977. 
Bottles, Scott L. Los Angeles and the Automobile: The Making of the Modern City. 
Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1987. 
Brandes, Stuart D. American Welfare Capitalism: 1880—1940. Chicago: Univer­
sity of Chicago Press, 1976. 
Brodsly, David. LA Freeway: An Appreciative Essay. Berkeley: University of Cali­
fornia Press, 1981. 
Brody, David. Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the Twentieth-Century 
Struggle. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980. 
Bruchey, Stuart, ed. The Colonial Merchant: Sources and Readings. New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966. 
. Small Business in American Life. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1980. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 209 
Bryant, Keith L., Jr. History of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway. New 
York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1974. 
Buder, Stanley. Pullman: An Experiment in Industrial Order and Community Plan­
ning, 1880-1930. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. 
Burton, George Ward. Men ofAchievement: Los Angeles. Los Angeles: Los Ange­
les Times Publishing, 1904. 
Burton, Katherine. Henry E. Huntington. Norton, Mass.: Periwinkle Press, 
1939. 
Caughey, John, and Laree Caughey. Los Angeles: Biography of a City. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1976. 
Central Labor Council of Los Angeles. Los Angeles—A Model Open Shop City. 
Los Angeles. 1 Nov. 1907. 
Chandler, Alfred D., Jr. The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American 
Business. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977. 
Cheape, Charles W. From Family Firm to Modern Multinational: The Norton Com­
pany, a New England Enterprise. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985. 
. Moving the Masses: Urban Public Transit in New York, Boston, and Phila­
delphia, 1880-1912. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980. 
The City ofBeverly Hills: From Bean Field to Beautiful City. Beverly Hills: Gibraltar 
Savings, 1970. 
Clary, William W. History of the Law Firm of O'Melveny and Myers. Los Angeles: 
O'Melveny and Myers, 1965. 
Cleland, Robert G. Cattle on a Thousand Hills: Southern California, 1850-1880. 
San Marino, Calif.: Huntington Library, 1951. 
Cleland, Robert G., and Frank B. Putnam. Isaias W. Hellman and the Farmers 
and Merchants Bank. San Marino, Cal.: Huntington Library, 1965. 
Clover, Samuel T. Constructive Californians: Men of Outstanding Ability Who Have 
Added Greatly to the Golden State's Prestige. Los Angeles: Saturday Night Pub­
lishing, 1926. 
Cochran, Thomas C. "The Entrepreneur in American Capital Formation." 
In Capital Formation and Economic Growth. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1955. 
. Railroad Leaders, 1845—1890: The Business Mind in Action. New York: 
Russell and Russell, 1965. 
Cochran, Thomas C , and William Miller. The Age of Enterprise. New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1942. 
Coleman, Charles M. P. G. andE. ofCalifornia: The Centennial Story of Pacific Gas 
and Electric Company, 1852-1952. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1952. 
Collier, Peter, and David Horowitz. The Rockefellers: An American Dynasty. New 
York: New American Library, 1976. 
Commons, John R., Don Lescohier, and Elizabeth Brandeis. History of Labor 
in the United States, 1896-1932. New York: Macmillan Co., 1935. 
Craemer, Ester R. La Habra: The Pass through the Hills. Fullerton, Calif.: Sultana 
Press, 1969. 
Cross, Ira. A History of the Labor Movement in California. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1935. 
210 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Crump, Spencer. Henry Huntington and the Pacific Electric. Los Angeles: Trans-
Anglo Books, 1970. 
. Ride the Big Red Cars: How the Trolleys Helped Build Southern California. 
Los Angeles: Trans-Anglo Books, 1962. 
Daggett, Stuart. Chapters on the History of the Southern Pacific. New York: Ronald 
Press Co., 1922. 
Davies, Edward J., II. The Anthracite Aristocracy: Leadership and Social Change in 
the Hard Coal Regions of Northeastern Pennsylvania, 1800-1930. DeKalb, 111.: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 1985. 
Decker, Donald D., and Mary L. Decker. Reflections on Elegance: Pasadena's 
Huntington Hotel since 1906. Laguna Niguel, Calif.: Royal Literary Publica­
tions, 1985. 
Decker, Peter. Fortunes and Failures: White Collar Mobility in Nineteenth-Century 
San Francisco. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978. 
Dickinson, Donald C. "Mr. Huntington and Mr. Smith." The Book Collector 37 
(Autumn 1988): 366-93. 
Dreiser, Theodore. The Titan. 1914; reprint ed., New York: New American 
Library, 1965. 
Dulles, Foster R. Labor in America: A History. Arlington Heights, 111.: Harlan 
Davidson, 1966. 
Dumke, Glenn. The Boom of the Eighties in Southern California. San Marino, Cal.: 
Huntington Library, 1944. 
Easlon, Steven L. The Los Angeles Railway through the Years. Anaheim, Cal.: 
Easlon Publications, 1973. 
Evans, Cerinda W. Collis Potter Huntington. 2 vols. Newport News, Va.: 
Mariners' Museum, 1954. 
Fairchild, Charles B. Street Railways: Their Construction, Operations, and Mainte­
nance. New York: Street Railway Publishing Co., 1892. 
Finger, John R. "The Seattle Spirit, 1851-1893." Journal of the West 13 (Sum­
mer 1974): 28-45. 
Fletcher, Ed. Memoirs of Ed Fletcher. San Diego: Pioneer Printers, 1952. 
Fogelson, Robert M. The Fragmented Metropolis: Los Angeles, 1850-1930. Cam­
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. 
Folsom, Burton W., Jr. Urban Capitalists: Entrepreneurs and City Growth in Penn­
sylvania's Lackawanna and Lehigh Regions, 1880-1920. Baltimore: Johns Hop­
kins University Press, 1981. 
Foner, Philip S. History of the Labor Movement in the United States: The Poli­
cies and Practices of the American Federation of Labor, 1900-1909. New York: 
International Publishers, 1964. 
Fones-Wolf, Elizabeth. "Industrial Recreation, the Second World War, and 
the Revival of Welfare Capitalism, 1934—1960." Business History Review 60 
(Summer 1986): 232-57. 
Foster, Mark S. From Streetcar to Superhighway: American City Planners and Urban 
Transportation. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981. 
. "The Model-T, the Hard Sell, and Los Angeles's Urban Growth: The 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 211 
Decentralization of Los Angeles during the 1920s." Pacific Historical Review 
44 (November 1975): 459-84. 
Friedricks, William B. "Capital and Labor in Los Angeles: Henry E. Hunting­
ton vs. Organized Labor, 1900—1920." Pacific Historical Review 59 (August 
1990): 375-95. 
. "Henry E. Huntington and Real Estate Development in Southern Cali­
fornia, 1898-1917." Southern California Quarterly 71 (Winter 1989): 327-40. 
-. "A Metropolitan Entrepreneur Par Excellence: Henry E. Huntington

and the Growth of Southern California, 1898-1927." Business History Review

63 (Summer 1989): 329-55.

Fulton, William. "'Those Were Her Best Days': The Streetcar and the Devel­
opment of Hollywood Before 1910." Southern California Quarterly 66 (Fall 
1984): 235-56. 
Gale, Zona. Frank Miller of the Mission Inn. New York: D. Appleton-Century 
Co., 1938. 
Glaab, Charles N. Kansas City and the Railroads: Community Policy in the Growth 
of a Regional Metropolis. Madison, Wis.: State Historical Society of Wiscon­
sin, 1962. 
Glaab, Charles, and A. Theodore Brown. A History of Urban America. New 
York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967. 
Goldfield, David R. Urban Growth in the Age ofSectionalism: Virginia, 1847-1861. 
Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1977. 
Gordon, David, Richard Edwards, and Michael Reich. Segmented Workers, 
Divided Workers: The Historical Transformation of Labor in the United States. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
Gordon, Dudley. Charles F. Lummis: Crusader in Corduroy. Los Angeles: Cultural 
Assets Press, 1972. 
Gottleib, Robert, and Irene Wolt. Thinking Big: The Story of the Los Angeles 
Times, Its Publishers, and Their Influence on Southern California. New York: G. P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1977. 
Graves, Jackson. My Seventy Years in California, 1857-1927. Los Angeles: 
Times-Mirror Press, 1927. 
Green, James R. World of the Worker: Labor in Twentieth-Century America. New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1980. 
Greenberg, Dolores. Financiers and Railroads, 1869—1889: A Study of Morton, 
Bliss, and Company. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1980. 
Grodinsky, Julius. Transcontinental Railroad Strategy, 1869-1893: A Study of 
Businessmen. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962. 
Gutman, Herbert G. Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America. New 
York: Vintage Books, 1977. 
Haber, Samuel. Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era, 
1890-1920. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964. 
Haeger, John D. The Investment Frontier: New York Businessmen and the Eco­
nomic Development of the Old Northwest. Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1981. 
212 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Halberstam, David. The Powers That Be. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979. 
Hays, Samuel P. The Response to Industrialism, 1885-1914. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1957. 
Heald, Morrell. The Social Responsibility of Business: Company and Community, 
1900-1960. Cleveland: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1970. 
Heilbroner, Robert L. The Making of Economic Society. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1962. 
Hereford, Rockwell. A Whole Man, Henry Mauris Robinson, and a Half Century, 
1890-1940. Pacific Grove, Calif.: Boxwood Press, 1985. 
Hertrich, William. The Huntington Botanical Gardens. San Marino, Calif.: Hunt­
ington Library, 1949. 
Higgs, Robert. The Transformation of the American Economy. New York: John 
Wiley and Sons, 1971. 
Hildebrand, George H. Borax Pioneer: Francis Marion Smith. San Diego: Howell-
North Books, 1982. 
Hill, Joseph J. The History of Warner's Ranch and Its Environs. Los Angeles: 
Young and McCallister, 1927. 
Hilton, George W. The Cable Car in America. Berkeley: Howell-North Books, 
1971. 
Hilton, George W., and John F. Due. The Electric Interurban Railways in America. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960. 
History of Los Angeles: City and County of California. 2 vols. Los Angeles: J.R. 
Finnelly and Son Publishing Co., 1931. 
Hodas, Daniel. The Business Career of Moses Taylor: Merchant, Finance Capitalist, 
and Industrialist. New York: New York University Press, 1976. 
Hofsommer, Don L. The Southern Pacific, 1901-1985. College Station, Tex.: 
Texas A&M University Press, 1986. 
Howard, Daniel L. Southern California and the Pacific Electric. Los Angeles: 
Daniel L. Howard, 1980. 
Hoyt, Franklin. "The Los Angeles and San Gabriel Valley Railroad." Pacific 
Historical Review 20 (August 1951): 227-40. 
Hughes, Jonathan. The Vital Few: American Economic Progress and Its Protagonists. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965. 
Hughes, Thomas P. Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880­
1930. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. 
The Huntington Family in America. Hartford, Conn.: Huntington Family Asso­
ciation, 1915. 
Hyde, Charles K. "Undercover and Underground: Labor Spies and Mine 
Management in the Early Twentieth Century." Business History Review 60 
(Spring 1986): 1-27. 
Ingham, John N., ed. Biographical Dictionary of American Business Leaders. 4 vols. 
Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983. 
. The Iron Barons: A Social Analysis of an American Urban Elite, 1874-1965. 
Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978. 
Issel, William. " 'Citizens Outside the Government': Business and Urban Policy 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 213 
in San Francisco and Los Angeles." Pacific Historical Review 57 (May 1987): 
117-45. 
Issel, William, and Robert Cherny. San Francisco, 1865-1932: Power, Politics, 
and Urban Development. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. 
Jackson, Kenneth T. Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 
Jacoby, Sanford M. Employing Bureaucracy: Managers, Unions, and the Trans­
formation of Work in American Industry, 1900—1945. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1985. 
Jaher, Frederic C. The Urban Establishment: Upper Strata in Boston, New York, 
Charleston, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1982. 
Johnson, Hank. The Railroad That Lighted Southern California. Los Angeles: 
Trans-Anglo Books, 1965. 
Jones, David W., Jr. Urban Transit Policy: An Economic and Political History. 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985. 
Kahn, Edgar M. Cable Car Days in San Francisco. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1944. 
Kahn, Judd. Imperial San Francisco: Politics and Planning in an American City, 
1897-1906. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1979. 
Kahrl, William L. Water and Power: The Conflict over Los Angeles' Water Supply in 
the Owens Valley. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982. 
Kazin, Michael. Barons of Labor: The San Francisco Building Trades and Urban 
Power in the Progressive Era. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987. 
. "The Great Exception Revisited: Organized Labor in San Francisco 
and Los Angeles, 1870-1940." Pacific Historical Review 55 (August 1986): 
371-402. 
Kelker, De Leuw and Company. Report and Recommendations on a Comprehensive 
Rapid Transit Plan for the City and County of Los Angeles. Chicago: Kelker, De 
Leuw and Co., 1925. 
Kennan, George. E.H. Harriman: A Biography. 2 vols. Boston: Houghton Mif­
flinCo., 1922. 
Kirkland, Edward. Dream and Thought in the Business Community, 1860-1900. 
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956. 
Klein, Maury. History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. New York: Mac­
millan Publishing Co., 1972. 
. The Life and Legend of Jay Gould. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986. 
Klotz, Ester. The Mission Inn: Its History and Artifacts. Riverside, Calif.: Rubi­
doux Printing, 1981. 
Knight, Robert. Industrial Relations in the San Francisco Bay Area, 1900-1918. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960. 
Kolko, Gabriel. The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterprelalion of American His­
tory, 1900-1916. New York: Macmillan Co., 1963. 
Larsen, Lawrence H. The Urban West at the End of the Frontier. Lawrence, Kan.: 
Regents Press of Kansas, 1978. 
214 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Larson, John L. Bonds of Enterprise: John Murray Forbes and Western Development 
in America's Railway Age. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984. 
Lavender, David. The Great Persuader. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and 
Co., 1970. 
. Nothing Seemed Impossible: William Ralston and Early San Francisco. Palo 
Alto, Calif.: American West Publishing Co., 1975. 
Lewis, Oscar. The Big Four. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1938. 
Licht, Walter. Working for the Railroad: The Organization of Work in the Nineteenth 
Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. 
Lindsey, Almont. The Pullman Strike. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1942. 
"Lines of the Pacific Electric: Northern and Eastern Division." Interurbans, 
Special no. 61 (1976). 
Link, Arthur S., and Richard L. McCormick. Progressivism. Arlington Heights, 
111.: Harlan Davidson, 1983. 
Littlefield, Douglas R., and Tanis C. Thorne. The Spirit of Enterprise: The 
History of Pacific Enterprises from 1886 to 1989. Los Angeles: Pacific Enter­
prises, 1990. 
Livesay, Harold C. American Made: Men Who Shaped the American Economy. Bos­
ton: Little, Brown and Co., 1979. 
. "Entrepreneurial Persistence through the Bureaucratic Age." Business 
History Review 51 (Winter 1977): 415-43. 
-. "Entrepreneurial Dominance in Businesses Large and Small, Past and 
Present." Business History Review 63 (Spring 1989): 1-21. 
McAfee, Ward. California Railway Era, 1850—1911. San Marino, Calif.: Golden 
West Books, 1973. 
McKelvey, Blake. The Emergence of Metropolitan America, 1915—1966. New 
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1966. 
McShane, Clay. Technology and Reform: Street Railways and the Growth of Milwau­
kee, 1887-1900. Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1974. 
McWilliams, Carey. Southern California: An Island on the Land. 2nd ed. Santa 
Barbara, Calif.: Peregrine Smith, 1978. 
Marchand, Bernard. The Emergence ofLos Angeles: Population and Housing in the 
City ofDreams, 1940-1970. London: Pion, 1986. 
Marcosson, Isaac F. A Little Known Master of Millions: The Story of Henry E. 
Huntington—Constructive Capitalist. Boston: E. H. Rollins and Sons, 1914. 
Marshall, James. The Railroad That Built an Empire. New York: Random House, 
1945. 
Martin, A\bro. James J. Hill and the Opening of the Northwest. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1976. 
Mercer, Lloyd M. E.H. Harriman: Master Railroader. Boston: Twayne Pub­
lishers, 1985. 
Meyer, Stephen,III. The Five Dollar Day: Labor Management and Social Control in 
the Ford Motor Company, 1908-1921. Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1981. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 215 
Miller, John. Fares Please! A Popular History of Trolleys, Horsecars, Streetcars, 
Buses, Elevateds, and Subways. New York: Dover Publications, 1960. 
Miller, William, ed. Men in Business: Essays on the Role of the Entrepreneur. New 
York: Harper and Row, 1962. 
Miller, Zane L. The Urbanization of Modern America: A Brief History. New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973. 
Monkkonen, Eric H. America Becomes Urban: The Development of U.S. Cities and 
Towns, 1780—1980. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of Cali­
fornia Press, 1988. 
Montgomery, David. Workers' Control in America: Studies in the History of Work, 
Technology, and Labor Struggles. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1979. 
Moody's Manual ofInvestments: Public Utility Securities, 1926. New York: Moody's 
Investment Service, 1926. 
Mowry, George E. The California Progressives. Berkeley: University of Califor­
nia Press, 1951. 
Myers, William A. Iron Men and Copper Wires: A Centennial History of the Southern 
California Edison Company. Glendale, Calif.: Trans-Anglo Books, 1983. 
Myers, William A., and Ira L. Swett. Trolleys to the Surf: The Story of the Los 
Angeles Pacific Railway. Glendale, Calif.: Interurban Publications, 1976. 
Nadeau, Remi. City-Makers: The Story of Southern California's First Boom, 1868— 
1876. Los Angeles: Trans-Anglo Books, 1965. 
. Los Angeles: From Mission to Modern City. New York: Longmans, Green 
and Co., 1960. 
Nash, Gerald D. The American West in the Twentieth Century: A Short History of an 
Urban Oasis. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973. 
. "The California Railroad Commission, 1876-1911." Southern Califor­
nia Quarterly 44 (December 1962): 287-306. 
-. State Government and Economic Development: A History of the Administra­
tive Policies in California, 1849—1933. Berkeley: Institute of Governmental 
Studies, 1964. 
-. "Urban Development in the Southwest: A Review Essay." Journal of 
Urban History 11 (August 1985): 471-80. 
Nelson, Daniel. "The Company Union Movement, 1900—1937: A Reexami­
nation." Business History Review 56 (Autumn 1982): 335-57. 
. Managers and Workers: Origins of the New Factory System in the United 
States, 1880-1920. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1975. 
Nelson, Howard J. The Los Angeles Metropolis. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt 
Co., 1983. 
Nesbit, Robert C. "He Built Seattle": A Biography of Judge Thomas Burke. Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1961. 
Newmark, Harrison. Sixty Years in Southern California, 1853-1913. New York: 
Knickerbocker Press, 1916. 
O'Flaherty, Joseph S. An End and a Beginning: The South Coast and Los Angeles, 
1850-1887. New York: Exposition Press, 1972. 
216 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
. Those Powerful Years: The South Coast and Los Angeles, 1887-1917. New 
York: Exposition Press, 1978. 
Olin, Spencer C, Jr. California's Prodigal Sons: Hiram Johnson and the Progres­
sives, 1911-1917. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968. 
O'Melveny, Henry. William G. Kerckhoff: A Memorial. Los Angeles: Adcraft 
Press, 1935. 
Ozanne, Robert. A Century of Labor-Management Relations at McCormick and 
International Harvester. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967. 
Perkins, Edwin J., and Steven Ross. "Integrating Business History and Labor 
History." Business and Economic History 15 (1986): 43—52. 
Perry, Louis B., and Richard S. Perry. A History of the Los Angeles Labor Move­
ment, 1911-1941. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963. 
Pomeroy, Earl. The Pacific Slope: A History of California, Oregon, Washington, 
Idaho, Utah, and Nevada. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1965. 
Pomfret, John E. The Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery from Its Be­
ginnings to 1969. San Marino, Calif.: Huntington Library, 1969. 
Poor's Directory of Railway Officials and Manual of American Street Railways, 1892. 
New York: Poor's Railroad Manual Co., 1892. 
Poor's Manual ofRailroads. New York: Poor's Railroad Manual Co., 1884-1902. 
Post, Robert C. "American Electric Railway Beginnings: Trolleys and Draft 
Dummies in Los Angeles." Southern California Quarterly 69 (Fall 1988): 203­
21. 
Pourade, Richard. The History of San Diego: Gold in the Sun. San Diego: Union 
Tribune Publishing Co., 1965. 
Quiett, Glenn C. They Built the West: An Epic of Rails and Cities. New York: 
D. Appleton-Century Co., 1934. 
The Ranch of the Gathering Waters (Rancho Rodeo de las Aguas). Los Angeles: 
Security First National Bank, 1934. 
Redinger, David. The Story of Big Creek. Los Angeles: Eureka Press, 1949. 
Richards, Elizabeth W. Del Mar Decades. Del Mar, Cal.: Santa Fe Federal 
Savings and Loan Assoc, 1974. 
Robinson, William W. Land in California: The Story of Mission Lands, Ranchos, 
Squatters, Mining Camps, Railroad Grants, Land Script, Homesteads. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1948. 
. Ranchos Become Cities. Pasadena, Calif.: San Pasqual Press, 1939. 
. The Story of the San Fernando Valley. Los Angeles: Title Insurance and 
Trust Co., 1961. 
Rolle, Andrew. Los Angeles: From Pueblo to City of the Future. San Francisco: 
Boyd and Fraser, 1981. 
Rose, Mark H., and John G. Clark. "Light, Heat, and Power: Energy Choices 
in Kansas City, Wichita, and Denver, 1900-1935."Journal of Urban History 
5 (May 1979): 340-64. 
Schad, Robert. Henry Edwards Huntington: Founder of the Library. San Marino, 
Calif.: Huntington Library, 1937. 
Schiesl, Martin J. The Politics of Efficiency: Municipal Administration and Reform 
in America, 1800-1920. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 217 
Schlesinger, Arthur M. The Rise of the American City: 1878-1898. New York: 
Macmillan, 1933. 
Schnore, Leo F., ed. TheNew Urban History: Quantitative Explorations by American 
Historians. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972. 
Schwantes, Carlos A. "The West Adopts the Automobile: Technology, Un­
employment, and the Jitney Phenomenon of 1914—1917." Western Historical 
Quarterly 16 (July 1985): 307-26. 
Seims, Charles. Mount Lowe: Railroad to the Clouds. San Marino, Calif.: Golden 
West Books, 1976. 
Seligman, Ben B. The Potentates. New York: Dial Press, 1971. 
Selvin, David. A Place in the Sun: A History of California Labor. San Francisco: 
Boyd and Fraser, 1981. 
Shanahan, Dennis. Old Redondo: A Pictorial History ofRedondo Beach, California. 
Redondo Beach: Legends Press, 1982. 
Sherwood, Midge. Days of Vintage, Years of Vision. San Marino, Calif.: Orizaba 
Publications, 1982. 
Smallwood, Charles. The White Front Cars of San Francisco. Glendale, Calif.: 
Interurban Press, 1978. 
Sobel, Robert. The Entrepreneurs: Explorations within the American Business Tra­
dition. New York: Weybright and Talley, 1974. 
Spalding, William A. History and Reminiscences: Los Angeles, City, County, and 
California. 3 vols. Los Angeles: Finnell and Sons Publishing Co., 1931. 
Starr, Kevin. Inventing the Dream: California through the Progressive Era. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 
Stein, Lou. Son Diego County Place-Names. San Diego: Tofua Press, 1975. 
Steiner, Rodney. Los Angeles: The Centrifugal City. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall / 
Hunt Publishing Co., 1981. 
Stimson, Grace H. Rise of the Labor Movement in Los Angeles. Berkeley: Univer­
sity of California Press, 1955. 
Swett, Ira L. "Los Angeles and Redondo." Interurbans, Special no. 20 (1957). 
. "Los Angeles Railway." Interurbans, Special no. 11 (1951). 
Taft, Philip. Organized Labor in American History. New York: Harper and Row, 
1964. 
Tarr, Joel A. Transportation Innovation and Changing Spatial Patterns in Pitts­
burgh, 1850-1934. Pittsburgh: Public Works Historical Society, 1978. 
Taylor, George R. "The Beginnings of Mass Transportation in Urban

America." Smithsonian Journal ofHistory. Pts. 1 and 2. (Summer and Autumn

1966): 35-50,31-54.

Tazewell, William L. Newport News Shipbuilding: The First Century. Newport 
News, Va.: Mariners' Museum, 1986. 
Teaford, Jon C. The Twentieth-Century American City: Problems, Promise and 
Reality. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. 
. The Unheralded Triumph: City Government in America. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1984. 
Thorpe, James. "The Creation of the Gardens." Huntington Library Quarterly 
32 (August 1969): 333-50. 
218 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
. "The Founder and His Library." Huntington Library Quarterly 32 
(August 1969): 291-308. 
Trottman, Nelson. History of the Union Pacific: A Financial and Economic Survey. 
New York: Ronald Press Co., 1923. 
Tutorow, Norman. Leland Stanford: Man of Many Careers. Menlo Park, Calif.: 
Pacific Coast Publishers, 1978. 
Vance, James E. Geography and Urban Evolution in the San Francisco Bay Area. 
Berkeley: Institute of Government Studies, 1964. 
Van Valen, Nelson. "A Neglected Aspect of the Los Angeles Municipal Elec­
tric System." In A Southern California Historical Anthology. Edited by Doyce B. 
Nunis, Jr., Los Angeles: Historical Society of Southern California, 1984. 
Pp. 289-311. 
Viehe, Fred W. "Black Gold Suburbs: The Influence of the Extractive Indus­
try on the Suburbanization of Los Angeles, 1890-1930." Journal of Urban 
History 8 (November 1981): 3-26. 
Vonnegut, Kurt, Jr. Player Piano. New York: Delacorte Press, 1952. 
Wade, Richard C. "An Agenda for Urban History." In American History: Retro­
spect and Prospect. Edited by George A. Billias and Gerald N. Grob. New 
York: Free Press, 1971. Pp. 367-98. 
. The Urban Frontier: The Rise of Western Cities, 1790-1830. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1959. 
Walker's Manual of Securities. San Francisco: H.D. Walker, 1908, 1920, 1922. 
Wallace, George. Joseph Francis Sartori. Los Angeles: Ward Richie Press, 1948. 
Wark, Robert R. "Arabella Huntington and the Beginnings of the Art Gallery." 
Huntington Library Quarterly 32 (August 1969): 309-31. 
Warner, Sam B., Jr. Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston, 1870— 
1900. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962. 
. The Urban Wilderness: A History of the American City. New York: Harper 
and Row, 1972. 
Watkins, Louise W. Henry Edwards Huntington: A Character Sketch of a Great 
Man. Gardena, Calif.: Spanish American Institute Press, 1928. 
Weiss, Marc A. The Rise of the Community Builders: The American Real Estate In­
dustry and Urban Land Planning. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987. 
Wheeler, Kenneth W. To Wear a City's Crown: The Beginnings of Urban Growth in 
Texas. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. 
Wiebe, Robert H. Businessmen and Reform: A Study of the Progressive Movement. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962. 
. The Search for Order, 1877-1920. New York: Hill and Wang, 1967. 
Wilcox, Delos F. Preliminary Report on Local Transportation Policy Submitted to the 
City Council of the City of Los Angeles. Los Angeles, 28 Apr. 1927. 
Willard, Charles D. A History of the Chamber of Commerce of Los Angeles. Los 
Angeles: Kingsley-Barnes and Neurer, 1899. 
Williams, R. Hal. The Democratic Party and California Politics, 1880-1896. Stan­
ford: Stanford University Press, 1973. 
Wilson, Carol Green. California Yankee: William R. Staats—Business Pioneer. 
Claremont, Calif.: Saunders Press, 1946. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 219 
Wilson, Neill, and Frank J. Taylor. Southern Pacific: The Roaring Story of a 
Fighting Railroad. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952. 
Winther, Oscar O. "The Rise of Metropolitan Los Angeles, 1870-1910." Hunt­
ington Library Quarterly 10 (1947): 391-405. 
Wollenberg, Charles. "Working on El Traque: The Pacific Electric Strike of 
1903." Pacific Historical Review 42 (August 1973): 358-69. 
Workman, Boyle. The City That Grew. Los Angeles: Southland Publishing 
Co., 1936. 
Wright, Helen. Explorer of the Universe: A Biography of George Ellery Hale. New 
York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1966. 
Yago, Glenn. The Decline of Transit: Urban Transportation in German and U. S. 
Cities. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984. 
Zahavi, Gerald. "Negotiated Loyalty: Welfare Capitalism and the Shoemakers 
of Endicott Johnson: 1920-1940." Journal of American History 71 (December 
1983): 602-20. 
DISSERTATIONS, THESES, AND UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL 
Arroyo, Luis L. "Industrial Unionism and the Los Angeles Furniture Industry, 
1918-1954." Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1979. 
Culton, Donald R. "Charles Dwight Willard, Los Angeles City Booster and 
Professional Reformer, 1880-1914." Ph.D. diss., University of Southern 
California, 1971. 
Dumke, Glenn S. "The Growth of the Pacific Electric and Its Influence upon 
the Development of Southern California to 1911." M.A. thesis, Occidental 
College, 1939. 
Elias, Judith W. "The Selling of a Myth: Los Angeles Promotional Literature, 
1885-1915." M.A. thesis, California State University, Northridge, 1979. 
Foster, Mark S. "The Decentralization of Los Angeles during the 1920s." 
Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 1971. 
Franks, Joel. "Bootmakers and Shoemakers in Nineteenth-Century San Fran­
cisco: A Study in Class, Culture, Ethnicity, and Popular Protest in an Indus­
trializing Community." Ph.D. diss., University of California, Irvine, 1983. 
Haeger, John D. "From Merchant to Urban Developer: John Jacob Astor and 
the Business Revolution in America." Paper presented at the Organization 
of American Historians' Meeting, March, 1985. 
Hoyt, Franklin. "Railroad Development in Southern California, 1868-1900." 
Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 1951. 
Jones, William C. "The Corporate Evolution of the Southern California 
Edison Company and Its Financial History from 1909 to 1928." M.B.A. 
thesis, University of Southern California, 1929. 
Lawrence, John A. "Behind the Palaces: The Working Class and the Labor 
Movement in San Francisco, 1877-1901." Ph.D. diss., University of Califor­
nia, Berkeley, 1979. 
Lewis, Edwin L. "Street Railway Development in Los Angeles and Environs, 
220 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
1878-1938." 2 vols. 1938. This typescript is available at the Huntington 
Library. 
Miller, Richard C. "Otis and His Times." Doctoral diss., University of Califor­
nia, Berkeley, 1961. 
Post, Robert C. "Street Railways in Los Angeles: Robert Widney to Henry 
Huntington." M.A. thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1967. 
Van Valen, Nelson S. "Power Politics: The Struggle for Municipal Owner­
ship of Electric Utilities in Los Angeles, 1905-1937." Ph.D. diss., Claremont 
Graduate School, 1964. 
Veysey, Laurence R. "The Pacific Electric Railway, 1910-1953: A Study in the 
Operations of Economic, Social, and Political Forces upon American Local 
Transportation." Available at Occidental College Library. 
Weber, Robert D. "Rationalizers and Reformers: Chicago Local Transporta­
tion in the Nineteenth Century." Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1971. 
Wright, Mabel. "History of the Pacific Electric Railway." M.A. thesis, Univer­
sity of Southern California, 1930. 
Index

Adams, E. A., 65

Ainsworth, John C, 89-90

Alfred Dolge Manufacturing Company,

13,89

Alhambra, 12, 41, 56, 59, 64, 65, 89

Alhambra Addition Water Company, 94

Altadena, 64

Amalgamated Association of Street Railway

Employees, 138-40, 144-46

American Railway Union, 43-44

Anaheim, 9

Arnold, Bion J., 107-8; and valuation of

Los Angeles Railway, 108

Ashland, Ky., 27

Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway,

8, 81—82; and expansion in southern

California, 2, 30, 40-41, 58

Balboa, 9, 77, 79

Balch, Allan C, 3, 94; and San Gabriel

Electric Company, 17, 61; and Pacific

Light and Power Company, 115

Bicknell, John D.: and Pacific Electric

Railway, 54, 56, 57; and Pacific Light

and Power Company, 62; and real estate

development, 3

Biddle, Lemuel, 139-40

Big Creek hydroelec ti k power facility, 109,

111-15, 118, 126, 127

Bolsa Chica Gun Club, 15

Borel, Antoine: and Los Angeles Railway,

5-6, 44, 50, 51, 69, 83, 85, 95; and

Market Street Railway, 179n31; and

Pacific Electric Railway, 57, 66, 69, 76,

77, 78, 95; and Pacific Light and Power

Company, 94

Bowbeer, Ben, 145

Boydjohn, 60

Boyle Heights, 41,50

Boy Scouts, 14

Brand, L. C , 91

Bryant, Ernest A., 151

Burbank and Baker, 125

Burke, Thomas, 4, 109

Butters, Henry, 51

California Club, 15

California Institute of Technology, 14,

148, 151

California Pacific Railroad, 72, 74

California Railroad Commission, 107, 117,

118, 119, 120, 131, 132

California Street Cable Railroad, 31

Canfield, C. A., 80

Carnegie, Andrew, 147

Carnegie Institution, 149

Central Labor Council, 144; assessment

of Henry Huntington, 141. See also Los

221

222 INDEX 
Central Labor Council (continued)

Angeles Council of Labor

Central Pacific Railroad, 20, 24, 28, 32,

35,60

Chaffey, Andrew, 3

Chandler, Harry, 11,92

Chateau Beauregard, 117

Chatsworth, 127

Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad, 21, 23,

25-28

Chicago, 144

Childs, Orzo W., 109

Cincinnati, 23

City Gas Company, 109-10

City Railroad, 34-35

City Railway, 99, 105, 119, 120, 121, 150

Clark, Eli P., 3, 11,51,87

Clark, William A., 73-75, 185nl5

Cleland, Robert C  , 10

Clement, Lewis, 37

Coalsmouth, W.Va., 23

Cohn, Kaspare, 62

Cohoes, N.Y., 22

Collis P. and Howard E. Memorial Hospi­

tal, 153

Colton, 41,76

Compton, 127

Cooperative Association of Employees of

the Los Angeles Railway, 144-45

Covina, 57, 77,80, 101

Covington, Ky., 27

Covington, Va., 23

Cowperwood, Frank Algernon, 155

Crank, James, 3

Crocker, Charles, 20, 28, 30, 31

Crocker, Charles Frederick, 28-29, 30, 31,

34; and Market Street Cable Railway, 33,

34, 35; and Market Street Railway, 35,

39-40

Crocker, George, 45, 46

Crocker, William, 46

Damon, George, 107—8

Debs, Eugene V., 43

DeGuigne, Christian: and Los Angeles

Railway, 5-6, 44, 50, 69, 83, 85, 95;

and Market Street Railway, 179n31; and

Pacific Electric Railway, 57, 66, 69, 76,

77, 78, 95; and Pacific Light and Power

Company, 93-94

Del Mar, 80

Denver, 144

Dolge, Alfred, 13

Dolgeville, 88, 89

Dolgeville Land Company, 126

Domestic Gas Company, 110, 129

Dreiser, Theodore, 155

Duarte, 57

Due, John F., 104

Dunn, William E., 115, 117, 118, 126,

131, 134, 149, 150, 151; and friendship

with Henry Huntington, 118-19; and

Huntington Land and Improvement

Company, 113-14, 119; and jitneys, 120,

121, 122-23; and Los Angeles Railway,

63, 107, 119

Duveen, Joseph, 134, 151

Eagle Rock, 84

Eastwood, JohnS., 111-12

Edgerton, Edwin, 120

E. H. Rollins and Sons, 114

Elizabethtown, Ky., 26

Elizabethtown, Lexington and Big Sandy

Railroad, 28

El Monte, 58

Farmers and Merchants Bank, 59

Ferries and Cliff House Railway, 34-35

Fisk, Harvey, 21

Fiskand Hatch, 21

Fletcher, Ed, 80

Folsom, Burt W.,Jr., 2

Foster, Mark S., 10

Foulds,J.E.,85 
Franchot, Richard, 24

Franchot, S. P., 24-25

Frank Meline and Company, 125

Frasier,J. S., 42

Fresno, 101

Fresno Electric Railway, 72

Frick, Henry, 81, 147

Frick Museum, 147

Garland, William M., 125; on impact

of Henry Huntington in southern

California, 8

Garnsey, Leman Thomas, 85, 90

Garvanza, 64, 84

Geary Street Park and Ocean Railroad, 31

INDEX 223 
General Electric, 38 
Glendale, 9, 10 
Glendora, 9, 80, 127 
Glenwood Tavern (later Mission Inn), 13 
Graham, Charles E., 65, 113, 115, 118, 
134; as Henry Huntington's East Coast 
manager, 56, 117, 126, 131 
"Great Merger, The," 103 
Grey, Elmer, 70 
Gutenberg Bible, 106 
H.J. Heinz Company, 141 
Hale, George E., 145-50 
Hammond Lumber Company, 150 
Hapgood, George, 151 
Harriman, E. H., 66, 102, 129; partner­
ship with Henry Huntington in Pacific 
Electric, 69-70, 80-82, 95-96, 99, 100; 
purchases Huntington family's South­
ern Pacific stock, 6, 46; and real estate 
development, 91; and Southern Pacific 
acquisitions, 7, 73, 74-76, 78, 85, 87, 99, 
186n23, and streetcar rivalry with Henry 
Huntington, 72-77 
Harriman, Job, 143 
Hatch, Alfrederick, 21 
Hayes Land Company, 80-81 
Haynes.John R., 109 
Hays, Charles M., 46 
Hellman, Isaias W.: as cable car owner, 3; 
and Los Angeles Railway, 5—6, 44, 50, 
51, 83, 84; and Market Street Railway, 
40, 179n31; and Pacific Electric Railway, 
57, 66, 76, 77; and Pacific Light and 
Power Company, 61, 94; and San Gabriel 
Wine Company, 59; sells interest in Los 
Angeles Railway, 69, 85, 95; sells interest 
in Pacific Electric Railway, 69, 78, 95 
Hellman, Isaias W., Jr., 85 
Henshaw, William, 82 
Herrin, William, 73, 85, 100 
Hertrich, William, 14, 134 
Hilton, George W., 34, 104 
Hispanic Society of America Museum, 148 
Holladay, Caroline, 45, 71 
Holladay, Edmund Burke, 45, 71, 90 
Hollywood, 84, 87 
Home Telephone Company, 140 
Hook, T.J.,63 
Hook, William, 63 
Hopkins, Mark, 20, 31 
Hopkins, Timothy, 28 
Hotel Wentworth. See Huntington Hotel 
Hubbard, Thomas E., 29, 35 
Hunt, Myron, 70, 89; on Henry Huntington 
and labor, 141 
Huntington, Arabella, 45, 60, 117, 134, 
148, 151, 203nl4; inheritance of, 6, 56, 
60, 181nl8; marries Henry Huntington, 
115, 153; sells Southern Pacific stock, 
6,46 
Huntington, Archer, 148, 149, 150 
Huntington, Clara, 45, 71, 180n51 
Huntington, Collis P., 19, 22, 31, 33, 38, 42, 
43, 44, 45, 46, 95; and Central Pacific, 
20-21; and Chesapeake and Ohio, 21, 
23, 25-28; employs Henry Huntington, 
21-22, 23-24, 25-28, 29, 45-46, 47, 
152; estate of, 5, 6, 56, 60, 181nl8; and 
Los Angeles Railway, 51; and Market 
Street Railway, 35, 37, 39, 40; and Mark 
Hopkins, 20; and Henry Huntington, 19, 
21, 22-23, 24, 30, 31, 35, 46, 47, 152-53; 
and Solon Huntington, 20, 173n4; and 
Southern Pacific, 28-29, 45-46 
Huntington, Elizabeth, 22 
Huntington, Harriet, 19, 22, 24, 26, 45, 59, 
83,90, 174nl4 
Huntington, Henry E., 5, 22, 24, 25, 49, 
70, 71, 98, 151, 152, 158; and agri­
culture, 12-13; and appraisal of estate 
(1928), 158; and art collecting, 106, 134; 
and book collecting, 15, 106, 133-34, 
198n46; and business strategy in Los 
Angeles, 1, 6-7, 11-12, 68; and business 
triad, 1, 12, 17-18, 49, 69, 154-55; and 
charitable contributions, 14, 45; and 
Chesapeake, Ohio and Southwestern 
Railroad, 25—26; and club membership, 
14-15; compared to Thomas Burke, 
109; compared to Frank Cowperwood, 
155; compared toJ.P. Morgan, 15, 147; 
compared to other urban entrepreneurs, 
5, 17-18; compared to James Phelan, 
59-60; compared to William Ralston, 89; 
compared to Moses Sherman, 7, 158-59; 
compared to Francis ("Borax") Smith, 58, 
158-59; and early business experience, 
22-23; and Elizabethtown, Lexington 
and Big Sandy Railroad, 28; and family 
224 INDEX 
Huntington, Henry E. (continued) 
life, 22, 44-45, 71, 174nl4, 180n51; and 
felt business, 13, 89; and William Dunn, 
118-19, 195n5; and E. H. Harriman, 
72-77; and Arabella Huntington, 6, 
45, 46, 60, 115, 117, 134, 151, 194n54, 
203nl4; and Collis Huntington, 19, 20, 
21-22, 23-26, 29, 38-39, 46, 47, 152­
53, 155, 158; and Mary Huntington, 24, 
45, 71, 175n21, 180n51; and Huntington 
Library, 15—16, 147—50; and impact on 
southern California, 1, 8-18, 65, 87­
88, 158-59; inheritance of, 5, 6, 56, 60, 
158, 181nl8; investment in southern 
California, 1, 8-9, 44, 48, 135, 152; and 
Kentucky Central Railroad, 26-27, 43; 
and labor, 43-44, 135-46, 155; and Los 
Angeles and Redondo Railway, 70, 85, 
87, 102, 103, 105; and Los Angeles Inter-
Urban Railway, 76-80; and Los Angeles 
Railway, 5-6, 44, 51, 54, 63-64, 84-85, 
105-8, 136-37, 139, 140-41, 142-46; 
and Market Street Cable Railway, 33-34; 
and Market Street Railway, 35, 37-40, 
45, 46; name as commodity, 80-81, 
190n58; and natural gas industry, 109— 
15; and Pacific Electric Railway, 6—7, 
9-10, 54-55, 56-58, 64-67, 71-72, 76­
80, 139-41; and northern California 
trolley systems, 72, 101; and Pacific 
Light and Power Company, 7, 61-62, 
92-94, 111-15, 118, 127-28, 131-33, 
194n53; partnership in Pacific Electric 
Railway, 69-70, 80-82, 95-96, 99, 100; 
plans to develop San Diego County, 8, 
80-81; and real estate, 11-12, 39, 50, 
58, 59, 87-92, 99-100, 109, 125-26, 
154, I72n37; religious beliefs of, 22, 45, 
175n22; and St. Albans sawmill, 23-25; 
and San Marino Ranch, 59, 70, 134; and 
Sargent & Company, 22-23; and South­
ern Pacific, 6, 29-45, 46, 99, 100-101, 
102-3, 104-5; and water companies, 12, 
94-95 
Huntington, Howard, 59, 150, 151, 180n51, 
203nl3; and Los Angeles Railway, 
83-84, 107, 123 
Huntington, Marian, 71, 180n51 
Huntington, Mary, 24, 45, 71, 175n21, 
180n51 
Huntington, Solon, 19-20, I73n4 
Huntington, W.Va., 25 
Huntington and Franchot, 25 
Huntington Beach, 16, 101, 127, 159 
Huntington Drive, 159 
Huntington Hotel, 14, 88-89, 159 
Huntington Land and Improvement Com­
pany, 13, 125-26; funding of other 
Huntington projects, 84, 100, 109, 113­
14, 118, 119-20; incorporated, 7, 58-59; 
lot sales, 126; net earnings, 83, 99, 109, 
125-26; real estate purchases, 59; return 
on investment, 69; and rising property 
values, 99-100 
Huntington Library, Art Collections, and 
Botanical Gardens, 15-16, 147-50, 152, 
158, 159 
Huntington Lodge, 128 
Huntington Park, 159 
Huntington-Redondo Company, 126, 150 
"Huntington Standards," 63—64 
Illinois Central Railroad, 27, 28 
Imperial Valley, 80, 81 
Inglewood, 50 
International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers, 140 
International Harvester, 141 
Jaher, Frederic C, 11 
Jitneys, 117, 120-23 
Johnson, George G., 75 
Jonathan Club, 15, 60, 61, 71 
Judah, Theodore, 20 
Judson, Henry S., 125 
Kahn, Edgar M., 32 
Kahn, Otto, 81 
Keller, H. W., 80 
Kentucky Central Railroad, 26, 27, 43 
Kerckhoff, William G., 3, 61, 80, 94, 129; 
and Big Creek hydroelectric facility, 111­
12; and Kern River hydroelectric facility, 
93—94; and natural gas industry, 110— 
11, 115; and Pacific Light and Power 
Company, 61-62, 112, 114-15; and real 
estate development, 91; and San Gabriel 
Electric Company, 17,61 
Kern Power Company, 62 
Kern River hydroelectric facility, 61—62, 
92-94, 110 
Kern River Land Company. 92—93 
INDEX 225 
Kern River Power Company, 129 
Key Route System, 4-5, 159 
Kuhrts, George, 123, 144, 146 
La Habra, 9, 76, 101 
Land-use zoning laws, 11, 88, 155, 189n53 
Lankenau Hospital, 151 
LARY. See Los Angeles Railway Company 
Lathrop, Ariel, 29 
Lexington, Ky., 26 
Lindley, Hervey, 63 
Livingston, Ky., 26 
Long Beach, 9, 11, 57, 58, 63, 64 
Los Angeles: development of downtown, 
60, 63, 109, 193n35; Festival of Flowers, 
66-67; Fiesta, 140; founding and early 
development, 2-3; growth of, 8, 58, 
183n30; and plans to develop municipal 
hydroelectric power, 130-31, 132; urban 
entrepreneurs in, 1-3, 8, 11, 16-17 
Los Angeles and Glendale Railway, 77 
Los Angeles and Pasadena Electric Railway, 
54, 56, 57, 64 
Los Angeles and Redondo Railway, 70, 85, 
87,90, 102, 103, 105 
Los Angeles Board of Public Utilities, 107­
8; investigation of Los Angeles Railway, 
108; and jitneys, 122, 123 
Los Angeles Citizens' Alliance, 138 
Los Angeles City Council, 73-74; and jit­
ney ordinance, 122; and plans to develop 
municipal hydroelectric power, 131, 132 
Los Angeles Consolidated Electric Rail­
way, 51 
Los Angeles Council of Labor, 136, 138, 
139-40 
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, 
148-49 
Los Angeles Electric Company, 62 
Los Angeles Evening Express, 42 
Los Angeles Evening News, 85 
Los Angeles Examiner, 68, 78, 91, 118 
Los Angeles Express, 55, 72, 100-101 
Los Angeles Financier, 68 
Los Angeles Gas and Electric Company, 
109, 110, 128, 129, 130, 132 
Los Angeles Herald, 59, 82, 98, 142 
Los Angeles Inter-Urban Railway, 102, 
105; incorporation of, 70, 76-77, 96, 
187n26; leased to Pacific Electric Railway, 
101; net earnings, 83, 188n43 
Los Angeles Land Company, 75, 126 
Los Angeles, Ocean Park and Santa Monica 
Railway, 74-75 
Los Angeles Pacific Railway, 9, 87, 103, 
158-59 
Los Angeles Pasadena Traction Com­
pany, 74 
Los Angeles Railway Building, 152, 193n35 
Los Angeles Railway Company, 9, 44, 48, 
50,51,69,74,95,96, 116, 117, 118, 150; 
acquired by Henry Huntington syndi­
cate, 5-6, 44, 48, 50-51, 54; dividends 
of, 107; employee-benefit programs, 
141-43; enlargement and expansion 
of, 51, 54, 63, 84-85, 101-2, 104-5, 
121-22, 123-24; and franchise battles, 
63; and "Huntington Standards," 6 3  ­
64; incorporates City Railway, 99; and 
jitney competition, 117-18, 120-23; 
and labor relations, 136, 139, 140-41, 
143-46; net earnings, 66, 83, 102, 105­
6, 121; and patronage, 105, 121; and 
PAYE car, 101-2; and proposed munici­
pal purchase, 108; receives funds from 
Huntington Land and Improvement, 
119-20; and reorganization plans (1913), 
119, 120; reorganized as Los Angeles 
Railway Corporation, 99, 105-6; return 
on investment, 102, 105, 106, 188n44; 
value assessed, 108 
Los Angeles Railway Recreation Associa­
tion, 143 
Los Angeles Suburban Homes Company, 92 
Los Angeles Times, 54, 64, 70, 75, 90, 92, 98, 
137,138 
Los Angeles Traction Company, 44, 50, 74, 
77, 140; and franchise battles, 63 
Louisville, Ky., 23, 26 
Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 27 
Lovett, R. S., 102, 104 
Lowe, Thaddeus S. C , 109 
Lummis, Charles F., 8 
Lux, Charles, 92 
McKee, H. S., 2 
McMillan Joseph, 61,70 
Macomber, A. Kingsley, 88 
McWilliams, Carey, 3 
Main and Fifth Street Railroad, 51, 55 
Main Street and Agricultural Park Railroad, 
50, 51 
226 INDEX 
Mammoth Power Company, 112 
Marcosson Isaac F., 16, 71, 171nl5 
Market Street and Fairmount Railway, 
34-35 
Market Street Cable Railway, 31-35 
Market Street Railroad, 31-32 
Market Street Railway, 35-37, 46, 48, 50, 
54, 55; earnings, 40; and electrifying 
lines, 37-39; expansion of, 39-40 
Marshall, Torrance, 119 
Mateo Street and Santa Fe Avenue Streetcar 
Company, 54, 57 
Mellon, Andrew, 147 
Memphis, 23, 26, 28 
Mendoza, Isaac, 133 
Mentone Power Company, 94 
Merchants' and Manufacturers' Associa­
tion, 138, 143 
Metropolitan Club, 61 
Mexican Federal Union, 140 
Midway Gas Company, 110-11 
Miller, C. O. G., 17, 129 
Miller, Frank, 13 
Miller, Henry, 92 
Miller, John B., 131, 132; on Henry Hunt­
ington's impact in southern California, 8, 
153; and Southern California Edison, 17, 
128-29, 131, 132-33 
Miller and Lux Land and Cattle Company, 
92-93 
Millikan, Robert A., 151 
Millspaugh, W. S., 42 
Milwaukee, 39 
Minneapolis, 144 
Mission Inn, 13 
Monrovia, 41, 56, 57, 65, 71, 80 
MorganJ. P., 15, 147 
Morgan Library, 147 
Morse, S. F., 42 
Mt. Lowe Railway, 57, 109 
Mt. Whitney Power and Electric Com­
pany, 127 
Muir.John A., 56, 83 
National Association of Manufacturers, 
137-38 
National Cash Register, 141 
National Street Railway Association, 138 
National War Labor Board, 145-46 
New Orleans, 25, 28 
Newport Beach, 9, 76, 77, 78 
Newport News, Va., 23, 25 
Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock 
Company, 56, 150 
New York Chamber of Commerce, 146 
New York City, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 45, 
60-61, 101, 117, 151 
Nickerson, H. M., 128 
North Beach and Mission Railway, 34-35 
Oak Knoll, 13-14, 79, 88-89 
Oak Knoll Company, 88 
Oakland, 4, 144 
Occidental College, 14 
Ocean Beach Railway, 35 
Oceanside, 80 
O'Melveny, Henry W., 62, 93 
Omnibus Cable Company, 34-35 
Oneonta, N.Y., 19, 45, 158 
Oneonta Park, 45, 88, 89 
Ontario and San Antonio Heights Rail­
way, 62 
Ontario Electric Company, 62 
Orange, 9 
"Orange Empire," 72 
Otis, Harrison G., 11, 137 
Owens Valley Aqueduct, 91, 128, 130 
Oxnard, 127 
Pacific Electric Building, 15, 60, 71 
Pacific Electric Railway, 6-7, 48, 50, 58, 
74, 150, 154, 184n59; expansion of, 64­
65, 71-72, 76, 77, 78-80, 101; impact 
on southern California, 9-11, 65, 82; in­
corporated, 6, 56-57, 181nl4; and labor 
relations, 139-41; net earnings, 66, 83, 
101, 104, 188n43; planned interurban 
routes, 57-58; and Southern Pacific, 69, 
72-76, 78, 95-96, 102-4, 116, 186n23 
Pacific Electric Railway of Arizona, 54­
55,57 
Pacific Improvement Company, 39, 56 
Pacific Light and Power Company, 7, 
39, 115, 140, 154-55; and Big Creek 
hydroelectric power facility, 109, 111-15, 
118, 126-27; expansion of, 62, 92-94, 
127-28; and Huntington Lodge, 128; 
incorporated, 7, 62; incorporates South­
ern California Gas, 110-11; and jitneys, 
122; and Kern River hydroelectric power 
INDEX 227 
facility, 62, 92-94; and merger with 
Southern California Edison, 128-33; 
and natural gas industry, 109—11; net 
earnings, 94, 111, 114, 128; receives 
funds from Huntington Land and Im­
provement, 100, 109, 113-14, 119; and 
Redondo Beach steam plant, 94, 111, 
114; reorganized as Pacific Light and 
Power Corporation, 112 
Pacific Lighting Corporation, 129 
Pacific Railroad Acts of 1862 and 1864, 
20,21 
Paducah, Ky., 23, 26 
Panic of 1873, 25 
Panic of 1893, 39 
Panic of 1907, 88, 109 
Paris, Ky., 26 
Park and Ocean Railroad, 35 
Parry, David, 137 
Pasadena, 9, 11, 12, 41, 57, 58, 59, 64, 
148, 153 
Pasadena and Los Angeles Electric Railway, 
50. See also Los Angeles and Pasadena 
Electric Railway 
Pasadena and Pacific Railway, 50 
Pasadena Art and Music Association, 
148, 149 
Pasadena Consolidated Gas Company, 129 
Pasadena Star News, 85 
Patton, George S., 95, 118, 149, 150, 
183n31; and Huntington Land and 
Improvement Company, 59 
PE. See Pacific Electric Railway 
People's Gas and Coke Company, 109 
Peterson, Neal, 9 
Phelan, James, 4, 60 
Philadelphia, 151 
Pico Heights, 50 
Playa del Rey, 87 
Pomona, 57, 58 
Portland, Oreg., 101, 144 
Potrero and Bay View Railroad, 34-35 
Prentice, Mary. See Huntington, Mary 
Promontory, Utah, 20 
Pullman Strike, 43-44, 136 
Ralston, William C, 4, 89 
Randolph, Epes, 42, 106, 118; and Long 
Beach line, 64-65; and Pacific Electric 
Railway, 55, 57, 64 
Redlands, 57, 76 
Redondo Beach, 9, 57, 85, 87, 89-91 
Redondo Beach steam plant, 94, 111, 114 
Redondo Improvement Company, 90, 126 
Reed, Haines, 108 
Richmond, Ky., 26 
Richmond, Va., 23, 25 
Riverside, 13, 41, 57, 58, 72, 76 
Riverside and Arlington Railway, 72, 77 
Riverside Light and Fuel Company, 110 
Riverside Power Company, 94 
Robinson, Henry M., 150-51 
Rockefeller Foundation, 147, 149 
Rodeo Land and Water Company, 150 
Rogers, Henry, 81 
Rollins, E. H., 114, 119 
Roosevelt, Theodore, 140 
Rosenbach, A. S. W., 133 
Sacramento, 20 
St. Albans, W.Va., 23 
St. Albans sawmill, 23-25 
St. Paul, 144 
San Bernardino, 11, 41, 57, 58, 76 
San Bernardino Gas and Electric Company, 
62, 110 
San Bernardino Valley Traction Com­
pany, 72 
San Diego, 8, 40, 70, 80-82 
San Diego and Arizona Railroad, 81-82 
San Dimas, 101 
San Fernando, 127 
San Fernando Mission Land Company, 
91-92, 127 
San Fernando Valley, 9, 76, 91-92 
San Francisco, 4-5, 29, 44, 48, 58, 60, 
89, 138, 140, 144, 145, 149, 155; street 
railways in, 30-40 
San Francisco Bulletin, 55 
San Francisco Chronicle, 177n2 
San Gabriel, 12, 56, 57, 64 
San Gabriel Electric Company, 61, 62 
San Gabriel Valley, 13, 41, 59, 65, 154-55 
San Gabriel Valley Rapid Transit Railroad, 
41,56,61,75 
San Gabriel Valley Water Company, 12, 
94-95, 126 
San Gabriel Wine Company, 59, 94 
Sanjoaquin and Eastern Railroad, 113 
228 INDEX 
San Joaquin Light and Power Com­

pany, 129

San Marino, 12, 15, 16, 59, 117, 148, 158

San Marino Growers' Packing Associa­

tion, 12

San Marino Ranch, 15, 44, 59, 70, 98, 134,

148, 150

San Pedro, 9, 57, 72, 74

San Pedro, Los Angeles and Salt Lake

Railroad, 73, 81

San Pedro Street Railway, 51

Santa Ana, 9, 11, 57, 76, 77, 78, 82, 101

Santa Ana and Orange Motor Railway, 77

Santa Ana Blade, 10

Santa Barbara, 58

Santa Fe Railroad. See Atchison, Topeka

and Santa Fe Railway

Santa Monica, 87

Santa Paula, 127

Sargent Affair, 29, 176n42

Sargent & Company, 22-23

Sartori, Joseph F., 91, 109

Searles, Edward T., 29

Seattle, 4, 109

Sherman, Moses H., 3, 7, 11, 17,51,87, 158

Shorb.J. de Barth, 3, 44, 59

Shorb ranch. See San Marino Ranch

Sierra Madre, 9, 57, 79

Simi Valley, 127

Slauson, Jonathan S., 3, 57

Smith, C. W., 54, 55

Smith, Francis Marion ("Borax"), 4-5,

58, 159

Smith, George, 133

Smith, Oscar A., 59

South Coast Land Company, 80, 81, 82

Southern California Edison, 118, 150,

153; purchases Pacific Light and Power,

128-33

Southern California Gas Company, 100,

110, 115, 155

Southern California Motor Road, 41

Southern Heights and Visitacion Railway,

34-35

Southern Pacific, 25, 29, 34, 73, 81, 152,

175n27; competition with Santa Fe

in southern California, 2, 40-41, 58;

incorporated, 28; purchases Henry

Huntington's northern California trolley

systems, 101; and streetcar interest in

southern California, 7-8, 69-70, 72­

76, 78-82, 85, 87, 95-96, 99, 100-101,

102-5, 116. See also Harriman, E. H.;

Huntington, Collis; Huntington, Henry

South Pasadena, 12, 57, 59

SP. See Southern Pacific

Speyer and Company, 45-46, 180nn56, 61

Spreckels, John D., 82

Staats, William, 88, 89

Stanford, Leland, 20, 28, 29; involvement

in streetcar industry, 31; and Market

Street Cable Railway, 32-33

Stanford University, 33

Starr, Kevin, 13

Stevens, Otheman, 152

Stockton, 72

Stone and Webster, 112, 113

Sunset Telephone and Telegraph Com­

pany, 140

Temple Street Cable Railway, 50, 57

Thompson, Robert R., 89-90

Titan, The, 155

Trimble, Tenn., 26

Union Pacific, 20,73,81

Union Trust Company, 66

United States Commission on Industrial

Relations, 144

United States Mortgage and Trust Com­

pany, 112

University Club, 15

University of Southern California, 14, 84

Vail and Freeman, 89

Van Nuys Hotel, 61,71 
Venice, Calif., 87

Ventura, 127

Ventura County Power Company, 127

Vernon, 50

Viehe, Fred W., 170n5 
Vining, E. P., 38, 43

Ward, George C, 94-95, 112, 115, 127

Warner's ranch, 80, 82

West Ninth Street Railway, 57

White, Lovell, 51

INDEX 229 
Whittier, 9, 57, 65, 71 Wilson, Woodrow, 145 
Wickham, William C, 21 Wood, Fred, 54, 55 
Willcutt, Joseph L., 31, 33, 34 World War I, 117, 121, 145 
William Salomon and Company, 112 
Wilson, Benjamin, 3 YMCA, 14 







labor's attempt to gain a foothold in the Los 
Angeles basin. 
William Friedricks's biography of Henry 
Huntington is an important contribution to 
the fields of business and urban history, 
as well as to the history of California, and 
provides insight into the development of one 
of the nation's most important metropoli­
tan areas. 
William B. Friedricks is Assistant Professor 
of History at Simpson College and the author 
of several articles on the development of 
southern California. 
jackal design: Bruce Gore 
lacket illustration: Northbound Los Angeles Railway car on Spring 
Street, Los Angeles, c. 1901. Magna Collection, courtesy of Richard J. 
Fellows 
Also in the 
Historical Perspectives on Business Enterprise Series 
Eagle-Picher Industries 
Strategies for Survival in the Industrial Marketplace, 1840-1980 
Douglas Knerr 
This comprehensive history traces the evolution of Cincinnati-based 
Eagle-Picher Industries from its beginning as a closely held regional 
producer of white lead and other paint pigments to a diversified 
industrial manufacturer. 
Daniel Willard and Progressive Management on the 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad 
David M. Vrooman 
This ground-breaking study examines the personnel policies of Daniel 
Willard, one of the most progressive American business leaders of 
the first half of this century. 
Rebuilding Cleveland 
The Cleveland Foundation and Its Evolving Urban Strategy 
Diana Tittle 
Rebuilding Cleveland explores how The Cleveland Foundation, the 
country's oldest community trust, has helped shape public affairs in 
the city from its establishment in 1914 to the present. 
Making Iron and Steel 
Independent Mills in Pittsburgh, 1820-1920 
John N. Ingham 
This in-depth examination of small and mid-sized Pittsburgh steel 
mills during the Carnegie era challenges business historians' tradi­
tional view that nineteenth-century industrial development followed a 
linear pattern, from a handicraft stage to large-scale mass production. 
Oh io State Universi ty Press ISBNO-8142-0553-4 
Columbus 
